Deoudes v. G.B. Macke Corporation

• Decision Date: 07 July 1959
• Docket Number: No. 2356.,2356.
• Citation: 153 A.2d 309
• Parties: John N. DEOUDES and John D. Cokimos, trading as D. C. Novelty Company, Appellants, v. G. B. MACKE CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 309

153 A.2d 309

John N. DEOUDES and John D. Cokimos, trading as D. C. Novelty Company, Appellants, v. G. B. MACKE CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Appellee.

No. 2356.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued March 23, 1959.

Decided July 7, 1959.

Leonard C. Collins, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Francis J. Robinson, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before ROVER, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

HOOD, Associate Judge.

Appellee, The G. B. Macke Corporation, hereafter referred to as Macke, sued appellants Deoudes and Cokimos, a partnership, trading as D. C. Novelty Company, hereafter referred to as D. C. Novelty, alleging that D. C. Novelty had unlawfully interfered with the contract relationship between Macke and one Gogos. Trial resulted in a judgment for damages in favor of Macke and D. C. Novelty has appealed.

The record contains no statement of proceedings and evidence or transcript of the testimony and the only record which we can consider is the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.¹ Our question is whether the findings of fact support the judgment.

The findings disclose that Gogos operated two restaurants and on December 14, 1956, she entered into a contract with Macke by which it was given exclusive rights for one year to place its cigarette vending machines in the two restaurants. On June 5, 1957, the contract was extended to December 14, 1958. For some time prior to January 10, 1958, D. C. Novelty was doing business with Gogos, placing and servicing juice boxes at the two restaurants. On January 10, 1958, Gogos sought a loan from D. C. Novelty and, representing that her contract with Macke had expired, offered as consideration for the making of the loan to give D. C. Novelty a contract to place its cigarette vending machines in her two restaurants. As a result D. C. Novelty made the loan to Gogos and obtained from her a contract dated January 10, 1958, for the exclusive privilege for one year of placing its machines in the restaurants.² On January 13, 1958, Macke's counsel notified D. C. Novelty's counsel that Macke's contract with Gogos had not expired. Nevertheless, on January 20, 1958, Gogos took Macke's machines out of operation, and pushed them aside, and on that date D. C. Novelty's machines were placed in the restaurants. Thereafter, at the request of Gogos, Macke removed its machines.

The trial court also found that in June 1957 D. C. Novelty knew that Macke's machines were in the restaurants under a contract with Gogos; that prior to January 10, 1958, D. C. Novelty knew that Macke's contract with Gogos contained a renewal clause,³ and that on January 10, 1958, D. C. Novelty knew that Macke's machines were in the restaurants. The court further found "no actual malice, or willful or wanton disregard" by D. C. Novelty of Macke's rights, but found that D. C. Novelty placed its machines in the restaurants "solely in the belief that they did so in furtherance of their own contract rights."

On the above findings the court concluded that D. C. Novelty "interfered with the contract relationship" between Macke and Gogos, "preventing performance of the existing contract." Accordingly the court awarded damages to Macke.

While the authorities are not entirely in accord on all phases of the subject dealing with the law concerning liability for interference with contractual relations, we believe that it is correctly stated in 1 Harper & James, Torts, § 6.5 (1956) that: "The core of this protection is to be found in the common law tort principle that one who intentionally induces another to break a valid contract is, unless his conduct is privileged, liable for damages legally caused thereby."⁴ We think it is generally agreed that one cannot intentionally induce the breach of a contract if he has no knowledge of the contract. "All that the law requires as essential to establish intentional action on the part of the defendant company to act in a manner which would induce the breach of plaintiff's contract is a knowledge of the contract rights of the plaintiff, and that plaintiff's contract was still in effect." Meyer v. Washington Times Co., 64 App. D.C. 218, 222, 76 F.2d 988, 992, certiorari denied 295 U.S. 734, 55 S.Ct. 646, 79 L.Ed. 1682. "If defendant, knowing of the contract,...