DeMeyer v. Maxwell

• Decision Date: 29 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13490,13490
• Citation: 647 P.2d 783,103 Idaho 327
• Parties: Emil J. DeMEYER, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. Anna Bernese MAXWELL and Viki A. Nakroshis, Defendants, Anna Bernese Maxwell, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 783

647 P.2d 783

103 Idaho 327

Emil J. DeMEYER, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. Anna Bernese MAXWELL and Viki A. Nakroshis, Defendants, Anna Bernese Maxwell, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent.

No. 13490.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 29, 1982.

William A. McCurdy, Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant; Nicholas J. Dibert, Boise, of the firm, on briefs.

Daniel T. Eismann, Homedale, for defendant-appellant and cross-respondent.

THIS OPINION SUPERSEDES THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION ISSUED APRIL 6, 1982, WHICH IS WITHDRAWN.

SWANSTROM, Judge.

Emil J. DeMeyer's wife was a passenger in a car driven by her sister, Anna Bernese Maxwell, the defendant. The two were returning to their homes in Idaho from Seattle, Washington, when their car left the roadway in Oregon, struck two fog markers, crossed the roadway and flipped onto its top, coming to rest in the median separating the eastbound and westbound lanes. DeMeyer's wife was killed in the accident. He brought suit against the sister, claiming his wife's death was the result of the defendant sister's negligence. Defendant claimed that plaintiff's wife was contributorily negligent. Trial before a jury was held. The jury found that both defendant and plaintiff's wife were negligent; that the negligence of both was the proximate cause of the accident; that 50% of the negligence causing the accident was attributable to each; and that plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $3,008.72 for losses due to funeral expenses. The jury also specifically found that plaintiff suffered no damages for either loss of services and support or loss of society, companionship, and protection.

Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment n. o. v. on the issue of liability and for a new trial on damages, or in the alternative for a new trial on issues of both liability and damages. The trial court denied the motion for judgment n. o. v. and for a new trial on damages only. However, the court granted the motion for a new trial on all issues because, in his view, the circumstances indicated that the jury's verdict was given under the influence of passion and prejudice. He further found that this passion and prejudice made the jury's findings as to negligence and damages suspect. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The issues on appeal and cross-appeal are whether the trial court erred: (1) in denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, (2) in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of liability, (3) in granting plaintiff a new trial, and (4) in refusing to grant plaintiff's motion in limine, seeking to prevent the jury from learning of the sibling relationship between defendant and plaintiff's wife? In addition, we are called upon by both parties to award attorney fees on appeal.

I.

Defendant contends that her motion for judgment on the pleadings was wrongly denied. The basis for her motion was that Oregon's then existing "guest statute" was controlling and should have been applied to preclude suit against a driver by a passenger or heirs of a passenger. Defendant urges this court to apply the "most significant relationship" test to determine which state's law is applicable in a tort action. The traditional test in determining applicable law in tort cases has been that the law of the place of the tort "governs all matters going to the basis of the right of action or affecting the substantive rights of the parties." 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict Of Laws, § 99 (1979). However, courts in a number of states recently have rejected this test in favor of any of several modern rules, which analyze a number of objective factors before determining the applicable law. Id. at § 98.

In Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968), our Supreme Court adopted the "most significant relationship" test for determining the applicable law in contract dispute cases. 92 Idaho at 722-23, 449 P.2d at 382-83. The merit of the "most significant relationship" approach "is that it gives the place having the greatest interest in the problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thereby allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation." 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws, § 103 (1979). We adopt the "most significant relationship" test in Idaho for the determination of which state's law is applicable in a tort action.

Defendant is urging application of the "most significant relationship" test in the belief that the Oregon "guest statute," Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.115 (1961), would be a bar to any recovery by plaintiff. However, application of the "most significant relationship" test does not require use of Oregon law in this case. For guidance in applying the "most significant relationship" test, the court in Rungee looked to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 6 (proposed official draft 1968). Likewise, we look to this same authority. Section 6 of the, now adopted, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws provides, in part, as follows:

"Choice of Law Principles.

(2) When there is no (statutory) directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include:

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied."

Applying these factors to the case before us, we hold the trial court correctly applied Idaho law. We note that only those contacts with Oregon and Idaho which are significant for purposes of the application of a guest statute are weighed in this analysis. Rungee, 92 Idaho at 723, 449 P.2d at 383. Our analysis is as follows:

(a) We do not see the trial court's decision as adversely affecting, in any way, the needs of the interstate or international systems.

(b) Idaho's relevant policies clearly are served better by application of Idaho law. In Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974), Idaho's version of the guest statute (I.C. § 49-1401) was held violative of the equal protection clauses of both the Idaho and the United States constitutions. 96 Idaho at 23, 523 P.2d at 1369. The legislature has neither re-enacted I.C. § 49-1401 nor attempted to correct its constitutional defects. The Supreme Court's actions and the legislature's lack of action indicate that Idaho's relevant policies are opposed to the application of a guest statute in cases heard in Idaho.

(c) In considering relevant policies of other states, we note that Oregon's guest statute, as it existed when this accident occurred, had withstood attacks on its constitutionality. Duerst v. Limbocker, 269 Or. 252, 525 P.2d 99 (1974). However, we also note that in 1979 Oregon amended its laws to eliminate motor vehicles (but not aircraft or watercraft) from its guest statute. Therefore, in our view, Oregon no longer has a policy reason to prefer that its law be applied to the present case.

(d) Defendant points to no evidence, and we find none, indicating she or the decedent had any expectation the Oregon guest statute would be applicable. Considering that they both lived in Idaho, where this trip originated, and that only through fortuitous circumstances were they passing through Oregon at the time of the accident, we cannot infer that either of them had any expectation that the Oregon guest statute would apply.

(e) The basic policy of negligence law is to allow a person to recover from injury proximately caused by another's violation of a duty of reasonable care. Our Supreme Court in Thompson reaffirmed this policy. Thus, the trial court's refusal to apply Oregon's guest statute protected Idaho's interest in applying its policy.

(f)-(g) Although a decision by this court to apply the law of the state where the accident occurred might increase certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and make easier the determination of the applicable law, we find that the consideration of the above factors outweigh these latter considerations.

In addition to the general rule set out in § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 145 says:

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) The place where the injury occurred,

(b) The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contracts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

Considering these factors we conclude that, as concerns the application of a guest statute, the fact all parties to this suit are domiciled in Idaho and the relationship between them is centered in Idaho outweighs the fact the injury and conduct leading to the injury occurred in Oregon. We affirm the trial court's application of Idaho law to the facts in this case. It follows that the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

II.

On cross-appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of liability. He argues there is no evidence in the record to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff's wife was contributorily negligent. We agree. We also find substantial evidence to support the jury's...