Dennis v. City of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 20 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-2689 |
| Citation | 603 F.Supp.3d 214 |
| Parties | James DENNIS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Michael C. Schwartz, James, Schwartz & Associates PC, Philadelphia, PA, Paul M. Messing, Kairys Rudovsky Messing Feinberg & Lin, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew Pomager, Bailey Axe, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant City of Philadelphia.
Christopher Paul Boyle, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, King of Prussia, PA, John P. Gonzales, Joseph J. Santarone, Jr., Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman and Goggin, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Detective Frank Jastrzembski, Detective Manuel Santiago.
Plaintiff James Dennis ("Plaintiff") brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Philadelphia (the "City") and Detectives Frank Jastrzembski and Manuel Santiago (the "Detective Defendants") (collectively, "Defendants"). Presently before the Court is the Detective Defendants’ motion to stay discovery. The Detective Defendants specifically seek to stay Plaintiff's ability to take their depositions. For the following reasons, the Detective Defendants’ motion will be granted.
In 1992, after a jury trial, Plaintiff was convicted of committing the murder of a high school student and sentenced to death. In 2011, Plaintiff sought habeas relief in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff obtained habeas relief in 2013. In 2016, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, granted Plaintiff's request for habeas relief based on a finding that Plaintiff's trial was replete with Brady violations and that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's case against Mr. Dennis was "effectively gutted." Dennis v. Sec'y, Pa. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2016). Plaintiff was to be retried. Instead, the Commonwealth offered Plaintiff a no contest plea to a reduced charge. Plaintiff agreed to enter a plea of nolo contendere to third-degree murder and was ultimately released for time served.
In the present suit, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for the alleged fabrication of evidence and deliberate deception by Defendants that deprived Plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and a fair trial. Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them. In May 2019, this Court denied Defendants’ motion except with respect to Plaintiff's claim against the City for failure to train or discipline regarding Brady obligations. See Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 435-36 (E.D. Pa. 2019). The Court also held that the Detective Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, see id. at 434-35, and Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of this issue. On November 23, 2021, the Third Circuit affirmed this Court's ruling on the issue of qualified immunity and remanded the matter. See Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 292 (3d Cir. 2021).1 This Court then issued a revised scheduling order in which fact discovery was set to conclude by September 30, 2022.
Relevant to this motion, and while this case was pending, the Detective Defendants were indicted and charged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with perjury, false swearing, and false testimony in connection with murder charges brought against an unrelated individual, Anthony Wright.2 In his complaint in this matter, Plaintiff references the circumstances surrounding Wright's prosecution as support for his Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia. The complaint provides that various cases, including the investigation and prosecution of Anthony Wright, show that "misconduct was pervasive within the Philadelphia Police Department at time of Mr. Dennis's 1992 trial, and, upon information and belief, the misconduct described below was committed with the knowledge of Homicide Unit and PPD supervisors or because of their deliberate indifference to this misconduct." Compl. ¶ 85. To support the allegation that "misconduct was pervasive," the complaint references the investigation and prosecution of Anthony Wright. The complaint provides that "Mr. Wright had been convicted of the rape and murder of an elderly women based on misconduct by defendants Jastrzembski, Santiago and other homicide detectives including the tampering with evidence, coercive witness interrogation, planting evidence and numerous other actions that denied Mr. Wright a fair trial." Id.
The Detective Defendants have moved to dismiss the indictment. The motion is still pending in state court.
The Detective Defendants now move to stay discovery in this matter because they fear they may make statements during their depositions in this case that may be used against them during the criminal proceedings in state court.3 The parties have already completed written discovery, and Plaintiff asserts he is not seeking any additional written discovery from the Detective Defendants. Further, the parties agree that the stay, if granted, would only affect Plaintiff's ability to depose the Detective Defendants, and other discovery, including depositions of third parties, may proceed. Plaintiff opposes this motion, and after a hearing on the relevant issues, the motion is now ripe before this Court.
Generally, defendants to do not "have a due process right to stay proceedings in related civil actions." Golden Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53, 55 (E.D. Pa. 1980). However, courts may do so if "the interests of justice require it." Walsh Sec. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., 7 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970) ). To determine whether a stay will be appropriate, courts will consider six factors:
1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal and civil cases overlap; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the plaintiff's interest in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiff caused by a delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on defendants; 5) the interests of the court; and 6) the public interest.
Id. at 527 ; Thorpe v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-5094, 2022 WL 991379, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2022). The factors will be addressed below.
Typically, "[t]he degree to which issues in simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings overlap is considered the most important threshold issue when determining whether or not to grant a stay." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Beckham–Easley, No. 01-5530, 2002 WL 31111766, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002). "The strongest case for deferring civil proceedings until after completion of criminal proceedings is where a party under indictment for a serious offense is required to defend a civil action involving the same matter." Soroush v. Ali, No. 09-3703, 2009 WL 3467897, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009) (quoting Reyes v. Freebery, No. 02-1283, 2004 WL 1737683 at *3 (D. Del. July 30, 2004) ). Here, the Detective Defendants were indicted for their actions related to the prosecution of another individual, Anthony Wright. However, Plaintiff contends that there is the potential for significant overlap between this case and the Commonwealth's prosecution of the Detective Defendants because Plaintiff bases his Monell claim against the City, in part, on the Detective Defendants’ involvement in Wright's prosecution. See Compl. ¶ 85. The Court agrees.
To support Plaintiff's Monell claim, Plaintiff must "identify a municipal policy or custom that amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people with whom the police come into contact." Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ). For support, Plaintiff will point to other instances of state employees fabricating evidence during the course of their investigation into, and the prosecution of, other individuals. Plaintiff intends to point to evidence of the Detective Defendants’ involvement in Wright's case as an example of this.
Further, Plaintiff brings a section 1983 claim under the theory of supervisory liability against Defendant Jastrzembski. To successfully bring this claim, Plaintiff must:
(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling's violation resulted from the supervisor's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.
Min v. Morris, 737 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) ). To support this claim, Plaintiff may also point to the Detective Defendants’ involvement in Wright's case as evidence of an existing custom or practice that created an unreasonable risk of the harm Plaintiff suffered.
It is evident that the issues in both cases overlap. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of staying discovery.
"Courts tend to grant stays after an indictment is returned, rather than before, because ‘[t]he potential for self-incrimination is greatest’ post indictment." Thorpe, 2022 WL 991379, at *2 (quoting Judge Milton Pollack, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201, 203 (1989) ); see also Sperry v. Bridges, No. 18-9996, 2021 WL 5413984, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2021) (same). Last month, the Detective Defendants were indicted by a grand jury. Accordingly, this weighs in favor of staying the action. But cf. Thorpe, 2022 WL 991379, at *2 (...
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