Democratic Party v. NAT. CONSERVATIVE PA COMMITTEE

• Decision Date: 12 December 1983
• Docket Number: 83-2823.,Civ. A. No. 83-2329
• Citation: 578 F. Supp. 797
• Parties: DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, and Edward Mezvinsky, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, et al., Defendants, and Federal Election Commission, Intervenor. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

578 F. Supp. 797

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, and Edward Mezvinsky, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, et al., Defendants, and Federal Election Commission, Intervenor.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 83-2329, 83-2823.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

December 12, 1983.

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Steven B. Feirson (argued), John M. Coleman, Lisa M. Scottoline, Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., for Democratic Party of the U.S.; Anthony S. Harrington, Gen. Counsel, Democratic Nat. Committee, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

A. Richard Gerber, Gerber, Gerber & Shields, Norristown, Pa., for Mezvinsky.

Robert R. Sparks, Jr. (argued), Sedam & Herge, McLean, Va., Harry C.J. Himes, Himes, Sanders, Bunting & Nolan, Philadelphia, Pa., for NCPAC and FCM.

Lawrence M. Noble (argued), Charles N. Steele, Richard B. Bader, Jeffrey H. Bowman, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C., for FEC.

Roger M. Witten (argued), William T. Lake, Deborah M. Levy, Jana B. Singer, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C., Robert F. Stewart, Jr. Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, Philadelphia, Pa., for amicus Common Cause; Ellen G. Block, Common Cause, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Harold N. Iselin (argued), Philip A. LaCovara, Ronald A. Stern, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, Washington, D.C., Thomas B. Harvey, Jr., American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Philadelphia Branch, Philadelphia, Pa., for amicus American Civ. Liberties Union; Charles S. Sims, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City, Arthur B. Spitzer, American Civil Liberties Union, Fund of the National Capitol Area, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Before BECKER, Circuit Judge,^* and GREEN and GILES, District Judges.

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
                  I. Preliminary Statement                                801
                 II. Procedural History                                   802
                III. Justiciability                                       803
                     A. Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction             803
                        1. The Contentions                                803
                        2. Discussion                                     805
                           (a) The Evolution of 9011(b) and 437c(b)(1)    805
                           (b) The Legitimacy of Maximum Enforcement      806
                     B. Constitutional Subject Matter Jurisdiction
                        Standing and Ripeness                             807
                        1. Standing                                       808
                           (a) The Contentions                            808
                           (b) Discussion                                 809
                        2. Ripeness                                       811
                           (a) The Contentions                            811
                           (b) Discussion                                 812
                

                IV. The Merits                                             814
                    A. Introduction                                        814
                    B. The Statutory Scheme: Section 9012(f)'s Role in
                       the Fund Act, and FECA                              815
                    C. The Constitutional Protection Afforded the
                       Conduct Barred by Section 9012(f)                   816
                       1. Analyzing Buckley v. Valeo                       816
                          (a) Expenditures are Speech                      817
                          (b) Contributions are only Proxy Speech          817
                          (c) Associational Freedoms                       817
                          (d) The Centrality of Corruption                 817
                          (e) Examining Corruption                         818
                       2. Does Section 9012(f) Bar Speech Fully Protected
                          by the First Amendment?                          818
                          (a) The Contentions                              818
                          (b) PACs Amplify Individual Speech               819
                          (c) Justifying 9012(f) as a Regulation on
                              Corporate Speech                             820
                       3. Does Section 9012(f) Prevent Corruption or
                          its Appearance?                                  822
                          (a) Scope of Review                              822
                              (i)   The Impact of NRWC                     822
                              (ii)  The Buckley Findings                   823
                          (b) Plaintiff's Evidence                         823
                              (i)   The Polls                              824
                              (ii)  Patronage Appointments                 827
                              (iii) Briefings                              828
                              (iv)  The Benefits From Independent
                                    Expenditures                           829
                          (c) Adjudicative v. Legislative Facts            830
                              (i)   Potential for a Quo                    830
                              (ii)  Potential for a Quid                   831
                          (d) "Corruption to the Statute"                  831
                       4. Possible Narrowing Constructions of Section
                          9012(f)                                          835
                          (a) Control                                      835
                          (b) Advisory Opinions                            836
                    D. The Overbreadth Analysis                            837
                V. Conclusion                                              839
                

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Section 9012(f) of Title 26 of the United States Code makes it a crime for a "political committee" to expend more than $1,000 to further the election of nominated presidential or vice presidential candidates who are financing their campaigns with public funds.¹ These consolidated declaratory judgment actions require us to decide whether this provision violates the first amendment guarantees of free speech and association, as recognized and interpreted by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), and its progeny. Briefly put, Buckley held that, while contributions to political candidates were only "proxy speech" subject to moderate constitutional protection, expenditures made on behalf of such candidates were speech fully protected by the first amendment and might be silenced only if they posed a threat of corruption or its appearance.

This is not the first time actions such as these have been brought. In Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F.Supp. 489 (D.D.C.1980), the District Court for the District of Columbia held section 9012(f) to be unconstitutional on its face. That decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court without opinion. 455 U.S. 129, 102 S.Ct. 1266, 71 L.Ed.2d 20 (1982). Because such affirmances have no precedential authority whatsoever, see Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), the issue is fairly before us. Although we are not in precise accord with the entire reasoning of our District of Columbia colleagues, we echo their ultimate conclusion: section 9012(f) is unconstitutional.

The procedural posture of these suits presents an inversion of the conventional declaratory judgment action in constitutional cases. Usually the plaintiff, needing to overcome the presumption that congressional enactments are constitutional, seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality. The plaintiffs in both of these actions, the Democratic National Committee and Edward Mezvinsky (plaintiffs in No. 83-2329) and the Federal Election Commission (plaintiff in No. 83-2823) seek a declaration that section 9012(f) is constitutional. This procedural anomaly, coupled with the apparent dormancy of section 9012(f) until the summer of 1984, when the major parties will select their presidential and vice presidential candidates, impels us to consider sua sponte whether the cases are now justiciable within Article III of the Constitution. The action brought by the Democrats and Mr. Mezvinsky, the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic Committee and a voter, also presents another significant procedural problem—whether the group of statutes of which section 9012(f) is a part permits private parties to enforce its prohibitions, or whether it reserves that right exclusively to the Federal Election Commission.

Our methodology in this opinion is as follows. After briefly recounting in Part II the procedural developments in the cases, we address the issue of justiciability, including standing and ripeness, in Part III. We first conclude that 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b) permits private parties such as the Democratic National Committee to bring this declaratory judgment action before this three-judge district court. We so conclude, notwithstanding other statutes that might appear to restrict enforcement powers to the Federal Election Commission. Having found statutory standing, we then turn to the constitutionality of section 9011(b) as applied in this case. We conclude that, based on the unique circumstances of this case, section 9011(b)'s authorization of these actions does not violate the restriction of Article III on federal court jurisdiction to "cases and controversies." We further conclude in Part III that the suits brought by the Democrats and the FEC are ripe for adjudication.

Having found both suits justiciable, we then analyze in Part IV the facial constitutionality of section 9012(f), proceeding along traditional overbreadth lines as set forth in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). From an examination of the Fund Act, of which section 9012(f) is a part, and of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), a closely related statute, we first determine the type of conduct and speech that section 9012(f) is intended to prohibit. Basing our analysis on an exposition of Buckley v. Valeo and a discussion of how subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court may have modified the holdings of that case, we then determine what speech and conduct relating to presidential campaigns Congress may not legitimately prohibit. Because Buckley and its progeny...