Deneen v. Gilmore

Decision Date21 February 1905
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. DENEEN v. GILMORE.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Information filed against Leslie A. Gilmore for disbarment, and rule obtained agaist respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys. Rule made absolute.

Charles S. Deneen, State's Atty. (Harry D. Irwin and John L. Fogie, of counsel), for the People.

Francis M. Burwash, for respondent.

BOGGS, J.

This is a petition filed originally in this court for the disbarment of the respondent, Leslie A. Gilmore. The respondent filed his answer, and the cause was referred to a master to take and report the proofs, and the proofs have been heard and reported, and the respective parties have filed their briefs. The testimony discloses that in the year 1889 the respondent was a resident of Kansas City, Jackson county, Mo., and was a member of the bar of that state and engaged in the practice of his profession there. At the September term, 1890, of the criminal court of Jackson county, an indictment was returned against him charging him with the crime for embezzling certain moneys belonging to one Mrs. Eva Abbott, which came into his hands in his capacity as the attorney of said Mrs. Abbott. At the December term, 1890, of the said criminal court of Jackson county, Mo., he was placed on trial before the court and a jury, and was adjudged to be guilty of the offense charged in the indictment, and was convicted and sentenced to be imprisoned in the penitentiary of the state of Missouri for the period of five years. He prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of the state of Missouri, and under the statutes of that state was permitted to go at liberty during the pendency of the appeal. He absented himself from the state of Missouri and went to Colorado. On the 28th day of March, 1892, the judgment of his conviction and sentence to the penitentiary were affirmed by the Supreme Court. He was then absent from the state of Missouri, and was in Colorado, and did not return to Missouri, but in January, 1893, came to the city of Chicago. On the 4th day of June, 1894, he was arrested in the city of Chicago as a fugitive from justice, and was taken by the officers to the state of Missouri and committed to the penitentiary of that state to serve the term of imprisonment to which he had been sentenced in the said criminal court of Jackson county. He remained a convict in the penitentiary of Missouri until August 21, 1896, a period of about 26 months, when he received a pardon from the then acting Governor of the state. He returned to Chicago, and within about two months presented his application for admission to the bar of this state. The circuit court of Cook county, acting on the motion and testimony of a member of the bar of that county, entered an order to the effect that the respondent was a person of good moral character, and a copy of that order was presented with his application. He did not make known to the circuit court, the Appellate Court (before whom he was examined), or to this court that he had been sentenced to and served as a convict in the penitentiary of the state of Missouri. His name was ordered to be placed on the roll of the members of the bar of this state, and a license as an attorney at law of this state was issued to him on the 6th day of November, 1896.

The crime of which the respondent was convicted and imprisoned in the penitentiary of the state of Missouri was an infamous offense, which involved not only moral turpitude, but alos the lack of professional integrity. The conviction of that crime had the effect to degrade him, and to establish that he was of bad moral character as a man and as a lawyer. The pardon granted him by the then acting Governor of the state of Missouri did not efface the moral turpitude and want of professional honesty involved in the crime, nor obliterate the stain upon his moral character. People ex rel. v. George, 186 Ill. 122, 57 N. E. 804. He obtained the certificate from the circuit court of Cook county that he was possessed of a good moral character by concealing from the court the fact that he had been adjudged guilty by the court of final resort of a sister state of an offense involving his guilt of personal dishonesty in his dealings as an attorney with a client, and also by concealing from that court that he had but so recently served as a convict in the penitentiary of the state of Missouri until relieved from such punishment by a pardon. His concealment of these facts was a fraud on the circuit court. He practiced a further fraud upon the Appellate Court and upon this court by presenting that certificate of good moral character so deceitfully and fraudulently obtained by him. Had this court been advised, when the respondent asked an order admitting him to the bar, that he had but only about two months before obtained his release from the penitentiary of the state of Missouri, where he had been imprisoned, because adjudged to be guilty of the crime of embezzlement of funds which had been intrusted to him by a client, he would not have been admitted as a member of the bar of the state. He obtained his certificate of admission by deceitfully and falsely inducing this court to believe that he enjoyed and possessed a good moral character, knowing at the same time that he was purposely concealing a fact which would demonstrate that his assertion was untrue. To permit him to longer hold that certificate of admission would be to allow him to enjoy the fruits of his own fraud and deceit.

The respondent, in his answer, asserts that he was innocent of any actual wrongdoing in the transaction with his client in Missouri, and that his conviction was not justified by the proofs and was wrongful. The respondent and the relator have presented to us the testimony of the witnesses heard on the trial of the charge of embezzlement, as preserved in the record of that proceeding. Without conceding that any reason exists for declining to give full faith and credit to the adjudications of the courts of Missouri, we are unwilling to say that this testimony demonstrates that the respondent was innocent of the charge of which he was convicted. He was a member of the bar of Missouri, and was employed by Mrs. Abbott as her attorney to collect an indebtedness due to her. He collected $500 from her debtor on the 22d day of October, 1889. He saw her within three days thereafter, and saw and consulted with her and advised her frequently during the nine months which intervened before an accusation of the crime was lodged against him, and did not at any time inform her that he had collected any money for her, but, on the contrary, led her to believe that he had not received any money for her, until after she had caused a warrant to issue against him. He did not repay any of the money until after the affirmance by the Supreme Court of the judgment of conviction. While in the city of Chicago, a few months before he was seized as a fugitive from justice, he sent $240.75 to a friend in Kansas City, Mo., to be paid to Mrs. Abbott on condition that she would sign a letter to the Governor of the state which he had prepared and which he inclosed with the money. This letter contained some statements of alleged fact and a recommendation of the writer that the respondent should be pardoned. Mrs. Abbott signed the letter and received the money, but the pardon was not granted. About eight months thereafter the respondent was extradited from Illinois and placed in the penitentiary of Missouri.

It is true that in People ex rel. v. Coleman, 210 Ill....

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29 cases
  • IN RE ABRAMS
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 5 Febrero 1997
    ...237 (1886). Specifically, the pardon "did not efface the . . . want of professional honesty involved in the crime." People v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737, 737 (1905). "No moral character qualification for Bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor." In re Meyerson,......
  • State ex rel. Attorney General v. Irby
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 8 Abril 1935
    ...tersely said, it involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness." State v. Hazard, 139 Wash. 497, 247 P. 957, 47 A. L. R. 538; 69 L. R. A. 71; 214 Ill. 569. think it self-evident that the issuance and acceptance of a pardon within its self irrevocably acknowledges a conviction of the crime pard......
  • State v. Irby, 4-3850.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 8 Abril 1935
    ...139 Wash. 487, 247 P. 957, 47 A. L. R. 538; [In re Pacific Mail S. S. Co. (C. C. A.) 130 F. 76] 69 L. R. A. 71; [People v. Gilmore] 214 Ill. 569 [73 N. E. 737, 69 L. R. A. 701]." We think it self-evident that the issuance and acceptance of a pardon within its self irrevocably acknowledges a......
  • Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Connolly
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 29 Junio 1942
    ... ... 265, 2 S.Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed. Ed. 552; People ex rel. Chicago ... Bar Ass'n v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 356, 116 N.E. 189; ... People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737, ... 69 L.R.A. 701, and State ex rel. Guille v. Chapman, 11 Ohio ... In addition ... to the ... ...
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