Denney v. City of Albany
| Decision Date | 29 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:97-CV-99-3(WDO).,1:97-CV-99-3(WDO). |
| Parties | Dewayne DENNEY, Harold Pinson, Robert McGee, and Edgar Webb, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ALBANY, a Municipal Corporation, and Janice Allen, Individually and in Her capacity as Manager for the City of Albany, Henry Fields, Individually and in his Capacity as Fire Chief for the City of Albany, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Eugene C. Black, Jr., Albany GA, for plaintiffs.
Al Grieshaber, Jr., Albany, GA, for defendants.
Before the Court are Defendants', City of Albany, and Janice Allen and Henry Fields, in their official capacities, Motion for Summary Judgment [Tab # 69] and Defendants', Janice Allen and Henry Fields, in their individual capacities, Motion for Summary Judgment [Tab # 73]. Having carefully considered the motion, the related caselaw and statutes, and the file as a whole, the Court enters the following order.
Plaintiffs DeWayne Denney, Harold Pinson, Robert McGee, and Edgar Webb are firefighters employed by the City of Albany Fire Department. Defendant City of Albany ("Albany") is a municipal corporation. Defendant Janice Allen Jackson ("Jackson") is sued in her capacity as City Manager for the City of Albany, and in her individual capacity. Defendant Henry Fields ("Fields") is sued in his capacity as Fire Chief for the City of Albany, and in his individual capacity.
Plaintiffs were passed over for promotions in 1995 and 1996. Plaintiffs allege that the above-named defendants discriminated against them in denying them the promotions.
The City of Albany's hiring policy (amended in 1995) specifically required the Fire Department to "be operated in compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the City of Albany, Georgia's Affirmative Action Plan." Albany's Affirmative Action Plan states, in pertinent part: the City of Albany shall recruit, hire, upgrade, train, promote, and administer personnel actions in all job classifications without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or disability. The promotion policy states that "every effort will be made to ensure that ... everyone, regardless of race ... will receive fair treatment during the process."
Under the 1995 policy, promotion applicants took a written examination, completed an assessment center, and had an oral examination. Applicants scoring at least a 70 on this 100 point qualification exercise were considered qualified for promotion to the Lieutenant position. Once this process resulted in a pool of qualified applicants, Chief Fields had the authority to make the final promotional decision.
In November 1995, the Fire Department conducted a qualification exercise to identify qualified applicants for vacant Lieutenant positions. Twenty-three applicants completed the examination, and twenty-one were placed in the pool of qualified applicants, having scored 70 or better.
Plaintiff Denney, who began working for the Albany Fire Department in 1978, qualified for consideration for promotion by scoring 77 (however, Denney argues his score should have been 86), Denney, who had the lowest score of all applicants (for the 1995 promotion), does not contend that his low score was the result of race discrimination. Rather, Denney contends that he was denied the promotion because he wrote a check [to others involved in the prior litigation but not to Chief Fields].
Plaintiff Pinson, who began working in the Albany Fire Department in 1973, qualified for consideration for promotion by scoring 80.5 (however, Pinson argues his score should have been 83.5). Pinson, who was disciplined on at least eight occasions, does not contest the Harris promotion as discriminatory. His only claim of discrimination arises out of the promotion of Hayslip.
Plaintiff McGee, who began working in the Albany Fire Department in 1978, qualified for consideration for promotion by scoring 73.5. McGee claims that he should have been given the promotions earned by Harris and Hayslip, though he filed a grievance only in connection with the promotion of Hayslip.
Plaintiff Webb qualified for consideration for promotion by scoring 80.5 (however, Webb argues he should have scored 83.5). At the time of selection, Webb had been disciplined on at least three occasions.
In 1995, Chief Fields selected Wesley Pantone (white), Tommy Anderson (white), Gregory Maze (black), and James Pratt (black) from the qualified list of 1995 for promotions to Lieutenant. Pantone scored 85.5 on the qualifying exams, Anderson scored 95, Maze scored 85, and Pratt scored 85. Plaintiffs do not contest these promotions as being discriminatory.
In 1996, Chief Fields selected Willie Harris to fill an open Lieutenant position. Harris qualified by achieving a total score of 80.5 (however, based on plaintiffs' corrected scoring schedule, Harris lost two points due to the rounding down of assessment scores, he should have received a total score of 87 and not 80.5). Harris was a 16-year veteran of the fire department and an 8-year veteran as an AOE. On his 1994 annual performance evaluation, the following review appeared:
Harris spends a lot of his free time studying his job as an A.O.E. He never refuses to do anything required of him. AOE W.R. Harris has proven to be a credit to the Albany Fire Department and the City of Albany ... AOE Harris has a very positive attitude about the Albany Fire Department and his job. W.R. Harris is always ready to assist anyone and does so without any hesitation. Not only does Harris have this attitude on the job, it also reflects over into his everyday life.
In selecting Harris for the position, Chief Fields considered the following factors: Harris' demonstrated leadership, maturity, interpersonal skills and a willingness to support management and its policies. Among the qualified applicants for promotion, Chief Fields considered Harris to possess the greatest level of maturity, leadership skills, interpersonal skills and willingness to support fire department and city management and policies1.
In September 1996, Albert Hayslip was promoted to fill a Lieutenant vacancy. Hayslip qualified for promotion by scoring an 80.5 (however, under plaintiffs' corrected scoring schedule, Hayslip was graded two points higher on the interview than he should have been; his proper score should have been 78.5 instead of 80.5). Hayslip was a 10-year veteran firefighter with outstanding performance evaluations. Hayslip also brought years of current experience as a sergeant in the Army Reserve, had an ability to carry out instructions, a level of maturity, and an understanding of leadership that Fields believed made Hayslip the best candidate for the lieutenant position.
Since plaintiffs all received qualifying scores on the three-part examination, they were considered for these Lieutenant promotions. While Chief Fields considered each of these candidates qualified, he felt that Harris and Hayslip had the maturity, leadership, interpersonal skills, and willingness to support management and Fire Department policies, which he considered necessary for the positions.
In 1996, Chief Fields selected Kelly Harcrow (white) and James Ambrose (white) for vacant Lieutenant positions from the 1995 qualified list. Plaintiffs do not contend that these promotions were discriminatory.
Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 1) Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII; 2) Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII; 3) suits against defendants in their individual capacities are not cognizable under Title VII; 4) Plaintiffs have not established a viable § 1981 claim; 5) Plaintiffs' Conspiracy claims under § 1985 lack merit; and 6) Plaintiffs' claims under § 1986 are time barred or precluded. Plaintiffs argue that material issues of fact remain on his claims which should preclude summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment may be entered in favor of the movant where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact and that (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 953 (11th Cir.1995). The movant's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law is satisfied where "the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a party has moved for summary judgment and properly supported its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to create, through the evidentiary forms listed in FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c), genuine issues of material fact necessitating a trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
For a claim of disparate impact discrimination, Plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case by showing that Defendants have employed a facially neutral employment practice that has had a significantly discriminatory impact. Hill v. Seaboard Line R. Co., 885 F.2d 804, 811 (11th Cir.1989); Stephen v. PGA Sheraton Resort, Ltd., 873 F.2d 276, 279 (11th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs must then show that the application of that specific employment practice caused the disparity and that he was adversely impacted by the practice. Id.
In order to establish the first element of his prima facie case, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the...
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Denney v. City of Albany
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