Dennis v. Merrill

• Decision Date: 20 November 1934
• Docket Number: No. 42576.,42576.
• Citation: 257 N.W. 322,218 Iowa 1259
• Parties: DENNIS v. MERRILL
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

218 Iowa 1259

257 N.W. 322

DENNIS

v.MERRILL

No. 42576.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 20, 1934.

Appeal from District Court, Story County; O. J. Henderson, Judge.

Action at law for damages on account of injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff because of negligence of the defendant. From a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Lee, Steinberg & Walsh, of Ames, for appellant.

Shaw & Yoder, of Sigourney, and Welty, Soper & Welty, of Nevada, Iowa, for appellee.

DONEGAN, Justice.

On January 31, 1933, a few minutes before 6 o'clock in the evening, J. W. Merrill, while driving westward on paved highway No. 2 about half a mile west of the city of Sigourney, drove his automobile into the rear end of a hayrack which was proceeding along the said highway in the same direction. The hayrack was on a wagon which was being drawn by a team of horses, and, as a result of the collision, the tongue and front running gear of the wagon became detached and the team ran away to the westward on the highway carrying the tongue and running gear along with it. Approximately 600 feet from the point where Merrill's automobile struck the hayrack, and while the team was still on the paved highway, an automobile driven by Harold Reece, in which Harold Dennis was riding, collided with one of the horses and Dennis was injured. An action for damages was commenced by Dennis against Merrill, claiming that the accident and injuries to Dennis were caused by Merrill's negligence. Merrill answered, denying such negligence, and, as a separate and distinct defense, alleged that the acts complained of were in no sense the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Dennis, but that the direct, independent, and proximate cause of such injuries was the negligence of Reece, the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding. Upon the trial of the case, the defendant, at the close of plaintiff's evidence, presented a motion for a directed verdict, which was overruled. This motion was renewed at the close of all the evidence and was again overruled. From a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

[1] 1. It is the first contention of the appellant that the trial court erred in submitting the cause to the jury, because the evidence failed to show that the alleged negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of. The question of appellant's negligence is not raised in this appeal, but it is contended that, conceding the negligence of the appellant, the evidence shows that the driver of the car in which appellee was riding was negligent and that this negligence, and not appellant's negligence, was the proximate cause of the collision with the team and the injuries sustained by appellee. Many cases are cited by appellant, and the greater portion of his argument is devoted to this proposition. It must be admitted that the courts have not always agreed in their definition of “proximate cause,” and that the application of the rule of proximate cause of the facts of particular cases has frequently resulted in confusion. Appellant argues that, where the negligence of one person does no more than furnish a condition under which the separate and independent negligence of another person results in injury to a third person, the real proximate cause of such injury is the negligence of the second person and not the negligence of the first person; and he contends that in the instant case the appellant's negligence did no more than furnish a condition under which the driver of the car in which appellee was riding committed separate and independent acts of negligence which caused the collision with the team and are the sole proximate cause of appellee's injuries. If the condition brought about by appellant's negligence did no more than to make the collision possible, the rule for which he contends might apply. But, if the negligence complained of not only brings about a condition under which injuries may result, but is such that the injuries are the natural result of the negligence, it would be the proximate cause even though other independent negligence intervened. We think the test as to what constitutesa proximate cause is fairly stated in Burk v. Creamery Pkg. Co., 126 Iowa, 730, loc. cit. 734, 102 N. W. 793, 795, 106 Am. St. Rep. 377, wherein we said: “While there are some loose expressions in the books to the effect that one is not liable for negligence unless the results of his acts might reasonably have been foreseen by him, the true doctrine, as we understand it, is that it is not necessary to a defendant's liability that the consequences of his negligence should have been foreseen. It is sufficient if the injuries are the natural, though not the necessary or inevitable, result of the wrong; such injuries as are likely, under ordinary circumstances, to ensue from the act or omission in question. The test, after all, is, would ordinary prudence have suggested to the person sought to be charged with negligence that his act or omission would probably result in injury to some one? The particular result need not be such as that it should have been foreseen.”

[2] We do not think it can be said, as a matter of law, that a team of horses with the tongue and running gear of a wagon attached to them, which is loose and uncontrolled on a paved...