Dent v. Nat'l Football League

• Decision Date: 17 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. C 14-02324 WHA,C 14-02324 WHA
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: RICHARD DENT, JEREMY NEWBERRY, ROY GREEN, J.D. HILL, KEITH VAN HORNE, RON STONE, RON PRITCHARD, JAMES MCMAHON, MARCELLUS WILEY, and JONATHAN REX HADNOT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, a New York unincorporated association, Defendant.

RICHARD DENT, JEREMY NEWBERRY, ROY GREEN, J.D. HILL, KEITH VAN HORNE,RON STONE, RON PRITCHARD, JAMES MCMAHON, MARCELLUS WILEY,and JONATHAN REX HADNOT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, a New York unincorporated association, Defendant.

No. C 14-02324 WHA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 17, 2014

ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

INTRODUCTION

In this putative class action alleging improper administration of pain medications to professional football players, defendant has filed two sets of motions to dismiss the operative complaint, based on (1) preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act; and (2) the statute of limitations and improper pleading. To the extent stated herein, the motion to dismiss under Section 301 is GRANTED. Defendant's other motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT.

STATEMENT

The following well-pled facts are assumed to be true for purposes of the present motions. Defendant National Football League is an unincorporated association of 32 separately-ownedand independently-operated professional football "clubs" or teams across the country. Named plaintiffs are ten retired individuals who played for a number of those individual football teams at various points in time, some as early as 1969 and others as recently as 2012 (Second Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 23-49, 55). On May 20, 2014, those ten plaintiffs sued the NFL and are now on their second amended complaint.

Here is the nub of it. Since 1969, doctors and trainers from the individual clubs have allegedly supplied players with a consistent string of pain medications — including opioids, Toradol and other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medications, local anesthetics, and combinations thereof — all in an effort to return players to the game, rather than allow them to rest and heal properly from serious, football-related injuries. The medications "were often administered without a prescription and with little regard for a player's medical history or potentially-fatal interactions with other medications," and were distributed in ways that violated federal laws (both criminal and civil) as well as the American Medical Association's Code of Ethics (id. ¶¶ 10-22, 63-122).

For example, while still playing football, plaintiffs "rarely, if ever, received written prescriptions" for their pain medications, which could come in either injection or pill form. "The bulk of their pills [were] not in bottles . . . but rather in small manila envelopes that often had no directions or labeling," and "NFL doctors and trainers" would then fail to disclose to plaintiffs the side effects and risks posed by such medication, instead rushing plaintiffs to return to the field (regardless of the injuries still suffered). The result now is that after years of taking such medication without proper disclosure about the medical side effects and risks, plaintiffs suffer from debilitating physical and mental heath issues, including nerve, knee, and elbow injuries that never healed properly, heart disease, renal failure, and drug addiction (id. ¶¶ 23-49, 242-47, 287).

The operative complaint seeks relief against the league, the NFL, not against the clubs. It asserts nine claims: (1) declaratory relief; (2) medical monitoring; (3) fraud; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) negligence per se in connection with the federal Controlled Substances Act, the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, "state laws," andethical codes governing the acquisition, storage, dispensation, and record keeping of prescription medications; (7) loss of consortium on behalf of putative class members' spouses; (8) negligent hiring of medical personnel; and (9) negligent retention of medical personnel (id. 373-80).

Now, the NFL has filed two sets of motions to dismiss. First, the league argues that plaintiffs' negligence and fraud-based claims i.e., Claims Three, Four, Five, Six, Eight, and Nine, are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a). This motion also asserts that all remaining claims i.e., Claims One, Two, and Seven, are derivative such that they too are preempted. Second, the league moves to dismiss the operative complaint as time-barred under the statute of limitations, for failure to plead fraud-based claims with sufficient particularity, and for failure to plead other claims adequately. Both sides also request judicial notice of various documents relating to medical studies, workers' compensation proceedings, arbitration matters, and other topics.

Following the hearing on November 6, 2014, the Court propounded a series of requests for additional briefing, including from the union (which is not a party herein). The Court thanks counsel for their prompt follow-up and responses.

ANALYSIS

1. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Defendant appended the various collective-bargaining agreements as exhibits to its motion to dismiss (Curran Exhs. 1-13). Defendant also appended several player grievance letters to its brief. The Court then requested that both parties explain whether or not the Court could consult these agreements and grievance letters in ruling on defendant's Rule 12 motion. Both parties agreed that under FRE 201(b), the Court should judicially notice the agreements and letters (Dkt. Nos. 95, 97-98, 105). Accordingly, defendant's requests for judicial notice of Curran Exhibits 1-13 and Nash Exhibit A are GRANTED. Because this order need not consider the other materials for which the parties seek judicial notice, those requests are DENIED AS MOOT.

2. PREEMPTION AND SECTION 301 IN THE SUPREME COURT.

Unlike ordinary contracts, collective-bargaining agreements enjoy preemptive effect over state common law duties. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act governs "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. 185(a). In enacting Section 301, Congress intended that the rights and duties created through collective-bargaining, involving as they do the collective strength of the unionized workers and their employer, should ordinarily trump common law remedies.

In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957), the Supreme Court concluded that Congress, through Section 301, had authorized federal courts to create a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements, "which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."

In Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962), the Supreme Court concluded that "in enacting Section 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." Lucas Flour described the need for strong enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements:

The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation.

In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985), the Supreme Court examined an employee's state law tort action against his employer for bad faith handling of disability-benefit payments due under a collective-bargaining agreement. The employee alleged that his employer and its insurance company breached a state law duty to act in good faith in paying disability benefits. Allis-Chalmers held that "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in alabor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim, or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law." A tort claim "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract" must be deemed preempted under Section 301. The Court found that the claims against the employer and the insurer were thus preempted under Section 301. Significantly, Allis-Chalmers went beyond preempting only claims in express conflict with a collective-bargaining agreement.

Lastly, in International Brotherhood Of Electric Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 (1987), the Supreme Court concluded that "we must determine if respondent's claim is sufficiently independent of the collective-bargaining agreement to withstand the pre-emptive force of Section 301." The Court determined that plaintiff's claim was not sufficiently independent. In assessing tort liability, "a court would have to ascertain, first, whether the collective-bargaining agreement in fact placed an implied duty of care on the union to ensure that Hechler was provided a safe workplace, and, second, the nature and scope of that duty, that is whether, and to what extent, the union's duty extended to the particular responsibilities alleged by respondent in her complaint. Thus, in this case, as in Allis-Chalmers, it is clear that 'questions of contract interpretation . . . underlie any finding of tort liability.'" Id. at 862 (internal citations omitted). Again, an express conflict between the claim asserted and the collective-bargaining agreement was not required.

In sum, Section 301 preempts state-law claims that are "founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements," as well as claims that are "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining...