Denver Ry Co v. Harris

• Decision Date: 27 May 1887
• Citation: 30 L.Ed. 1146,122 U.S. 597,7 S.Ct. 1286
• Parties: DENVER & R. G. RY. CO. v. HARRIS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

122 U.S. 597

7 S.Ct. 1286

30 L.Ed. 1146

DENVER & R. G. RY. CO. v. HARRIS.

May 27, 1887.

[Syllabus from page 597 intentionally omitted] This action was brought by James Harris, the defendant in error, against the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company, a corporation of the state of Colorado, to recover damages for injuries which he alleges were sustained by him, in his person, by reason of an illegal and wrongful assault made by that company, acting by its servants and agents. The plea was not guilty. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $9,000. The judgment was affirmed in the supreme court of the territory, and has been brought here for review.

The defendant introduced no evidence, although its officers were the chief actors on the occasion when the plaintiff was injured. The case made by the latter, and other witnesses testifying in his behalf, is stated by the supreme court of the territory in the following extract from its opinion: 'The record discloses the fact that there was evidence on the trial in the lower court to the effect that about the tenth or twelfth of June, 1879, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company was in peaceable possession, by its agents and employes, of a certain railroad in the state of Colorado, running from Alamosa to the city of Pueblo, in that state; that at or about that date, and while the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company were so in possession of said railroad, the plaintiff in error, the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company, by an armed force of several hundred men, acting as its agents and employes, and under its vice-president and assistant general manager, attacked with deadly weapons the agents and employes of said Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company having charge of said railroad, and forcibly drove them from the same, and took forcible possession thereof; that there was a demonstration of armed men all along the line of the railroad seized, and while this was being done, and the seizure was being made, the defendant in error, who was an employe of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, on said line of railroad, and while on the track of the road, and on a hand car thereon, in the line of his employment, was fired upon by men as he was passing, and seriously wounded and injured; that immediately upon the seizure of the railroad as aforesaid the plaintiff in error accepted it, and at once entered into possession thereof, and commenced and for a time continued to use and operate the same as its own.'

[Argument of Counsel from pages 599-604 intentionally omitted] E. O. Wolcott, Chas. M. Da Costa, and C. A. Seward, for plaintiff in error.

John H. Knaebel, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts of the case in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

One of the propositions advanced by counsel for the company is this: That it appears from the plaintiff's case, and by his evidence, that he voluntarily armed himself, and, taking the law into his own hands, joined an illegal assembly, for the purpose, if necessary, of committing murder; that, in the course of the riot and rout, he received a wound at the hands of those whom he had sought by violence to destroy; that, under such circumstances, the law will not permit him to recover for an alleged assault, but conclusively presumes his assent thereto; nor will the law permit him to recover through the medium and by the aid of an illegal transaction, to which he was a party, and which constitutes the foundation of his case. The same proposition was stated in another form in argument: That the plaintiff engaged voluntarily, and not for his necessary self-defense, in a physical combat with others, and cannot, upon principle, maintain a civil action to recover damages for injuries received in such combat at the hands of his adversary, unless the latter beat him excessively or unreasonably; this, upon the ground that, 'where two parties participate in the commission of a criminal act, and one party suffers damages thereby, he is not entitled to indemnity or contribution from the other party.'

These propositions have no application in the present case. The evidence, taken together, furnishes no basis for the suggestion that the plaintiff voluntarily joined an illegal assembly for the purpose, if necessary, of committing murder, or any other criminal offense; nor does it justify the assertion that he voluntarily engaged in a physical combat with others. All that he did on the occasion of his being injured was by way of preparation to protect himself, and the property of which he and his co-employes were in peaceable possession, against organized violence. It appears in proof as stated by the court below, that the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company was in the actual, peaceable possession of the road, when the other company, by an armed body of men, organized and under the command of its chief officers, proceeded, in a violent manner, to drive the agents and servants of the former company from the posts to which they had been respectively assigned. It was a demonstration of force and violence, that disturbed the peace of the entire country along the line of the railway, and involved the safety and lives of many human beings. It is a plain case, on the proof, of a corporation taking the law into its own hands, and, by force and the commission of a breach of the peace, determining the question of the right to the possession of a public highway established primarily for the convenience of the people. The courts of the territory were open for the redress of any wrongs that had been, or were being, committed against the defendant by the other company. If an appeal to the law, for the determination of the dispute as to right of possession, would have involved some delay, that was no reason for the employment of force,—least of all, for the use of violent means under circumstances imperiling the peace of the community and the lives of citizens. To such delays all, whether individuals or corporations, must submit, whatever a y be the temporary inconvenience resulting therefrom. We need scarcely suggest that this duty, in a peculiar sense, rests upon corporations, which keep in their employment large bodies of men, whose support depends upon their ready obedience of the orders of their superior officers, and who, being organized for the accomplishment of illegal purposes, may endanger the public peace,...