Denny v. Jones

• Decision Date: 01 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11-cv-00249-LTB
• Parties: DANIEL L. DENNY, Applicant, v. SUSAN JONES, and JOHN SUTHERS, The Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

DANIEL L. DENNY, Applicant, v. SUSAN JONES, and JOHN SUTHERS, The Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 11-cv-00249-LTB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Dated: September 1, 2011

Senior Judge Lewis T. Babcock

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Babcock, J.

This matter is before me on the pro se Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Application") [# 1] filed on January 31, 2011, by Applicant Daniel L. Denny. Respondents have filed an Answer to Habeas Petition ("Answer") [# 14], and Applicant has filed a Response to Respondents' Answer to Habeas Petition ("Reply") [# 15].

After reviewing the pertinent portions of the record in this case including the Application, the Answer, the Reply, and the state court record [#'s 18, 19, and 23], I conclude that the Application should be denied.

I. Background

Originally, Applicant was charged in six separate cases with numerous crimes, including burglary, criminal mischief, menacing, stalking, assault, possession of a forged instrument, and violation of a protection order. Applicant pled guilty to two counts of second degree burglary charges in Adams County District Court Case Nos. 06CR3887and 07CR257. The remaining four cases were dismissed. Before sentencing, Mr. Denny filed a Colo. R. Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced him to twenty years of incarceration in the DOC. Mr. Denny appealed, but the Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA) affirmed the trial court's denial. See State of Colo. v. Denny, No. 08CA2387 (Colo. App. Oct. 22, 2009). Mr. Denny filed a petition for certiorari review that was denied on February 8, 2010. Pre-Answer Resp. at Exs. G and H.

Mr. Denny then, on January 31, 2011, submitted an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to this Court. Mr. Denny asserted three claims in the Application, including that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his Rule 32(d) motion because his plea attorney coerced him into pleading guilty and the prosecution failed to argue prejudice based on withdrawal of the plea; (2) the plea attorney told the court that he waived the factual basis of the plea when he had not, the prosecution did not stipulate to the lack of a factual basis in the plea, and appellate counsel failed to submit a transcript of the providency hearing to the appeals court; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 32(d) motion because he had shown a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his plea, and he had a constitutional right to go to trial.

On April 29, 2011, I entered an order dismissing Claim Two as unexhausted in part and as procedurally barred in part and directed Respondents to file an Answer in compliance with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases that fully addresses the merits of Claims One and Three. Respondents filed an Answer on May 25, 2011, and Applicant filed a Reply on June 9, 2011.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

I must construe the Application liberally because Applicant is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, I cannot act as an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

I review claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) is whether Applicant seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time his conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. Furthermore,

clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context.

House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008).

If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of my inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018. If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, I must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: (a) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases"; or (b) "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d [665,] 669 [(10th Cir. 2006) ] (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405). "The word 'contrary' is commonly understood to mean 'diametrically different,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually opposed.' " Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (citation omitted).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08. Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable application may occur if the state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply.

House, 527 F.3d at 1018.

My inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable application" clause is an objective one. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A] decision is 'objectively unreasonable' when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671.

In addition,

evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations. It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786, --- U.S. --- (Jan. 19, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). I "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[ ] the state court's decision" and then "ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. "[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citation omitted). "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (Internal quotations marks and citation omitted).

Under this standard, "only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. Furthermore,

[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.

I review claims of factual errors pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Romano v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1145, 1154 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2002). Section 2254(d)(2) allows a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Pursuant to § 2254(e)(1), I must presume that the state court's factual determinations are correct, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1982), and Applicant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, see Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1997). "The standard is demanding but not insatiable . . . [because] '[d]eference does not by definition preclude relief.' " Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).

A claim, however, may be adjudicated on the merits in state court even in the absence of a statement of reasons by the state court for rejecting the claim. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. ("[D]etermining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion...