Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish

Decision Date29 September 2017
Docket NumberNo. 1:16-cv-11576,1:16-cv-11576
PartiesSANDOR DEMKOVICH, Plaintiff, v. ST. ANDREW THE APOSTLE PARISH, CALUMET CITY and, THE ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Sandor Demkovich filed this suit against St. Andrew the Apostle Parish in Calumet City, Illinois, and the Archdiocese of Chicago. He alleges employment discrimination based on: (1) sex, sexual orientation, and marital status under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2-101 et seq.; and the Cook County Human Rights Ordinance, Cook County, Ill., Code of Ordinances § 42-30 et seq., and (2) disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 755 ILCS 5/1-102 et seq.1 R. 1, Compl. ¶ 1.2 In particular, Demkovich claims that Reverend Jacek Dada, pastor of St. Andrew parish, fired Demkovich because heentered into a same-sex marriage and because of his disabilities (diabetes and a metabolic syndrome). Id. ¶¶ 25, 29, 75, 77.

The Archdiocese (as this Opinion will collectively refer to the two Defendants) now moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 4, Defs'. Mot. Dismiss. The Archdiocese argues that the First Amendment's "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination claims bars all counts of Demkovich's complaint. For the reasons discussed below, the Archdiocese's motion is granted.

I. Background

For the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Archdiocese of Chicago and St. Andrew Parish in Calumet City, Illinois, hired Demkovich in September 2012. Compl. ¶ 8. Demkovich served as "Music Director, Choir Director and Organist." Id. ¶ 9. In those positions, Demkovich "selected music played during masses at St. Andrew," id. ¶ 10, but he did not plan the liturgy and his music choices were "subject to the approval" of Reverend Jacek Dada, who is St. Andrew's pastor, id. ¶¶ 9, 10, 12.

Reverend Dada knew that Demkovich was gay and that he was engaged to another man. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 31. Demkovich married his partner in September 2014. Id. ¶ 19. In the forty-eight hours before the wedding, a St. Andrew employee told Demkovich that Reverend Dada intended to ask for Demkovich's resignationbecause of the marriage. Id. ¶ 17. Another employee told Demkovich that Reverend Dada had informed his staff that he had already fired Demkovich. Id. ¶ 18.

Four days after the wedding, Demkovich met Reverend Dada in the pastor's office, where Dada asked Demkovich to resign because of his marriage. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24. When Demkovich refused to resign, Dada fired him and said, "Your union is against the teachings of the Catholic church." Id. ¶ 25. Demkovich also alleges that, during his employment, Dada made remarks to him that reflected animus based on Demkovich's sex and sexual orientation. Id. ¶ 30. Demkovich also asserts, however, that Dada told Demkovich that he should marry his partner and that he (that is, Dada) would like to attend their wedding. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.

With regard to the disability-discrimination claim, Demkovich alleges that his disabilities—diabetes and a metabolic syndrome—were a contributing factor in his firing. Compl. ¶ 77. He says Dada repeatedly urged him to lose weight and complained about the cost of keeping Demkovich on the parish's health and dental insurance. Id. ¶¶ 35-38.

Demkovich brought suit for sex, sexual orientation, marital status, and disability discrimination under the statutes mentioned earlier in the Opinion. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 50, 62, 74, 86. He seeks reinstatement, back pay, front pay, fringe benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. The Archdiocese now moves to dismiss, invoking the ministerial exception. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss.

II. Legal Standard

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations—as opposed to mere legal conclusions—are entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

The ministerial exception is actually an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar or a reason for dismissing a claim for failure to state a claim. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195n.4 (2012). So it is conceivable that, sometimes, factual development is necessary before deciding the applicability of the ministerial exception. But as discussed next, on the face of the complaint as currently pled, and in light of governing case law, the ministerial exception applies.

III. Analysis

The ministerial exception bars claims of employment discrimination advanced by "ministers" against their religious-institution employers. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, 190 (applying ministerial exception to employment discrimination claim); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying ministerial exception to age discrimination claim). The purpose of the exception is to "ensure[] that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical' ... is the church's alone." Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). The exception is, therefore, expressly grounded in the First Amendment's religion clauses. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181.

The exception's applicability depends on whether the plaintiff-employee was a "minister." Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190; see also Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a diocese's Communications Manager qualified as a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception). For purposes of the exception, a minister can be someone other than "the head of a religious congregation." Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. In fact, there isno "rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister." Id. Rather, to determine whether a plaintiff qualifies as a minister, courts must engage in "factual and case-specific" analysis, Collette v. Archdiocese of Chi., 200 F. Supp. 3d 730, 733 (N.D. Ill. 2016), considering things like the plaintiff's job duties and whether he or she "reflected a role in conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission," "the formal title" the plaintiff held in the religious organization, "the substance reflected in that title," whether the plaintiff held herself or himself out as a minister, and whether the plaintiff performed "important religious functions." Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.

The Archdiocese contends that the ministerial exception bars Demkovich's claims because he performed a ministerial function in his employment. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 1. Specifically, the Archdiocese argues that—as "Music Director, Choir Director and Organist," Compl. ¶ 9—Demkovich performed the ministerial function of selecting, directing, and playing the music at Catholic masses, Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 3-4. They point to the similarity between Demkovich's work—"select[ing] music played during masses," Compl. ¶ 10—and the work of other music directors held to be ministers in other cases. See Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1040-41 (music director and organist was minister); Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (music director was minister); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 802-805 (4th Cir. 2000) (director of music ministry was minister); Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 2017 WL 1550186, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2017) (music director was minister).

Demkovich disputes the Archdiocese's characterization of his work, arguing that Reverend Dada made the final decision on musical selection and that Demkovich never planned the liturgy. Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 2. To argue for his lay—as opposed to ministerial—status, Demkovich says he was only a part-time employee and that the pastor encouraged him to marry another man (something Dada ostensibly would not have done if he considered Demkovich a "minister" of the church, at least so Demkovich argues). Id. Demkovich contends that the Archdiocese places too much value on the job titles and too little on the substance of his job. Id. at 5. Demkovich also brings up a media interview in which the Archbishop of Chicago seemed to suggest that almost all church employees are ministers, thereby "completely dilut[ing]" the term. Id. at 8.

Based on the current complaint and the governing case law, the Court holds that Demkovich was a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception. To be sure,...

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