Dennis v. State, 175

• Decision Date: 07 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 175,175
• Citation: 13 Md.App. 564,284 A.2d 256
• Parties: David DENNIS v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 564

13 Md.App. 564

284 A.2d 256

David DENNIS v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 175.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 7, 1971.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 7, s972.

John E. Jacob, Jr., Salisbury, for appellant.

Donald R. Stutman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Fulton P. Jeffers, State's Atty., for Wicomico County, for appellee.

Argued before ORTH, THOMPSON and MOYLAN, JJ.

MOYLAN, Judge.

The narrow question presented on this appeal is What is that quality of testimony required to rebut the universally-recognized presumption of sanity at the time of an alleged offense and to cast upon the State the burden of proving criminal responsibility, as it must prove all other elements of an offense, beyond a reasonable doubt?

The appellant, David Dennis, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County by a jury, presided over by Judge E. McMaster Duer, of rape. No question is before us as to the satisfactory establishment by the State of the corpus delicti of the crime. Nor is there any question before us of the criminal agency of the appellant, save in terms of his criminal responsibility.

The appellant had entered and went to trial upon, inter alia, a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged offense. In accordance with proper procedure see Jenkins v. State, 238 Md. 451, 209 A.2d 616, and Strawderman v. State, 4 Md.App. 689, 244 A.2d 888, testimony was taken on the question of criminal responsibility by the trial judge outside the presence of the jury. At the conclusion of that preliminary examination, the trial judge ruled that the appellant had not produced satisfactory evidence of insanity to cross the threshold and to rebut the presumption of sanity. He, therefore, refused to submit the issue to the jury. The appellant appeals from that ruling.

Article 59, Section 25, sets out the essentially two-part test for criminal insanity. It provides:

'A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct and shall be found insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime if, at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disorder, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. As used in this section, the terms 'mental disorder' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.'

At issue in the instant case is not the 'substantial capacity' of the appellant 'to appreciate the criminality of his conduct'-the so-called cognitive aspect of the test-but solely the 'substantial capacity' of the appellant 'to conform his conduct to the requirements of law'-the so-called volitional aspect of the test.

The primary defense witness was Dr. Frances Reid Nabors, a doctor of medicine specializing in psychiatry and serving on the staff of the Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital. There is no question but that Dr. Nabors was an expert witness, qualified to express an opinion on the ultimate question of criminal responsibility. See Saul v. State, 6 Md.App. 540, 252 A.2d 282. It is also clear that Dr. Nabors was offering testimony not to 'some undefined mental disorder or instability,' see Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150; Cole v. State, 212 Md. 55, 128 A.2d 437; Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502; Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913, but to the ultimate consideration of the 'substantial capacity' of the appellant here to 'conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' The only question before us is whether the ultimate opinion expressed by Dr. Nabors had sufficient probative value to cross the threshold and 'to raise a question in the minds of reasonable men as to whether he (the appellant) is or is not sane.' Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md. 599, 165 A.2d 918; Strawderman v. State, supra. We hold that it had not.

The testimony of Dr. Nabors was both vacillating and equivocal. Her first tentative testimonial offerings were encouraging to the appellant's cause. After making the initial observations that the appellant had an I.Q. of 67 which she classified as 'borderline defective'; that he suffered hallucinations; that he suffered a sex-connected delusion that his sexual performance was so satisfying to the female that even the victim of a forcible rape would not report him; that he believed that 'the way not to get mentally sick was to have plenty of sex with women'; that he was 'extremely oversexed' amounting to 'satyriasis'; and that he was dangerous to women, Dr. Nabors testified that the appellant was, at the time of the commission of the offense, suffering from schizophrenia. She further testified that in her opinion the appellant was not able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

On cross-examination, however, Dr. Nabors testified that it was she who had presented the appellant's case to the staff conference at Clifton T. Perkins and that it was the unanimous opinion of that conference, including herself, that the...