Densmore v Jefferson County, 1000264
Decision Date | 20 September 2001 |
Docket Number | 1000264 |
Parties | Ray Densmore et al. v. Jefferson County et al. 1000264 SPECIAL TERM, 2001 SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 0 |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (CV-98-1314)
This appeal is from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants. It involves the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature relating to the discharge of storm waters in Jefferson County and municipalities located therein or partially therein.
The specific legal issues presented are (1) whether Act No. 95-775, Ala. Acts 1995, codified at § 11-89C-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Storm Water Act"), is a local act that was not properly advertised, (2) whether the codification of the Act into the Code by the Legislature had the effect of making it a general act, and (3) whether the storm-water fees authorized by Jefferson County Ordinance No. 97-1532, adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Act, amount to an unconstitutional levy.
After carefully reviewing the law relating to the effect codification of a statute has on the classification of a law as being "general" or "local," we conclude that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to this issue. Furthermore, after reviewing the methodology used to implement the Act, as shown by the record before us, we conclude that the summary judgment was proper as to this issue also. Consequently, we affirm.
The Storm Water Act was adopted by the Legislature in 1995. In the preamble to the Act, the Legislature stated, in pertinent part:
§ 11-89C-1, Ala. Code 1975.
Section 11-89C-2 defined, in pertinent part, the term "governing body":
It seems apparent from a reading of this section of the Storm Water Act that the Act would apply in Jefferson County at the time of its enactment. The parties stipulated that the legislation was not advertised as the Constitution of 1901 would require for local legislation.
In March 1997, acting pursuant to the provisions of the Storm Water Act, Jefferson County, along with 23 municipalities located within Jefferson County or partially therein, formed the Storm Water Management Authority, Inc., and, as authorized by the Storm Water Act, the Jefferson County Commission approved Ordinance No. 97-783, in July 1997, entitled: "An Ordinance to levy storm water management program fees on parcels of property located within the unincorporated limits of Jefferson County." The Ordinance provided, in part:
The original plaintiffs, Phillip Ford and Shannon Ford, filed this class action on March 2, 1998, challenging the constitutionality of the Storm Water Act and the storm-water fee imposed by the county ordinance.1 They named as defendants the Jefferson County Commission, the Storm Water Management Authority, and the tax assessor of Jefferson County.
The plaintiffs amended the complaint to add Ray Densmore and Brenda Densmore, the appellants here, as plaintiffs and the 23 municipalities in Jefferson County as defendants; the plaintiffs subsequently moved to dismiss the original plaintiffs, and they were dismissed.
The defendants timely answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment; they subsequently filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The motion was accompanied by supporting affidavits and other documents. After receiving briefs from the parties and hearing oral argument from both sides, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the Storm Water Act had been properly enacted as a general law and that any constitutional infirmities in the Storm Water Act had been cured when the Act was codified into the Code of Alabama and carried into the Cumulative Supplement to the Code. The plaintiff appealed. The two arguments that both sides address are whether the Storm Water Act was a local act that was not properly adopted by the Legislature and whether the fees imposed on property owners were valid and enforceable.
We first state the scope of our review, which was recently stated in Watkins v. Board of Managers of the City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System and Firemen's & Policemen's Supplemental Pension System, [Ms. 1992215, Feb. 9, 2001] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2001): when reviewing a ruling on a motion for a summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard the trial court used in determining whether the evidence before the court made out a genuine issue of material fact. When a party moving for a summary judgment makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. "Substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved. West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
We first consider the summary judgment as it relates to the plaintiffs' claim that the Storm Water Act is a local law and not a general law. The plaintiffs argue that the Legislature, in adopting the act, failed to comply with Art. IV, § 106, Const....
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