Denton v. Duckworth, 87-2819

• Decision Date: 08 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-2819,87-2819
• Citation: 873 F.2d 144
• Parties: Royce E. DENTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 144

873 F.2d 144

Royce E. DENTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 87-2819.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 26, 1988.

Decided April 17, 1989.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied June 8, 1989.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied June 8, 1989.

Warren Byrd, Law Student, Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Ind., for petitioner-appellant.

Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondents-appellees.

Before COFFEY, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Royce Denton was convicted by a jury of rape in Marion County (Indiana) Superior Court in 1981. The same jury, in a bifurcated proceeding, also found that Denton was an habitual offender under Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-8. ¹ As a result, Denton's fifteen-year sentence was "enhanced" by an additional thirty years. As a separate part of the original indictment, the State of Indiana had alleged in support of the habitual offender charge that Denton had been convicted of four prior unrelated felonies. Denton was, the separate part of the indictment alleged, convicted in 1963 of grand larceny, in 1970 of theft, in 1975 of rape and commission of a crime of violence, and in 1979 of escape.

In 1983, the state trial court in which Denton was convicted of rape in 1975 vacated that conviction. As a result, Denton then moved for correction of his sentence for the 1981 rape conviction. The Marion County Superior Court granted this motion and set aside the finding of habitual offender status.

The Superior Court judge, however, also granted the State of Indiana leave to refile its charge as to the habitual offender count. It did so by an information in September of 1984, alleging three of the originally alleged prior convictions, and excluding the (now vacated) 1975 rape conviction. In December of 1984, the state moved to amend its information by alleging a new prior unrelated felony conviction of Denton, that of unlawful possession of mail in 1977. The Marion County Superior Court permitted this amendment to the information, and the second hearing on Denton's habitual offender status ensued. On May 2, 1985, the jury returned a finding of habitual offender status, and the court reenhanced Denton's original sentence by thirty years.

Denton appealed the finding of habitual offender status to the Indiana Supreme Court, which affirmed. Denton v. State, 496 N.E.2d 576 (Ind.1986). Denton then filed his petition for habeas corpus in the Northern District of Indiana on April 2, 1987, alleging a violation of his rights under the double jeopardy clause as to the redetermination of his habitual offender status, and under the due process and equal protection clauses as to the amendment of the information. The district court denied Denton's petition, and he appeals.

I. Discussion

A. Double Jeopardy Clause

Denton's argument that redetermination of his habitual offender status was barred by the double jeopardy clause must fail. Double jeopardy does not attach in cases where the defendant succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through either direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to his conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 1589, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11-19, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to this rule, holding that when a defendant's conviction is reversed by an appellate court on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, double jeopardy attaches, and the defendant cannot be retried. In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the Court extended the application of Burks to a separate capital sentencing proceeding which, because the prosecution had to prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt, "resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence." Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438, 101 S.Ct. at 1858. Previous sentencing procedures to which it held double jeopardy did not attach did not have, unlike the proceeding at issue in Bullington, "all the hallmarks of the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence." Id. at 439, 101 S.Ct. at 1858.

Our analysis of this case requires two inquiries: first, whether this case falls under Bullington, and second, whether this case comes under the trial error exception to the prohibition against double jeopardy. Cf. Lockhart v. Nelson, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 285, 289 n. 6, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (calling Bullington issue "logical antecedent" of trial error issue, but asserting that it was not necessary to decide the former issue, which was decided by the courts below and conceded by the state on appeal, in that case). Denton argues that the Indiana habitual offender statute is like the capital sentencing proceeding in Bullington, and he urges that we follow the Fifth Circuit, which has held the double jeopardy clause applicable to a similar statute. See Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). ² He next contends that this is a case where the prior finding of habitual offender status was reversed on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, and not for trial error. Hence, Denton argues, the double jeopardy clause should bar redetermination of whether he is an habitual offender.

In Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985), we said This court agrees that Indiana's habitual offender statute ... does not create a separate crime. Rather, the statute authorizes the enhancement of a convicted felon's sentence for an underlying felony, if the convict has accumulated at least two prior unrelated felony convictions.... Thus, an habitual criminal who receives an enhanced sentence pursuant to an habitual offender statute does not receive additional punishment for his previous offenses, or punishment for his recidivist status as such, but rather receives a more severe punishment for his most recent felonious offense.

(citations omitted) (emphasis added). ³ See also Durham v. State, 464 N.E.2d 321 (Ind.1984) (statute does not establish a separate offense, but rather provides for the imposition of a more severe sentence for the substantive crime charged). Noting that the use of prior convictions in this manner itself does not violate the double jeopardy clause, we held in Baker that one jury's finding that the defendant in that case was not an habitual offender did not bar the state from presenting the same two felonies it alleged in the first proceeding to the second jury at the habitual offender phase of Baker's second trial for theft. Id. at 304-06.

Denton argues that Baker is distinguishable from his case because Baker involved two separate trials and two distinct underlying offenses, 752 F.2d at 305. He claims that the Indiana habitual offender statute is like the statute at issue in Bullington, because the prosecution bears the burden of proving habitual offender status by competent evidence, and because this status cannot be found unless the state proves the past convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. This case presents circumstances similar, however, to those in Durham. In that case, the jury in defendant's first trial convicted him of the underlying offenses, but did not find that he was an habitual offender. When the underlying convictions were set aside due to error, the state refiled the charges for the two underlying counts and also filed an amended habitual offender count which alleged four prior felony convictions, including the two prior convictions which had been the basis of the first habitual offender count. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the rule in Bullington did not apply to habitual offender determinations. It said there:

The death penalty is the most extreme penalty authorized by law and for that reason alone warrants unique treatment. It can only be applied within the specific facts of a particular case. The habitual offender status, however, is a continuing status of a particular defendant as long as he has two or more felony convictions on his record. The state may use this status any time the defendant commits a further crime and a jury's determination that a defendant is not a habitual offender during a particular trial is not an "acquittal" of that defendant's status as a habitual offender.

Durham, 464 N.E.2d at 324.

The Indiana Supreme Court also distinguished the habitual offender statute from a bifurcated death penalty proceeding like the one in Missouri because the latter "involved a consideration of the particular facts underlying the substantive offense.... Because the habitual offender statute does not create new or separate offenses and the habitual offender proceeding does not deal with the underlying facts on the substantive charge, the use of prior convictions at more than one habitual offender proceeding does not constitute double jeopardy." Durham, 464 N.E.2d at 325 (quoting Baker v. State, 425 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind.1981), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985)) (emphasis in original). ⁴ We agree with the Indiana court that the habitual offender statute, which does not create a separate offense or require consideration of the underlying facts on the substantive charge, is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Bullington, and thus double jeopardy does not attach.

We do not find persuasive the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Bullard. It distinguished the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) ⁵ by noting that the "availability of enhancement [under the Texas statute at issue in Bullard ] depended upon a finding that certain...