Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company
Decision Date | 08 January 1969 |
Docket Number | 24811-24813.,No. 24810,24789,24810 |
Citation | 406 F.2d 399 |
Parties | James C. DENT and United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Appellees. John A. HYLER et al., Appellants, v. REYNOLDS METAL COMPANY et al., Appellees. Alvin C. MULDROW et al., Appellants, v. H. K. PORTER COMPANY, Inc., et al., Appellees. Worthy PEARSON et al., Appellants, v. ALABAMA BY-PRODUCTS CORPORATION et al., Appellees. Rush PETTWAY et al., Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, and United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Appellants, v. AMERICAN CAST IRON PIPE COMPANY, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Leroy D. Clark, Jack Greenberg, Robert Belton, New York City, Elihu I. Leifer, D. Robert Owen, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Russell Specter, E. E. O. Comm., Washington, D. C., Sanford Jay Rosen, Baltimore, Md., for appellants.
William F. Gardner, Jerome A. Cooper, Birmingham, Ala., Richard R. Lyman, Toledo, Ohio, for appellees.
Robert L. Carter, New York City, Orzell Billingsley, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., Richard F. Bellman, New York City, for appellants.
James R. Forman, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., Howell T. Heflin, Tuscumbia, Ala., Clarence F. Rhea, Gadsden, Ala., Jerome Cooper, Birmingham, Ala., for appellees.
Oscar W. Adams, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., Jack Greenberg, Leroy D. Clark, Robert Belton, New York City, Sanford Jay Rosen, Baltimore, Md., for appellants.
Lucien D. Gardner, Jr., William F. Gardner, Jerome A. Cooper, Birmingham, Ala., Bernard Kleiman, Gen. Counsel, United Steelworkers of Am., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellees.
Leroy D. Clark, Jack Greenberg, Robert Belton, New York City, Oscar W. Adams, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., Sanford Jay Rosen, Baltimore, Md., for appellants.
Drayton T. Scott, Jerome Cooper, William F. Gardner, Birmingham, Ala., for appellees.
Leroy D. Clark, Jack Greenberg, New York City, Oscar W. Adams, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., Elihu I. Leifer, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Macon L. Weaver, U. S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., Russell Specter, Equal Emp. Oppor-Comm., Washington, D. C., Sanford Jay Rosen, Baltimore, Md., for appellants.
James R. Forman, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for appellees.
John Doar, Asst. Atty. Gen., David L. Norman, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Kenneth F. Holbert, Acting General Counsel, David R. Cashdan, Atty., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, of counsel.
Albert Rosenthal, New York City, David Shapiro, Cambridge, Mass., James M. Nabrit, III, New York City, for appellants Dent, Muldrow, Pearson, Pettway and others; Hawkins, Rhea & Mitchell, Gadsden, Ala., of counsel.
Mulholland, Hickey & Lyman, Toledo, Ohio, for appellees Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America; Clarence Mann, General Chairman of Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America; Clyde Vinyard, Chairman of Local 60 of Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen of America, in Case No. 24810.
Alfred D. Treherne, General Counsel, Washington, D. C., International Union of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, Cooper, Mitch & Crawford, Birmingham, Ala., for appellee International Union of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, in Case No. 24812.
Paul R. Moody, St. Louis, Mo., Paul R. Obert, Pittsburgh, Pa., Drayton Nabers, Jr., Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner & Clark, Birmingham, Ala., for appellees, St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., H. K. Porter Co., Inc., Alabama By-Products Corp.
Before COLEMAN and CLAYTON,* Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
Because they present the same legal issue, with no substantial factual differences, these cases were consolidated for appellate disposition. The District Court held that actual conciliation atempts by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission proceeding under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e et seq. was jurisdictionally prerequisite to the maintenance of an action in the courts under Title VII, 265 F.Supp. 56 (N.D.Ala., 1967). We reverse.
The facts in the Dent case may be taken as illustrative of the group.
September 10, 1965, Dent filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a charge that the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company and the Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen of America were violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The substance of the complaint was that the railway company had, on account of race, terminated the employment of Dent and other Negroes, eliminated the job classifications in which they were employed and excluded them from employment in and training programs for other job classifications; that the railway company maintains racially segregated facilities, and that the Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen maintains racially segregated local unions, with Local No. 60 being all-white and Local No. 750 being all-Negro — these locals being the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees of the railway company.
October 8, 1965, copies of Dent's charges were served on the company and the Brotherhood.
December 8, 1965, the Commission issued a decision, after investigation, to the general effect that there was reasonable cause to believe that the company and the Brotherhood were violating Title VII.
December 15, 1965, the company was informed of this decision by letter from the Commission's executive director. This letter also discussed the Commission's desire to engage in conciliation, but advised the company that an action would possibly be filed before conciliation could be undertaken. On this point, the executive director wrote:
There was no conciliation.
Neither the company nor the Brotherhood made any effort to promote conciliation. Because of the unexpectedly large number of complaints that were filed with the Commission and the extremely small staff available, the Commission made no further effort to promote conciliation.
By letter dated January 5, 1966, the Commission advised Dent that "the conciliatory efforts of the Commission have not achieved voluntary compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964". The letter continued:
The action was filed in the District Court on February 7, 1966. As stated, the district court dismissed on the ground that "conciliation * * * is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of a civil action under Title VII".
Section 706(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a), after making reference to the receipt by the Commission of a charge of unlawful employment practice, provides:
Section 706(e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), provides:
"If, within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission * * * (except that * * * such period may be extended to not more than sixty days upon a determination by the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary compliance are warranted), the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved, and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge * *."
Section 706(e) further provides:
"Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending * * * the efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance."
Thus it is quite apparent that the basic philosophy of these statutory provisions is that voluntary compliance is preferable to court action and that efforts should be made to resolve these employment rights by conciliation both before and after court action. However, we are of the opinion that a plain reading of the statute does not justify the conclusion that, as a jurisdictional requirement for a civil action by the aggrieved employee under Section 706(e), the Commission must actually attempt and engage in conciliation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently considered and decided this issue in companion cases, Ray Johnson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company and Charles W. Walker v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 405 F.2d 645. That Court held:
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