Denis v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 September 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 5:22-cv-00095-TES
• Parties: MONISSA DENIS, Plaintiff, v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC., and JOHN DOE 1-2, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

MONISSA DENIS, Plaintiff, v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC., and JOHN DOE 1-2, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:22-cv-00095-TES

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division

September 26, 2022

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE

Plaintiff Monissa Denis (“Denis”), brings claims against Defendant Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (“Cracker Barrel”), arising out of alleged injuries she sustained in a trip-and-fall incident at Cracker Barrel on February 22, 2020. [Doc. 1, pp. 1-2]. Denis commenced this action in the State Court of Bibb County Georgia, on January 5, 2022. [Doc. 1, p. 1]. Cracker Barrel filed a Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] from the State Court of Bibb County to this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446, on March 4, 2022. [Doc 1]. On June 13, 2022, Cracker Barrel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 8]. As detailed below, the Court GRANTS Cracker Barrel's Motion for Summary Judgment.^[1]

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the sunny morning of February 22, 2020, Denis visited the Cracker Barrel restaurant at 5000 Eisenhower Parkway in Macon, Georgia. [Doc. 1-3, p. 38, ¶ 8]; [Doc. 8-1, p. 6]. As she left the restaurant, Denis carried her two-year-old grandson in her arms, then started running towards her vehicle. [Doc. 8-1, pp. 2, 7-8]; [Doc. 8-2, p. 4]. While running, she lost balance when she stepped down from the restaurant's patio. [Doc. 8-1, p. 6]; [Doc. 8-2, p. 4]. She then stumbled down the parking lot and slammed her head against the rear bumper of a parked vehicle.^[2] [Id.]. Denis alleges that she initially fell because her foot went into a “hole” in the parking lot near the edge of the patio. [Doc. 1-3, pp. 38-39]. She suffered injuries and medical expenses because of her fall.^[3] [Doc. 1-1, pp. 2-3]; [Doc. 1-3, pp. 4-5]; [Doc. 8-1, p. 5]; [Doc. 8-2].

Although Denis alleges that she fell because her foot got stuck in a hole-or as she later referred to it, a “crack/pothole/break in the pavement”-pictures of the parking lot indicate that no such hole, or even a hazard, exists. [Doc. 1-3, pp. 38-41]; [Doc. 9, p. 1]; [Doc. 8-2, p. 4]; [Doc. 8-3, pp. 1-2]. In fact, Denis's own photograph that she took of the area where she fell shows no hole or similar hazard that Cracker Barrel visitors would have to traverse. [Doc. 8-1, pp. 4-5, 7-8]; [Doc. 8-4, p. 2]. Further, Brandon Wiggins, a civil engineer who visited the Cracker Barrel restaurant where Denis fell to take measurements and photographs of the area, claimed that there were no potholes in the area where Denis allegedly tripped and fell.^[4] [Doc. 8-3, pp. 1-2]. Wiggins claimed-and attached photographs in his affidavit to support-that there was “no uneven pavement, raised crack, or other protrusion in the area where Denis allegedly tripped and fell.” [Id. at pp. 2-4].

Below are photos of the area where Denis fell. The first photo is Denis's photo, and the bottom two are Wiggins's. [Doc. 8-4, p. 2]. These are the only three photos provided by the parties in the record.^[5]

(Image Omitted)

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on the evidence presented, “‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting U.S. v. Four Parcels Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion.” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437. The movant may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, including “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A).^[6]

“When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim[]' in order to discharge this ‘initial responsibility.'” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437-38 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Rather, “the moving party simply may show-that is, point out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437-38 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324) (cleaned up). Alternatively, the movant may provide “affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.” Id.

If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must rebut the movant's showing “by producing . . . relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The nonmoving party does not satisfy its burden “if the rebuttal evidence ‘is merely colorable or[] is not significantly probative' of a disputed fact.” Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). “A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the [nonmoving] party's position will not suffice.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). Further, where a party fails to address another party's assertion of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Court may consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). However, “credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Succinctly put,

[s]ummary judgment is not a time for fact-finding; that task is reserved for trial. Rather, on summary judgment, the district court must accept as fact all allegations the [nonmoving] party makes, provided they are sufficiently supported by evidence of record. So[,] when competing narratives emerge on key events, courts are not at liberty to pick which side they think is more credible. Indeed, if “the only issue is one of credibility,” the issue is factual, and a court cannot grant summary judgment.

Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). Stated differently, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “The evidence of the [nonmovant] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. And “if a reasonable jury could make more than one inference from the facts, and one of those permissible inferences creates a genuine issue of material fact, a court cannot grant summary judgment”; it “must hold a trial to get to the bottom of the matter.” Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1263.

2. Georgia Law

Under Georgia law,

Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Therefore, an invitee who becomes injured on an owner's premises may recover under a theory of premises liability if he can show that the owner's breach of that duty caused his injury, i.e., if the invitee shows the owner's negligence in failing to maintain safe premises caused the injury.

However, “‘[p]roof of a fall, without more, does not create liability on the part of a proprietor or landowner. It is common knowledge that people fall on the best of sidewalks and floors.'” Pinckney v. Covington Athletic Club & Fitness Ctr., 288 Ga.App. 891, 893, 655 S.E.2d 650 (2007) (quoting Flagstar Enters. v. Burch, 267 Ga.App. 856, 85657, 600 S.E.2d 834 (2004)); Hollis v. Callaway Gardens Resort, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-147CDL, 2008 WL 504396, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2008).

To establish liability, “‘[t]here must be proof of fault on the part of the owner and ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee.'” Belk Dep't Store Charleston, S.C., Inc. v. Cato, 267 Ga.App. 793, 794, 600 S.E.2d 786 (2004) (quoting Souder v. Atlanta Family Rests., 210 Ga.App. 291, 292, 435 S.E.2d 764 (1993)); accord Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 749, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997). “The plaintiff's first burden in a premises liability case is to show the premises were defective or hazardous.” Bartenfeld v. Chick-fil-A, Inc., 346 Ga.App. 759, 766 (2018) (citing Cohen v. Target Corp., 256 Ga.App. 91, 92, 567 S.E.2d 733 (2002)); see also Aubain-Gray v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 323 Ga.App. 672, 674 (1), 747 S.E.2d 684 (2013) (“the plaintiff's threshold burden” is to demonstrate a defect or hazard). Without evidence of the existence of a hazard that caused the fall, “there can be no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge of the alleged danger, and therefore no recovery for the plaintiff.” Cato, 267 Ga.App. at 794 (citation omitted).

Causation is an “essential element in slip or trip and fall cases.” Pennington v. WJL, Inc., 263 Ga.App 758, 760, 589 S.E.2d 259 (2003) (footnote omitted). “Where the plaintiff does not know of a cause or cannot prove the cause, there can be no recovery because an essential element of negligence cannot be proven.” Id. at 261-62 (footnote omi...