Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Nev.
Decision Date | 29 May 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 64474,64474 |
Parties | DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AGING AND DISABILITY SERVICES DIVISION, Appellant, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF NEVADA, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
An unpublished order shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority. SCR 123.
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review of a final decision made by respondent Public Utilities Commission of Nevada (PUC). First Judicial District Court, Carson City; James E. Wilson, Judge.
Appellant Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, Aging and Disability Services Division (ADSD), contends that the PUC erred when it altered the budget for deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers that the ADSD submitted to the PUC (ADSD's budget) to exclude the funding of services without a nexus to telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system.1 The ADSD argues that in so doing, the PUC prejudiced the ADSD's substantial rights by (1) exceeding the PUC's statutory authority, or (2) making a decision that was affected by an error of law. For thereasons stated below, we conclude that the PUC misinterpreted NRS 427A.797 when it altered the ADSD's budget and therefore exceeded its statutory authority.
NRS 703.373(11); see also Nev. Power Co., 122 Nev. at 834, 138 P.3d at 495.
The ADSD is not limited in using the surcharge money at the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers to funding services with a nexus to telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system
The PUC's interpretation of NRS 427A.797 is an issue of law that we review de novo. Nev. Power Co., 122 Nev. at 834, 138 P.3d at 495. We interpret unambiguous statutes based on their plain meaning. D.R, Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 468, 476, 168 P.3d 731, 737 (2007). "A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in two or more senses by reasonably well-informed persons." Id.
As an initial matter, we address whether the surcharge money may only be used to fund services with a nexus to telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system. Here, the statutory scheme is helpful. See In re CityCenter Constr. & Lien Master Litig., 129 Nev. ___, ___, 310P.3d. 574, 580-81 (2013) ( ); Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev. ___, ___, 287 P.3d 305, 315 (2012) ( ).
NRS 427A.010(2). Inasmuch as NRS 427A.797 is unclear regarding the specific services that the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers may provide and what must be funded by the surcharge money, the statutory scheme and its stated purpose offers a reliable basis for concluding that the Legislature intended something broader than what the PUC purports. Thus, we hold that the surcharge may fund services at the centers that serve the various interests in NRS 427A.010.
The PUC lacks authority to determine ADSD's budget
The first provision of NRS 427A.797 (the "program provision") requires the ADSD to create and manage a program that helps people with impaired speech or hearing obtain and use telecommunication devices or a "dual party-relay system." NRS 427A.797(1). While the program provision tasks the ADSD with creating and managing the program, it also requires the program to be "approved by the [PUC]." Id.
The second provision of NRS 427A.797 (the "surcharge provision") requires "the Commission" to establish a surcharge amount that customers of telephone companies must pay. NRS 427A.797(2). The amount of the surcharge must be enough to (1) finance the program concerning telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system that the ADSD creates and manages, (2) "[f]und the centers for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing operated by this State," and (3) cover a portion of costs that the ADSD incurs in carrying out the provisions of a statutory scheme regarding regulation of interpreters and realtime captioning providers. Id.
The third provision of NRS 427A.797 (the "account provision"), creates an "Account for Services for Persons With Impaired Speech or Hearing" that the ADSD administers. NRS 427A.797(3). The money that the ADSD obtains pursuant to the surcharge provision is credited to this account, which can be used for enumerated purposes, including:
Thus, in both the surcharge provision and the account provision, the Legislature identified funding for the program that concerns telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system separately from funding for the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers. Given that the Legislature, on two occasions, listed the telecommunication device/dual-relay system program separately from the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers, and since the Legislature did not mention the centers when defining the telecommunication device/dual-relay system program, we find that the centers are distinct from the program and its purpose.
The language in NRS 427A.797 does not authorize the PUC to alter the ADSD's budget. The program provision permits the PUC to approve or disapprove of the program concerning telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system. NRS 427A.797(1). The surcharge provision permits the PUC to "establish by regulation" the amount of the surcharge that must be "sufficient to . . . [c]over the costs of the program," which provides telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system, and to fund the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers. NRS 427A.797(2).Therefore, at most, the PUC can approve or disapprove of the program concerning telecommunication devices and the dual-relay system and set a surcharge rate to finance that program and the deaf-and-hard-of-hearing centers. See NRS 427A.797.
However, that is not to say that the PUC must set the surcharge rate at whatever level the ADSD requests. The PUC is still bound by NRS 704.001(4), which requires the PUC to provide customers with just and reasonable utility rates. Thus, while the PUC cannot approve or disapprove of funding for individual budget items of the ADSD, it may find that the overall amount requested by the ADSD leads to an unjust or unreasonable surcharge rate for customers, and it may adjust the surcharge rate accordingly. See Nevada Power Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 948, 957, 102 P.3d 578, 584 (2004) ( ).2
We hold that the PUC misinterpreted NRS 427A.797 and, thus exceeded its statutory authority when it altered the ADSD's budget. As a result, the PUC prejudiced the ADSD's substantial rights because it precluded the ADSD from exercising authority that it possessed. Therefore, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED and REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
/s/_________, J.
Parraguirre
/s/_________, J.
Saitta
The majority identifies the question on appeal as being whether the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by "alter[ing] the ADSD's budget." Majority at 1. In actuality, the conduct by the PUC in question intrudes less into the ADSD's domain than the majority'scharacterization of the circumstances suggests, inasmuch as the PUC only acted to "set[ ] the telecommunication device for the deaf surcharge rate per access line for telecommunication customers in Nevada" by refusing to fund items in the ADSD's budget that lacked a nexus to telecommunication devices for the deaf. Thus, the central issue raised here is more properly framed as the extent to which an executive agency like the ADSD, which has neither...
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