Dempsey-Lowden v. Levittown-Fairless Hills Rescue Squad, Inc., CIVIL ACTION No. 16-6112
| Decision Date | 11 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 16-6112 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | JANET DEMPSEY-LOWDEN, Plaintiff, v. LEVITTOWN-FAIRLESS HILLS RESCUE SQUAD, INCORPORATED, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Janet Dempsey-Lowden ("Dempsey-Lowden") filed suit in this Court against Defendant Levittown-Fairless Hills Rescue Squad, Incorporated, alleging her employment was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951-963. Dempsey-Lowden's "First Amended Civil Action Complaint" ("Amended Complaint") alleges identical violations of the ADA and the PHRA under the theories of (1) discrimination, (2) retaliation, and (3) failure to accommodate.
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which seeks dismissal of this action based on the merits and timeliness of the Complaint. Dempsey-Lowden has filed a Response in Opposition, and Defendant has filed a Reply Brief. For the reasons noted below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Dempsey-Lowden began working for Defendant in 2000 as an unpaid volunteer and became a paid employee in 2010 as a paramedic. (Pl.'s Statement of Material and Disputed Facts1 ("SMDF") ¶ 1.) At the time of her termination in January 2016, she was working approximately forty-eight hours per week. (Id. ¶ 5.) Her supervisors were Joel Rutkowski ("Rutkowski"), the Chief of Operations, and Ben Calhoun ("Calhoun"), the Deputy Chief of Operations. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Paramedics with Defendant are required to prepare "patient care reports" for each ambulance run. (Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts2 ("SUMF") ¶ 2.) Defendant's "Procedurals Manual" requires patient care reports to be completed by the end of a shift or, if that is not possible, within twenty-four hours of the completion of the call. (Id.) Paramedics were permitted to work past the end of their scheduled shift and were paid for the time that was necessary to complete patient care reports timely. (Id. ¶ 3.)
In October 2015, it was reported to Calhoun that Dempsey-Lowden was staying past the end of her shift to complete patient care reports, but that he "should take a look at [Dempsey-Lowden's] time card." (Id. ¶ 5 (citing Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E ("Calhoun Dep.") at 9-10).) Calhoun conducted an investigation and concluded there were numerous discrepancies between the time Dempsey-Lowden claimed to have spent and was paid for completing the reports and the time she actually spent working on the reports. (Id. ¶ 8 (citing Calhoun Dep. at 16-19).) Calhoun's investigation revealed numerous instances of time theft, resulting in Dempsey-Lowden being suspended without pay for one twelve-hour shift. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12.) By letter datedOctober 15, 2015, Dempsey-Lowden was notified that "[a]ny future incidents of this nature will be cause for immediate termination." (Id. ¶ 13 (citing Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. Q) (alteration and emphasis in original).)
On November 6, 2015, Dempsey-Lowden injured her left knee while working for Newtown Ambulance Squad. (Pl.'s SMDF ¶ 10.) Rutkowski and Calhoun became aware of her knee condition in November 2015, including that she was feeling pain and discomfort. (Id. ¶ 13.) On January 12, 2016, Dempsey-Lowden had an MRI that revealed, among other things, a "high-grade radial tear at the posterior horn of the medial meniscus in the left knee." (Id. ¶ 24.)
On January 14, 2016, Katelyn Stahl ("Stahl"), a paramedic Defendant employed, told Calhoun that on December 31, 2015, Dempsey-Lowden and Emergency Medical Technician Jeremy Fox were in the "charting room" and were watching movies when they were supposed to be preparing patient care reports. (Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E at 37-39.) Stahl sent an email to Calhoun recounting her observations. (Id. 37.) Calhoun conducted an investigation and concluded that Dempsey-Lowden had once again committed time theft. (Def.'s SUMF ¶¶ 21-26.)
On January 18, 2016, Dempsey-Lowden sent Rutkowski and Calhoun an email detailing the results of her MRI and that she would need medical leave for surgery to her left knee. (Pl.'s SMDF ¶ 28.) She informed Rutkowski and Calhoun that she would be out of work on medical leave until her surgery on February 4, 2016, and would need an additional eight weeks after the surgery for recovery. (Id.)
On January 20, 2016, just two days after she sent her email, Defendant terminated Dempsey-Lowden's employment at a meeting in which Rutkowski, Calhoun, and Cynthia Herr were present. (Id. ¶ 35, 37, 38.) At her deposition, Dempsey-Lowden testified that Rutkowskistated, "[i]f you're injured[,] you're useless to me as an employee." (Id. ¶ 39 ).) Regarding Rutkowski's statement, Calhoun testified that Rutkowski stated, "[g]et out of here, you're fired, you're worthless or useless to me anyway." (Id. ¶ 41 (citing Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. D at 39).) Dempsey-Lowden claims that Rutkowski's statement evidences his discriminatory intent in firing based on her alleged disability in violation of federal and Pennsylvania law. (Id. ¶ 39.)
Dempsey-Lowden filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on April 1, 2016, which was dual-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. (Id. ¶ 68; Def.'s SUMF ¶ 44.) On June 7, 2016, an investigator for the EEOC sent Dempsey-Lowden's counsel a letter and a separate email, advising that her charge of discrimination would be dismissed and a "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" ("right-to-sue") letter would be issued "shortly." (Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. O; Def.'s SUMF ¶ 45.) The record indicates that the EEOC sent Dempsey-Lowden the right-to-sue letter on June 9, 2016. (Def.'s SUMF ¶ 47 (citing Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. M ("Right-to-Sue Letter").). The right-to-sue letter has a mailing date of June 9, 2016, and it is carbon-copied to Dempsey-Lowden's counsel, the Defendant, and Susan Metts ("Metts"), an Administrative Manager for Defendant. (See Right-to-Sue Letter.) It provides that (Id. (emphasis in original).)
Dempsey-Lowden and her counsel both claim they never received the right-to-sue letter. (Pl.'s SMDF ¶¶ 70, 71.) On November 10, 2016, Dempsey-Lowden's counsel reached out to the EEOC to request the right-to-sue letter in accordance with their procedures when a right-to-sue letter has not been received. (Id. ¶ 81.) The EEOC responded via email on November 17, 2016, enclosing the June 7, 2016 email and the right-to-sue letter dated June 9, 2016. (Id. ¶ 82 (citing Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. O).)
On November 21, 2016, Dempsey-Lowden filed suit in this Court against Defendant, alleging violations of the ADA, Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., and the PHRA. She subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on September 15, 2017 that asserts only ADA and PHRA claims. (See Amended Compl.) Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 6, 2017 that seeks dismissal of this action on the merits and because the Complaint was filed untimely. As to timeliness, Defendant claims that more than ninety days had elapsed from the time Dempsey-Lowden received the right-to-sue letter until her Complaint was filed. We agree and will grant Defendant summary judgment as to the ADA claim on the basis that Dempsey-Lowden's Complaint is time-barred.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) states that summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court asks "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether . . . one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute ofmaterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Compton v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 995 F. Supp. 554, 561 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).
Summary judgment must be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Once the moving party has produced evidence in support of summary judgment, the non-moving party must go beyond the allegations set forth in its pleadings and counter with evidence that presents "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362-63 (3d Cir. 1992). "More than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor" must be presented by the non-moving party in order to overcome a summary judgment motion. Tziatzios v. United States, 164 F.R.D. 410, 411-12 (E.D. Pa. 1996). If the court determines that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, then summary judgment will be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S....
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