DeMoranville v. Specialty Retailers, Inc., 14-94-00624-CV

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Writing for the Court: DRAUGHN
• Citation: 909 S.W.2d 90
• Parties: Lorraine DeMORANVILLE, Appellant, v. SPECIALTY RETAILERS, INC., Three Beall Brothers 3, Inc., Palais Royal, Inc. and Susan Bee, Appellees. (14th Dist.)
• Docket Number: No. 14-94-00624-CV,14-94-00624-CV
• Decision Date: 17 August 1995

Page 90

909 S.W.2d 90 Lorraine DeMORANVILLE, Appellant,
v.
SPECIALTY RETAILERS, INC., Three Beall Brothers 3, Inc.,
Palais Royal, Inc. and Susan Bee, Appellees. No. 14-94-00624-CV. Court of Appeals of Texas,
Houston (14th Dist.). Aug. 17, 1995.
Rehearing Overruled Oct. 12, 1995.

Page 91

Robert E. Newey, Houston, for appellant.

Glenn W. Patterson, Houston, for appellees.

Before YATES, FOWLER and DRAUGHN, ^* JJ.

OPINION

DRAUGHN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of appellees in an age discrimination case. Appellant brought suit alleging six causes of action against appellees for creating a hostile work environment. The trial court granted summary judgment on all causes of action. In four points of error, appellant only appeals the court's ruling on the age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on all intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against all appellees and the age discrimination claims against appellee, Susan Bee. We reverse the trial court's summary judgment on appellant's age discrimination claims against appellees, Speciality Retailers (SRI), Inc., Three Beall Brothers 3, Inc. (Bealls), and Palais Royal, Inc., and remand those claims to the trial court.

Appellant, Lorraine DeMoranville, began working as a buyer for appellee, Palais Royal, in November 1972. She was promoted to Vice President-Divisional Merchandise Manager of Misses Sportswear in September 1980. On December 29, 1988, appellee, Specialty Retailers, Inc. (SRI) purchased Bealls and Palais Royal. In May 1990, SRI merged Palais Royal with Bealls and eliminated some positions. At this time, appellant accepted a demotion to the position of buyer of Activewear-Knit Tops and Main Floor Separates. Appellee, Susan Bee, formerly with Bealls, was named appellant's supervisor. On October

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25, 1990, appellant changed positions to buyer of Career Separates, but continued to work under Bee.

Appellant contends her supervisor, Bee, discriminated against her beginning on May 24, 1990. Appellant alleges that Bee "began to criticize and continually complain about [appellant's] work, created a hostile work environment and caused constant stress and strain on [appellant], [by] demeaning her and discriminating against [her] in favor of younger workers." She claims appellees limited her chances for advancement, limited her pay, and applied different standards to her because of her age. Appellee claims that because of this conduct she was "constructively fired." As evidence of this discrimination, appellant contends that Bee was late for meetings or refused to meet with appellant, required appellant to work "after hours," changed the requirements for certain projects in midstream, told appellant that she needed to be "more fashion forward," and yelled at her.

Because of work related stress, appellant's psychologist, Dr. Francisco Perez, recommended she leave work temporarily on April 4, 1991. When her stress level did not decrease, appellant applied for short term disability on April 22, 1991. On May 10, 1991, John C. Chipperfield, Senior Vice President of Human Resources for SRI, allegedly told appellant she was being replaced as buyer and offered her another position in the company. Chipperfield also told appellant that she would be terminated if her leave lasted more than a year.

Appellant did not return to work on April 1, 1992. Therefore, she was automatically terminated after a one year medical leave of absence. She was fired on May 1, 1992. At this time, appellant was 59 years old. On June 2, 1992, she filed a complaint for age discrimination with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On the application, she alleged April 1, 1992, as the date of discrimination.

In her original petition, appellant alleged causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Violation of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress; (4) Invasion of Privacy; (5) Prima Facie Tort; and (6) Age Discrimination. Appellees moved for summary judgment on all six causes of action. The trial court granted summary judgment on March 1, 1994, on all causes of action except age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On March 3, 1994, the trial court granted final summary judgment on all causes of action.

In her first two points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that she failed to timely file her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Texas Commission on Human Rights. Under Texas law, a complaint must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Texas Commission on Human Rights within 180 days of the alleged violation after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01 (Vernon 1987). The time limit for filing a complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights is mandatory and jurisdictional. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Tex.1991). Although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, "ADEA," 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 has extended the time for filing to 300 days, the Texas time period is not affected. Pope v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 264 (5th Cir.1991). Thus, we must determine whether the trial court correctly held that appellant's filing on June 2, 1992 occurred more than...