Deniston v. Hoagland

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: THORNTON
• Citation: Deniston v. Hoagland, 67 Ill. 265, 1873 WL 8191 (Ill. 1873)
• Decision Date: 31 January 1873
• Parties: WILLIAM DENISTON et al.v.GEORGE HOAGLAND, Guardian, etc.

67 Ill. 265

1873 WL 8191 (Ill.)

WILLIAM DENISTON et al.

v.GEORGE HOAGLAND, Guardian, etc.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1873.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Mason county; the Hon. CHARLES TURNER, Judge, presiding.

This was a bill in chancery, by George Hoagland, as guardian of John Deniston and Aaron Deniston, against William Deniston and Aaron Pollard, for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land made by William Deniston to Samuel Deniston, deceased, the father of John and Aaron Deniston, in his lifetime, and to set aside a conveyance of the premises made by William Deniston to Aaron Pollard, as in fraud of the equitable rights of the complainants.

The bill alleged, in substance, that one John Deniston, about fourteen years before, died intestate, seized in fee of the east half of the south-west quarter of section 7, township 22 north, range 7 west, of the third principal meridian, leaving Ann Deniston, his widow, and Samuel Deniston, William Deniston, Nancy Pollard (formerly Deniston,) and Martha J. Deniston, since intermarried with William Derry, his children and only heirs at law; that no partition of said land had ever been had, or assignment of dower made to Ann Deniston, the widow; that, after the death of John Deniston, the said Samuel Deniston held possession of the land and farmed and improved the same, taking care of his mother, Ann, until his death, which was about March 1, 1870; that the land since that time had remained in the possession of the heirs of Samuel Deniston; that said Samuel left, surviving him, Hannah Deniston, his widow, and John and Aaron Deniston, his only heirs at law; that said Ann Deniston, widow of John Deniston, died in December, 1870; that about six years before the filing of the bill, William Deniston sold his entire undivided interest in said land to said Samuel Deniston, the father of the complainants; that he made a warranty deed to Samuel for the same, for the consideration of $250, all of which had been paid, and left the same with a justice of the peace to be acknowledged by his wife, Hannah, but that such acknowledgment was never taken; and that, after the death of Samuel, William took the same away and sold his interest in the land to Aaron Pollard for about $500, and made him a deed therefor, and that said Pollard had notice of the facts of the case before his purchase. The bill prayed to set aside this conveyance, and for specific performance of the contract. The court decreed as prayed, from which the defendants appealed.

Messrs. DEARBORN & CAMPBELL, and Messrs. LACEY & WALLACE, for the appellants.

Messrs. FULLERTON & ROGERS, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE THORNTON delivered the opinion of the Court:

The bill alleges that Deniston, one of appellants, bargained and sold his interest in the land in controversy to the father of appellees; that the purchase money was fully paid; that the purchaser, at the time of the sale, was in possession, and so continued for a number of years, and until his death, cultivating and improving the land; and that appellant, Pollard, had, before his pretended purchase and conveyance, full notice and knowledge of all the facts concerning the sale.

The bill prays that the deed to Pollard be set aside, and that Deniston be compelled to convey to appellees. The court below rendered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

Concede errors in the admission and rejection of testimony, there was evidence, clearly competent, sufficient to sustain the decree.

The court rejected the testimony of appellant Deniston, and a part of the testimony of Pollard, and refused to exclude any of the evidence of Mrs. Kimner, or the evidence of Samuel Deniston, the alleged purchaser.

We may consider the rejected testimony as heard and considered, and the decided preponderance of the evidence justifies the decree.

Without collating the evidence, we think that the following facts are satisfactorily established: a verbal contract as to the...