Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Arrighi

• Decision Date: 18 March 1904
• Parties: DENVER & R.G.R. CO. v. ARRIGHI.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

129 F. 347

DENVER & R.G.R. CO. v. ARRIGHI.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 18, 1904

Wm. W Field (Wolcott, Vaile & Waterman and E. N. Clark, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Harvey Riddell (William L. Dayton, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Arrighi the plaintiff below, was a switchman in the service of the railroad company in its yards at Salida, Colo. The railroad company was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce as well as in commerce within the state. On the evening of November 19, 1901, Arrighi was injured while endeavoring to effect a coupling of two narrow-gauge freight cars, one of which was at the time employed in moving interstate traffic. Neither car was equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact. The drawbars of each were equipped with old-style link and pin couplings. It therefore became necessary for Arrighi to go between the ends of the cars in the performance of his duty. In making the coupling his left hand was crushed between the drawheads, resulting in the loss of the first three fingers thereof and the corresponding metacarpal bones. He brought suit against the railroad company, and at the trial rested his right to recover solely upon the failure of the defendant to comply with the provisions of the act of Congress of March 2, 1893, c. 196 (27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp St. 1901, p. 3174), requiring the equipment of cars used in moving interstate traffic with couplers operating automatically. He recovered a judgment for $10,000, and the defendant prosecuted a writ of error from this court.

Before SANBORN, VAN DEVANTER, and HOOK, Circuit Judges.

HOOK Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .

The trial court denied a request of the defendant that the jury be instructed to return a verdict in its favor for the reason that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to his injury. The action of the court in that respect is assigned as error. Prior to the time when the act of Congress became fully operative, the employes of a railroad company subject to its provisions, engaged in coupling cars used in moving interstate traffic, but not equipped with automatic couplers assumed the ordinary risks and hazards of that employment, and the company was not liable to them for injuries resulting therefrom. The common-law doctrine of the assumption of risk was then applicable. But a new rule is prescribed by the act. It specifically provides that the employes shall no longer rest under the burden of that assumption in respect of any car used contrary to its provisions. While this is true, the railroad company is not thereby deprived of the defense of contributory negligence. With an exception, unnecessary to be noted here, the risks and dangers of an employment which at common law are assumed by the employe are not those which arise from the negligence of either party. And when the burden of those assumed risks and dangers were lifted from...