Dennis v. Crews
Decision Date | 03 December 2015 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 13-21064-CIV-ZLOCH |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Parties | LABRANT D. DENNIS, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL D. CREWS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections Respondent. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Petitioner Labrant D. Dennis's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (DE 1). Petitioner, Labrant Dennis ("Mr. Dennis"), is on death row at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida, following convictions in 1998 for the first degree murders of Marlin Barnes and Timwanika Lumpkins. The instant Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus (DE 1) was filed March 26, 2013. On June 26, 2013, the State filed its Response To Order To Show Cause Why Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus Should Not Be Granted (DE 10). Mr. Dennis filed his Reply (DE 15) on September 9, 2013.
The Court has carefully reviewed said Petition (DE 1), the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in premises. For the reasons that follow, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (DE 1) will be DENIED.
The Supreme Court of Florida gave the following summary of the pertinent and salient facts:
On October 27, 1998, Mr. Dennis was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one count of burglary with assault or battery while armed, and one count of criminal mischief. Dennis, 817 So.2d at 751. The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one. Id. The presiding judge adopted the jury's recommendation finding four aggravating circumstances1 and, while the court considered seven statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors, it only assigned weight to three.2
On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Mr. Dennisraised thirteen claims.3 Dennis v. State, 109 So.3d 680 (Fla. 2012). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence.
In November 2003, Mr. Dennis filed a motion for postconviction relief. On October 7, 2004, the trial judge entered an order denying all of Mr. Dennis's claims. However, this order did not include the reason for the denial or any findings of fact. On November 15, 2004, the trial court issued an amended order. The amended order still did not include findings of fact for all of Mr. Dennis's claims. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new proceeding on Mr. Dennis's postconviction motion and dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice. Dennis v. State, 999 So.2d 644 (Fla. 2008).
Upon remand, the circuit judge allowed Mr. Dennis to file anamendment to his postconviction motion, an amendment which included two new claims. A Huff hearing4 was held on May 11, 2009. On June 12, 2009, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying postconviction relief.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court again remanded the case for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on two claims. Specifically, the court ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Dennis's claims that: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present further mitigation evidence at the penalty phase; and (2) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the assistant state attorney's memo to Dr. Rao, the medical examiner who testified during the penalty phase. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied these claims.
Mr. Dennis appealed to the Florida Supreme Court and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Mr. Dennis asserted ten claims for postconviction relief5 and four claims for state habeasrelief.6 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Mr. Dennis's postconviction motion and denied habeas relief. Dennis, 109 So.3d at 704. Rehearing was denied on March 8, 2013.
On March 26, 2013, Mr. Dennis filed his federal Petition (DE 1) for a writ of habeas corpus asserting six claims. This matter is now ripe. The State has not argued that the Petition was untimely. The Court will review the merit of his claims.
Mr. Dennis's habeas corpus Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) ( ), which significantly changed the standards of review that federal courts apply in habeas corpus proceedings. Under the AEDPA, if a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, habeas corpus relief can only be granted if the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "resulted in a decision that was based on anunreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)(2014). This is an "exacting standard." Maharaj v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).
Pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law" or "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [an] [opposite] result." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (opinion of O'Connor, J., for a majority of the Court). In other words, the "contrary to" prong means that "the state court's decision must be substantially different from the relevant precedent of Court." Id.
With respect to the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1), which applies when a state court identifies the correct legal principle but purportedly applies it incorrectly to the facts before it, a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Significantly, an "objectively unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). An "unreasonable application" can alsooccur if a state court "unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001).
As noted above, § 2254(d)(2) provides an alternative avenue for relief. Habeas relief may be granted if the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable. "A state court's determination of the facts, however, is entitled to deference" under § 2254(e)(1). See Maharaj, 432 F.3d at 1309. This means that a federal habeas court must presume that findings of fact by a state court are correct, and a habeas petitioner must rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See Hunter v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corr., 395 F.3d 1196, 1200 (11th Cir. 2005).
Finally, where a federal court would "deny relief under a de novo review standard, relief must be denied under the much narrower AEDPA standard." Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1295 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004). Even if the Court believed the Florida Supreme Court's determination to be an incorrect one, under AEDPA deference that alone is not enough to grant habeas relief, the Court must also find that "there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [United States Supreme Court] precedents." Harrison v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). In other...
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