Dennis v. County School Bd. of Rappahannock Co.
Decision Date | 28 February 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-0021-C. |
Citation | 582 F. Supp. 536 |
Parties | James R. DENNIS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Roger A. Ritchie, Harrisonburg, Va., for plaintiff.
Douglas L. Guynn, Philip C. Stone, Harrisonburg, Va., for defendants.
The plaintiff, James R. Dennis, filed the above-referenced action on March 25, 1983, although he has since filed, with leave of court, an amended complaint. The suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiff is currently a resident of West Virginia, although at the time the complaint was originally filed he was a resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia. He had been employed for two years as a probationary teacher in the Rappahannock County school system in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The defendants include Robert Estabrook, Superintendent of the Rappahannock County Public Schools, and the individual members of the School Board of Rappahannock County. The defendants failed to renew the plaintiff's contract for his position as a probationary teacher in the Spring of 1982. This action forms the basis for this lawsuit.
The plaintiff's amended complaint contains two counts. First, he alleges that the substantial motivating factor in the defendants' decision not to renew his contract was retaliation for the plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights. Second, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant School Board's written notice of the nonrenewal of his teaching contract was not received until after the April 15 deadline established in Va.Code § 22.1-304, thereby entitling the plaintiff to a probationary contract for the 1982-83 school year. In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff asks for back pay, reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees.
On April 22, 1983, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On June 21, 1983, all parties appeared, by counsel, to argue the motion before the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court directed the parties to file further memoranda of law to support their positions, and the parties have complied with this request. Shortly after the plaintiff filed his amended complaint on November 9, 1983, the defendants responded with a second motion to dismiss, restating the same grounds raised in their previous motion. The issues are now ripe for disposition.
The defendants have raised three grounds to sustain their motion to dismiss: (1) with respect to the Second Count, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Count does not allege either diversity of citizenship or federal question jurisdiction; (2) again with respect to the Second Count, the written notice of nonrenewal given by the Superintendent of Schools prior to the April 15 deadline met the requirements of Va.Code § 22.1-304; and (3) the complaint as a whole fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court will consider each ground separately below.
The defendants urge the court to dismiss the Second Count because it alleges neither diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 nor a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The plaintiff has asked the court to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over the claim. Ever since the Supreme Court decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), it has been clear that as a matter of Constitutional power, a federal district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over non-federal claims whenever those claims are asserted with federal claims in a single action. However, both the federal and non-federal claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and be so related that ordinarily the plaintiff "would be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding". Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. Gibbs stresses that a federal district court ought to exercise its discretion sparingly, based on considerations of "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants," avoiding needless decisions based on state law. Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139.
This court has no difficulty in concluding that it has the Constitutional power to decide the plaintiff's Second Count. Furthermore, looking at the factors to be considered in exercising its discretion, the court believes it is certainly economical and convenient to all parties to rule upon the issues raised in the Second Count, rather than dismissing them without prejudice only to have the claim refiled in state court. The court recognizes that the necessity of construing the statutory scheme embodied in Va.Code §§ 22.1-304 and 22.1-305 without any direct guidance from Virginia courts makes the resolution of the questions somewhat more difficult. Nevertheless, in light of all the other factors, the court finds it proper to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over the plaintiff's Second Count.
In Title 22.1, Chapter 15 of the Virginia Code, the Virginia General Assembly has enacted a statutory scheme covering, inter alia, the hiring, dismissal, and suspension of teachers in the public school systems of the Commonwealth of Virginia. In particular, §§ 22.1-304 and 22.1-305 mandate certain procedures to be followed by school superintendents and local boards of education in order to effectuate the renewal or nonrenewal of a teaching contract of a probationary teacher. A probationary teacher is one who has not achieved "continuing contract status", i.e., one who has not taught for three years in the same school division, thereby entitling that teacher to a form of tenure within that school division. Teachers who have continuing contract status may be dismissed only for cause, see § 307, or because enrollments have decreased or particular subjects have been abolished from the school curriculum, see § 304. A probationary teacher, on the other hand, may be dismissed without cause simply by not renewing his contract for the coming school year. However, such a nonrenewal must be done in accordance with the procedures mandated in §§ 304 and 305.
In the Second Count of his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On April 13, 1982, the plaintiff, then in his second year as a probationary teacher, received a hand-delivered letter from the division superintendent, Mr. Estabrook. The letter advised the plaintiff that the superintendent would recommend to the Rappahannock County School Board at its meeting scheduled for that day that the plaintiff's contract not be renewed for a third year. At the time plaintiff received the letter, he requested the reasons for the recommendation, whereupon the superintendent responded that he was making the recommendation because he believed the plaintiff was immature. The School Board failed to take any action on the superintendent's recommendation at its April 13, 1982, meeting. On April 15, 1982, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the superintendent requesting supporting documentation, if there was any, for his recommendation. The superintendent...
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