DeMolick v. United States
| Decision Date | 24 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-01454 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | CASSANDRA ROSE DEMOLICK and KEITH KUROS, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant |
Before the Court is the United States of America's ("Defendant" or "Government")'s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Cassandra Rose DeMolick and Keith Kuros ("Plaintiffs")' complaint against it for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Government's motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the basis that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted and will dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend.
Plaintiffs allege that on the morning of February 5, 2018, while visiting Gettysburg National Military Park ("Gettysburg"), Plaintiff DeMolick ("Plaintiff or "DeMolick") slipped and fell on a patch of uncleared ice and snow on the walkway between a rest facility and a parking lot. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 22-23.) There had been snowfall the previous night. (Id. ¶ 20.) According to Plaintiffs, there were no warnings posted about the possible presence of snow and ice outside the restroom nor had the ice been treated with a melting agent. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 25.) As a result of DeMolick's fall, Plaintiffs claim that she sustained serious physical injuries which required surgery and resulted in extensive post-surgical complications. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.)
On August 23, 2021, Plaintiffs initiated the above-captioned case against the Government by filing a complaint with this Court, asserting two counts of negligence under Pennsylvania law pursuant to the FTCA. (Doc. No. 1.) In addition to DeMolick's negligence claim, Plaintiffs assert a derivative claim on behalf of Plaintiff Keith Kuros ("Kuros"), DeMolick's husband, alleging that he suffered damages related to loss of consortium with his wife due to her injury. (Id. ¶ 42.) Prior to filing their complaint, Plaintiffs exhausted their claims with the appropriate government agency. (Id. ¶¶ 7-10.)
On November 5, 2021, the Government filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. No. 8.) The Government's motion was accompanied by a brief in support (Doc. No. 9), two declarations from Gettysburg facilities workers about the park's operating and snow-removal procedures (Doc. Nos 9-1, 9-2), medical records from DeMolick's injury (Doc. No. 9-3 at 1-9), and pictures of the condition of the paved area where DeMolick fell on the day of the accident (id. at 10-15). The Government provided the following relevant information in its submission to the Court: The park and the rest facility are open to the public free of charge (Doc. No. 9 at 8-9); the restroom is located in an otherwise undeveloped area of the park, which itself covers thousands of acres of land (Doc. No. 9-1 ¶¶ 4, 10, 13); and while there had been snow the previous evening, the weather was clear on the morning of February 5, 2018 (Doc. No. 9 at 10). In response to Defendant's motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. No. 13.) On December 27, 2021, Defendant filed its reply brief to Plaintiffs' brief in opposition. (Doc. No. 14.) Accordingly, this matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) As an initial matter, the Court addresses the appropriate standard of review by which to assess a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). If a defendant's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction depends on a facial attack of the pleadings, the court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true, as it would with regard to a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mortensen v. First Fed. Savs. and Loan Ass'n. 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). However, a motion that presents evidence challenging any of the factual allegations put forth by the plaintiff in the complaint is considered a factual challenge to jurisdiction. See Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States. 220 F.3d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2000). In such circumstances, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion that jurisdiction exists, and the court is free to weigh evidence presented by each party outside of the pleadings. Id.
Here, the Government attacks the factual sufficiency of the complaint in establishing jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 9 at 4-5.) That is, the Government argues that the circumstances of DeMolick's injuries exclude her claims from coverage under the FTCA and are therefore barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Doc. No. 9 at 5-7.) The Government has submitted several declarations in support of its argument. (Doc. Nos. 9-1, 9-2.) Likewise, Plaintiffs dispute the facts contained in the Government's declarations and seek additional discovery as to the maintenance and building specifications of the restroom DeMolick was exiting at the time of her fall. (Doc. No. 13 at 3-4.) The filings of both parties indicate that the dispute over subject matter jurisdiction in this case is primarily a factual one. Therefore, the Court's role as to the Government's motion to dismiss is to weigh the evidence to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, giving no presumption of veracity to Plaintiffs' pleadings. See Mortensen. 549 F.2d at 891.
Individuals are typically barred from suing the federal government by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which can only be waived by act of Congress. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Where the United States has not consented to be sued, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain suits against it. See id In enacting the FTCA, Congress waived the federal government's immunity from tort suits brought by private parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. However, the FTCA only applies where a suit could be properly brought under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA does not create new causes of action against the federal government, nor does it alter the scope of state tort law. See id.
In determining whether Plaintiffs' tort claims against the Government are cognizable under the FTCA, the Court must address the contours of landowner liability under state law. See id; In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344, 362 (3d Cir. 2001) () (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the Court must address the Government's primary argument against liability: that the area of Gettysburg where DeMolick sustained her injuries falls under the exclusion to landowner tort liability contained in Pennsylvania's Recreational Use of Land and Water Act ("RULWA"), 68 P.S. §§ 477-1-9. (Doc. No. 9 at 5-7.) For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that: (1) RULWA applies to the walkway and parking lot where Plaintiff was injured; and (2) Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the Government willfully or maliciously failed to warn of or guard against dangerous conditions on the Gettysburg property. Therefore, the Government is shielded from liability under RULWA, making the FTCA inapplicable and rendering the Court unable to consider Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Pennsylvania's RULWA limits the tort liability of landowners who open their land to the public for recreational purposes at no cost. See 68 P.S. §§ 477-1, 477-4. This Court, as well as other district courts within the Third Circuit, have previously held that RULWA applies to federally owned property, including Gettysburg. See Lingua v. United States, 801 F.Supp.2d 320, 330 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (collecting cases that find RULWA applicable to the United States); DePatch v. United States. No. 95-cv-6698, 1996 WL 355355, at *1, *3-4 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 1996) ().
While RULWA has been found to apply to parts of Gettysburg, the definition of "land" under RULWA is limited, and not all structures or facilities within a given parcel of property are necessarily covered. See 68 P.S. §477-2(1). To determine whether RULWA applies to Plaintiffs' claims, the Court must focus on the specific area within Gettysburg where DeMolick's injury occurred, rather than the park as a whole. See Bashioum v. Cnty. of Westmoreland, 747 A.2d 441, 446 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) ( that the court below erred in focusing its RULWA analysis on an entire tract of land, rather than the "specific area which caused the injury"). Therefore, the Court analyzes only whether the sidewalk on which Plaintiff slipped falls within the definition of "land" under RULWA. The Court does not consider, as Plaintiffs urge it to, whether the rest facilities Plaintiff had recently exited at the time of her fall are considered "land" under RULWA. (Doc. No. 13 at 13-14.) The sidewalk and parking area are the only structures relevant to Plaintiffs' injuries. See Bashioum, 747 A.2d at 446.
Plaintiffs' primary argument is that RULWA does not apply to the rest area where DeMolick fell because it is a "developed non-recreational improvement to the land that requires regular maintenance to be safely used and enjoyed." (Doc. No. 13 at 10.) This argument fails for two reasons: The first is that RULWA was amended in 2018, expanding the statute's definition...
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