Denton v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 04 October 1898
• Docket Number: 18,553
• Citation: Denton v. Arnold, 151 Ind. 188, 51 N. E. 240 (Ind. 1898)
• Parties: Denton v. Arnold
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

51 N.E. 240

151 Ind. 188

Denton v. Arnold

No. 18,553

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 4, 1898

From the Harrison Circuit Court.

Affirmed.

Benjamin P. Douglass, John V. Denton and Tracewell & Mitchell, for appellant.

William Ridley, for appellee.

OPINION

Jordan, J.

The appellant instituted this action, whereby she sought, under the first paragraph of her complaint, to recover possession of twenty-five acres of land therein described situated in Harrison county, Indiana, and by the second paragraph to quiet title to the same premises.

An answer in three paragraphs was filed by the appellee. The facts alleged in the first may be summarized as follows: Appellant is the widow of Joseph Denton, who died some time in the year 1876, the owner of the real estate in suit. In 1878 one William H. Hudson was, by the Harrison Circuit Court, appointed administrator de bonis non of the estate of the said Joseph Denton. There being debts existing against said estate, it became necessary, in the course of the administration thereof, to sell the real estate of said decedent to pay such debts and liabilities. Two-thirds of the land of which the decedent died seized, appear, in the first instance, to have been sold by the administrator, by order of the court, for the purpose of paying and discharging the debts and claims against the estate, and the real estate now in controversy was ordered by the court, in partition proceedings, to be set off to appellant as her interest in the lands of her deceased husband. At the death of the decedent, and at the time the particular tract of land now in dispute was set off to appellant, there existed against it a mortgage lien for $ 500, as unpaid purchase-money therefor, in favor of one Murr, guardian, etc., and also a lien for unpaid taxes, and an additional lien of an indemnity mortgage for $ 200, held by one Samuel Ramsey.

It is shown by the averments of the answer that the two-thirds of the real estate originally sold by the administrator, proved to be insufficient to pay off and satisfy the claims and liabilities existing against the estate; and that consequently, Hudson, as administrator, at the May term, 1883, of the Harrison Circuit Court, filed his petition therein, praying for an order of said court authorizing him to sell the real estate now in controversy, for the purpose of paying and discharging said purchase mortgage lien and also the lien of the indemnifying mortgage, together with taxes alleged to have been due thereon.

Appellant was made a party to the said petition and proceedings to sell said real estate, and was duly notified of the pendency of the said petition. At said term of court, on June 13, 1883, the administrator obtained an order of the court, authorizing him to sell said tract of land as prayed for, for the purpose of paying and discharging said purchase mortgage lien, together with the liens averred to have existed against it by virtue of said indemnity mortgage and delinquent taxes; and in pursuance of said order of court, and in compliance therewith, after giving the notice required by law, the administrator, on July 18, 1883, sold the real estate at public sale, to the appellee, William J. Arnold, for $ 632, which amount was more than two-thirds of the appraised value thereof. This sale was duly reported to the court by the administrator, and by the court approved and confirmed, and, appellee having paid in full the purchase price, the administrator, on March 1, 1886, by order of the court, executed to him a deed for said real estate, which conveyance was by the court approved and confirmed; and appellee took possession of the land under his said purchase, and has ever since held possession thereof. The second paragraph of the answer alleges substantially the same facts as were set out in the first, being more particular and specific, perhaps, in the averment of the facts than is the first. Appellee subsequently filed a third additional paragraph of answer, but to this latter paragraph no demurrer appears to have been filed. The first and second paragraphs of the answer were each, upon demurrer, held sufficient as a defense to the action, and these rulings of the court are assigned as errors.

The debatable or controlling question between the parties to this appeal relates to the sufficiency of the facts as disclosed by the answer to repel the collateral attack which the answer exposes that the appellant is seeking to make against the order of the Harrison Circuit Court, made in the proceedings under which the land in controversy was sold and conveyed to the appellee by Hudson as administrator of Joseph Denton, the deceased husband of appellant, to satisfy the lien of the purchase-money mortgage. It is settled by the authorities that a proceeding in the proper court, by an administrator, to sell the land of his decedent, for the payment of debts and claims existing against the estate, stands upon the same ground as does an ordinary judicial proceeding in a court of superior jurisdiction, and, when the court is invested with jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties to such an action, its order or judgment therein will be protected against a collateral attack, however erroneous such judgment or order may be, and such order or judgment must stand and prevail against the parties thereto, until set aside in a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose. Gavin v. Graydon, 41 Ind. 559; Walker v. Hill, 111 Ind. 223, 12 N.E. 387; Thomas v. Thompson, 149 Ind. 391, 49 N.E. 268; First Nat'l Bank v. Hanna, Admr., 12 Ind.App. 240, 39 N.E. 1054, and cases there cited; Bailey v. Rinker, 146 Ind. 129, 45 N.E. 38; 1 Thornton & Blackledge on Admr. and Set. Dec. Estates, p. 325, and cases there cited.

It is insisted by counsel for appellant that the court was not invested with power to order the sale of the land, which appellant had acquired as the widow of the decedent, for the payment of debts existing against the estate. As a general proposition this is correct, but, that proposition, is not the one which the facts, as averred in the answer, present for our consideration. It appears that the land in controversy was owned and held by the appellant's husband at the time of his death, encumbered with and subject to a mortgage lien for unpaid purchase-money to the amount of $ 500. It is also shown that the land was still subject to said lien after the death of the decedent, when it was set off to appellant as her interest in his real estate. Two-thirds of the decedent's lands seem to have been previously sold by the administrator, upon the order of the court, for the payment of debts and liabilities of the estate, and the proceeds arising out of such sale, as it is averred, were not sufficient to pay and satisfy the debts and liabilities. The reason why the taxes, the purchase-money mortgage, and the indemnity mortgage, were not paid and satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the two-thirds of the decedent's lands, is not disclosed by the answer. It must be conceded as true that it was the duty of the administrator to have applied the money in his hands, belonging to the estate, not required to pay other claims or demands expressly preferred by law, to the payment of liens upon the real estate of the decedent in order to fully secure to the appellant, as widow, her interest in the lands of her husband. Sparrow v. Kelso, 92 Ind. 514; ...