Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply

• Decision Date: 20 February 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:15-CV-01873-LJO-SKO
• Parties: Ronald Densmore, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mission Linen Supply, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

164 F.Supp.3d 1180

Ronald Densmore, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Mission Linen Supply, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-CV-01873-LJO-SKO

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed February 20, 2016

Filed February 22, 2016

Ronald W. Makarem, Makarem & Associstes, APLC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Rafael Gonzalez, Mullen and Henzell LLP, Santa Barbara, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Lawrence J. O'Neill

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On October 13, 2015, Plaintiff Ronald Densmore commenced this action, individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, against his former employer Mission Linen Supply (“Mission”) and Does 1-20, inclusive, in Fresno County Superior Court. Doc. 2, Ex. 1 (“Compl.”). Densmore's Complaint, containing nine causes of action, alleges that Defendants violated provisions of the California Labor Code and Business and Professions Code. Id.

Mission removed the action to this Court on December 11, 2015, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

. Doc. 2. Now before the Court is Mission's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6), arguing that eight of the causes of actions in the Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and Densmore's Motion to Remand this action to state court (Doc. 7). The parties have filed timely oppositions (Docs. 9, 10) and replies (Doc. 11, 13) in connection with the pending Motions.

The matters are appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefing in light of the relevant law, the Court will GRANT Densmore's Motion to Remand and DENY AS MOOT Mission's Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set forth below.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Densmore was employed by Mission, a retailer who sells linens, uniforms and related products to various companies, as commercial truck driver from 2011 to July 29, 2015. Compl. ¶ 16; Doc. 6-1, at 1. Densmore, a non-exempt employee, typically worked for Mission at least eight hours per day, five days per week, until his termination. Compl. ¶ 17. Densmore's Complaint alleges that he and the other class members would work more than eight hours in one day, more than forty hours in one week, and would not receive the requisite compensation for the overtime hours they worked. Id. ¶ 18. The Complaint alleges that Mission failed to provide Densmore and the other class members with the requisite thirty-minute meal breaks, that Mission would nevertheless “clock [Densmore] out” for a meal break when Densmore did not actually take a meal break, that Mission deducted meal breaks from Densmore's shifts, and failed to provide ten-minute rest breaks. Id. ¶ 19. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that Densmore and the class members were not paid the wages they earned upon termination of their employment, including their overtime work. Id. ¶ 20. Specifically, the Complaint sets forth the following causes of action in violation of California labor laws: (1) failure to pay overtime wages, in violation of section 510 of the California Labor Code

(“CLC”); (2) failure to pay all wages earned on each regular pay period, in violation of CLC § 204; (3) failure to provide meal periods, in violation of CLC §§ 226.7 and 512 and the applicable Wage Order¹ ; (4) failure to provide rest periods, in violation of CLC §§ 226.7 and 512 and the applicable Wage Order; (5) failure to furnish accurate wage statements, in violation of CLC § 226(a); (6) failure to pay earned wages upon termination or discharge, in violation of CLC §§ 201 and 202; (7) failure to maintain required records, in violation of CLC §§ 226 and 1174; (8) failure to indemnify for business expenses incurred, in violation of CLC § 2802; and (9) unfair competition, in violation of section 17200 of the California Business & Professions Code (“CBPC”). Compl. ¶¶ 32-85.

Mission, invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

, removed the Complaint to this Court, arguing that state court jurisdiction over Densmore's claims is preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which gives to federal courts original jurisdiction over actions brought for violations of a contract between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. Doc. 2. Mission asserts that at all times relevant to this action, it was and is an employer employing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined by the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq. , and at all times relevant to this action during which Densmore was employed by Mission, he was represented by a labor organization (“Union”) and employed pursuant to collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). Id. , at 3.

On December 18, 2015, Mission moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

eight of the nine causes of action contained in the Complaint. Doc. 6. Mission contends that: (1) the existence of CBAs governing Densmore's employment with Mission exempts Mission from the CLC's statutory requirements upon which the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action in the Complaint are based; (2) the fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action must fail because they are derivative of the first four causes of action, and (3) because the ninth cause of action depends upon the first seven causes of action, it must also fail. Id. , at 4-6. Densmore opposes the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Mission has not demonstrated that any CBA applied to him specifically, and that even if the CBAs apply, they fail to exempt Mission from provisions of the CLC that form the bases of the causes of action in the Complaint. Doc. 9, at 3-6. Densmore further argues that the remaining causes of action are rooted in independent requirements under California law. Id. , at 7-8.

On December 29, 2015, Densmore moved to remand this action to state court, arguing that removal to federal court was improper because the causes of action in the Complaint are not preempted by LMRA § 301, as they do not require interpretation of any CBA for their resolution, and involve “non-negotiable rights conferred onto Plaintiff as a matter of state law.” Doc. 7, at 4-6. Densmore moreover seeks attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

. Id. , at 6-7. Mission opposes the Motion to Remand on the same grounds cited in its Motion to Dismiss regarding the preemptive effect of § 301 in this case. Doc. 10, at 9-16.

At this juncture, the Court notes that the adjudication of both Mission's Motion to Dismiss and Densmore's Motion to Remand turn upon (1) whether any CBAs governed during the period Densmore was employed by Mission; and (2) whether under LMRA § 301, the CBAs preempt all causes of action in the Complaint. If even one of the causes of action was preempted pursuant to § 301, the Court would deny Densmore's Motion to Remand, as “the other issues raised by the Complaint would come within the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court even if only tangentially involved with the CBA.” Buck v. Cemex , No. 1:13–cv–00701–LJO–MJS, 2013 WL 4648579, *6 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 29, 2013)

. However, if § 301 preemption does not apply in any of the claims, the Court must remand this case to state court and deny as moot Mission's Motion to Dismiss. Sanchez v. Calportland Co. , No. 2:15–cv–07121–CAS–SHx, 2015 WL 6513640, *5 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 26, 2015).

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 301 of the LMRA (“§ 301”), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)

, states in relevant part:

“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties ...”

The Supreme Court has noted that the LMRA “does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.” Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. , 353 U.S. 448, 456–57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957)

; see also

Local 174, Teamsters of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co. , 369 U.S. 95, 103–04, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) (“The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute”). As a result, because “[a]n action arising under § 301 is controlled by federal substantive law even though it is brought in state court,” the Supreme Court has deemed it proper for such cases to be removed to federal court under federal question jurisdiction. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 375, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers , 390 U.S. 557, 560, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968).

Section 301 preemption subsequently expanded “beyond cases specifically alleging contract violation to those whose resolution is ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.’ ” Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. , 255 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir.2001)

(en banc) (citing Allis

–

Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) ). “The preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.’ ” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust , 463 U.S. 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). “Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.” Id.

Nevertheless, “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a [CBA], is...