Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Young

• Citation: 70 P. 688,30 Colo. 349
• Parties: DENVER & R. G. R. CO. v. YOUNG.
• Decision Date: 06 October 1902
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

70 P. 688

30 Colo. 349

DENVER & R. G. R. CO. v. YOUNG.

Supreme Court of Colorado

October 6, 1902

Appeal from district court, Arapahoe county.

Action for personal injuries by Martha Young against the Denver &amp Rio Grande Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Reversed.

Walcott, Vaile & Waterman and W. W. Field, for appellant.

T. W Lipscomb, George W. Taylor, and John A. De Weese, for appellee.

GABBERT J.

Plaintiff is a married woman, residing with her husband at and since the time of sustaining her alleged injuries. On the subject of damages the court advised the jury to the effect that, if the verdict was in favor of plaintiff, she was entitled to such reasonable amount as would compensate her for her inability to perform manual labor, resulting from her injuries, and, in fixing the amount of her recovery, there should be taken into consideration her loss of time resulting from her incapacity to labor. The objection urged against this instruction is that it permitted the jury to assess damages which she was not entitled to recover. The material testimony to consider in connection with this instruction is to this effect: That prior to her injury the plaintiff, in addition to doing her ordinary household work took care of and milked three cows, made and delivered butter, and did other outside manual labor; that since sustaining her injuries she has been unable to perform any manual labor whatever. Our statutes provide that a married woman may sue and be sued in all matters having relation to her property or person in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, that she may carry on any trade or business and perform any labor or services on her sole and separate account, and that the earnings from these sources shall be her individual property. Sections 3009, 3012, 3020, 2 Mill's Ann. St. While these provisions have relieved a married woman from many of the disabilities imposed under the common law, they have not abrogated all the common-law relations of husband and wife. She is still required to perform the usual and ordinary household duties. For services of this character she is not entitled to any monetary compensation from her husband. Her services on this account belong to him, and hence the instruction, in so far as it authorized the jury to allow her damages which would compensate her for her inability to perform manual labor, was too broad, because it authorized damages to be assessed for her inability to perform her household duties proper. City of Wyandotte v. Agan, 37 Kan. 528, 15 P. 529; Thomas v. Town of Brooklyn, 58 Iowa 438, 10 N.W. 849; Railway Co. v. McGinnis 46 Kan. 109, 26 P. 453; 3 Suth. Dam. (1st Ed.) 723; 3 Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) § 952; Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 N.Y. 343; Minick v. City of Troy, 19 Hun, 253; 2 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 486. The cases cited by counsel for plaintiff in support of their contention that this instruction is correct are entirely different from the one at bar, and do not in any manner conflict with our ruling that a married woman cannot recover damages on account of her inability to perform her ordinary household duties. In Hamilton v. Railway Co. (Mont.) 43 P. 713, it was held that, in an action by a wife for personal injuries, she may recover damages for any impairment of her capacity to earn money; but that is not this case, because her inability to perform household duties is not an item for which she can recover, because she is not entitled to compensation in money for such labor from her husband. In Jordan v. Railway Co., 138 Mass. 425, it appears that a married woman, previous to an injury, had been earning a certain sum per annum by taking in sewing, the proceeds of which she applied to the support of her family and husband. The court very properly held that she was entitled to recover for the diminution of her capacity to do this work, resulting from the injuries sustained, because her capacity to earn money in that way was her own; but that, it will be readily understood from what we have already said, presents a case entirely different from the one at bar, in so far as it relates...