Den Haerynck v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 14 November 1955
• Docket Number: No. 5150.,5150.
• Citation: 228 F.2d 72
• Parties: E. J. DEN HAERYNCK, Appellant, v. Clarence Stewart THOMPSON, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

228 F.2d 72 (1955)

E. J. DEN HAERYNCK, Appellant, v. Clarence Stewart THOMPSON, Appellee.

No. 5150.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

November 14, 1955.

Walter T. Chaney and Lester M. Goodell, Topeka, were on the brief for appellant.

Hall Smith and William L. Rees, Topeka, were on the brief for appellee.

Before BRATTON, MURRAH and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.

BRATTON, Circuit Judge.

The question for determination is whether a judgment for damages for personal injury which resulted in death was dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Clarence Stewart Thompson was driving an automobile on a street in Topeka, Kansas. The automobile struck two youths. One was killed and the other was injured. An information charging Thompson with first degree manslaughter was filed in the state court. The information was amended to charge manslaughter in the fourth degree. The accused entered a plea of guilty to the information as amended and was sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary. Two actions for damages were instituted against Thompson in the state court. One was by the injured youth, and the other was by the father of the deceased youth. Judgments were entered in the two cases in the sums of $12,500 and $6,000, respectively. Shortly after the rendition of the two judgments, Thompson instituted this proceeding in voluntary bankruptcy. The claims predicated upon the judgments were established in the proceeding. The bankrupt seasonably filed his petition for discharge. In the petition, the bankrupt sought a specific determination that the discharge should release him from liability on the judgments. The holders of the judgments resisted such a determination. The referee determined that the judgment held by the injured minor was dischargeable, and that the judgment held by the father of the deceased youth was not. The bankrupt sought review. On review, the district court entered its order granting a full discharge, including release of liability upon the two judgments. The father of the deceased minor alone brought the proceeding here on appeal.

Section 14, sub. c of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, 52 Stat. 840, 850, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32, sub. c, provides that after hearing objections to the application for discharge, the applicant shall be discharged unless he has committed one or more of certain enumerated acts. And section 17, 52 Stat. 851, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35, provides in presently pertinent part "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts * * * except * * * liabilities * * * for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another * * *." No question was presented to the referee or the district court in respect to the commission of any of the acts enumerated in section 14. The only question presented was whether the claims founded upon the judgments should be included within or excluded from the discharge, depending upon whether such judgments represented liabilities for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of others. And the bankruptcy court was clothed with inherent equity jurisdiction to determine that question and mold its order of discharge accordingly. Harrison v. Donnelly, 8 Cir., 153 F.2d 588; In re Tamburo, D.C., 82 F.Supp. 995; 7 Remington on Bankruptcy, 1953 Supp. § 3440.

The boundaries of willful and malicious conduct causing injury to the person or property of another within the purview of section 17 of the Act do not lend themselves completely to a clear and definite pattern available for ready use in every case involving the question of non-dischargeability. But it is settled law that such conduct does not necessarily mean or involve a malignant spirit or a specific intention to injure a particular person or harm his property. A willful disregard of that which one knows to be his duty, or an act which is wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury, if done intentionally, is done willfully and maliciously, within the scope of the exception to dischargeability created by the statute. And "In order to come within that meaning as a judgment for a wilful and malicious injury to person or property, it is not necessary that the cause of action be based upon special malice, so that without it the action could not be maintained."...