DeMott v. Congdon

• Decision Date: 03 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 23395.,23395.
• Citation: 370 F.2d 909
• Parties: R. H. DeMOTT, Appellant, v. A. C. CONGDON, Trustee in Bankruptcy, for First Mortgage Corporation of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

370 F.2d 909 (1967)

R. H. DeMOTT, Appellant, v. A. C. CONGDON, Trustee in Bankruptcy, for First Mortgage Corporation of Florida, Appellee.

No. 23395.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

January 3, 1967.

Paul Ritter, Winter Haven, Fla., for appellant.

Don M. Stichter, Tampa, Fla., for appellee.

Before JONES, WISDOM and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

JONES, Circuit Judge:

A chattel mortgage was given by First Mortgage Corporation of Florida to the appellant, R. H. DeMott, covering "All the office equipment, furniture, fixtures and other personal property located in the building at 509 South Florida Avenue, Lakeland, Florida." The mortgagor became bankrupt and the Trustee in Bankruptcy petitioned for an order to sell the office furniture, fixtures and equipment located on the premises of the bankrupt. The Trustee asserted and the Referee held that the mortgage was invalid as to the Trustee because of the insufficiency of the description of the encumbered property. The district court upheld the ruling of the Referee. The mortgagee has appealed. The decision as to the sufficiency of the description depends upon the Florida law.

In an early decision the Supreme Court of Florida, quoting from Cyc., stated the rule as to the sufficiency of general descriptions in chattel mortgages in this language:

"As against third persons the mortgage must point out the subject-matter, so that the third person may identify the property covered by the aid of such inquiries as the instrument itself suggests; * * *" Davis v. Horne, 54 Fla. 563, 45 So. 476, 127 Am.St.Rep. 151.

The principle was again stated by the Supreme Court of Florida in these terms:

"Courts recognize well-established, but no inflexible, rules for determining the sufficiency of the description in a chattel mortgage, and such rules are less rigid than those applied to conveyances of real estate. As between the parties, it may be generally said that a description of the property mortgaged is sufficient, if it so identifies the chattels that the mortgagee may say, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what property is subject to his lien. As against third persons, the description in the mortgage must point out its subject-matter so that such persons may identify the chattels covered by it; but it is not essential that the description be so specific that the property may be identified alone. If such description suggests inquiries or means of identification which, if pursued, will disclose the property conveyed, it is sufficient. * * *

"An inspection of the pertinent parts of the description in the mortgages quoted in this opinion discloses that as to certain items they appear to cover separate and distinct chattels, but as to other items we think the terms of appellant\'s mortgage were ample to suggest inquiries which, if pursued, would have disclosed to appellee, a third party, the identity of the property covered thereby." First National Bank of Panama City v. First National Bank of Chipley, 90 Fla. 617, 106 So. 422.

Citing and following the First National Bank of Panama City v. First National Bank case, the Supreme Court of Florida sustained the sufficiency of the description in a lien...