Dep't of Healthcare & Family Servs. ex rel. Hodges v. Delaney
| Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1-20-1186 |
| Parties | The DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES EX REL. Jacqueline HODGES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terrance DELANEY, Respondent-Appellant |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Ben J. Mahon and Laura SB Vallejo, of Greater Chicago Legal Clinic, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Benjamin F. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee.
¶ 1 In 2003, the Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Department) filed a petition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Support Act) ( 750 ILCS 22/100 et seq. (West 2002)) on behalf of Jacqueline Hodges to determine the existence of a parental relationship between respondent Terrance Delaney and Hodges's daughter Terriana1 and to establish respondent's support obligations (support petition). Respondent was allegedly served through substitute service, and a default judgment was entered against him in early 2004.
¶ 2 In 2012, respondent filed a petition claiming that he had never been served with the support petition and sought to vacate the default judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010) ). In 2013, the trial court struck the section 2-1401 petition, with leave to refile it, when respondent did not appear in court to argue it.
¶ 3 In 2019, respondent filed a second section 2-1401 petition challenging the support petition, again claiming that he had never been served with process. However, the trial court ultimately denied respondent's section 2-1401 petition, finding that respondent had not demonstrated due diligence in raising the defect in service, due to the several-year gap between his first and second section 2-1401 petitions. Respondent appeals, and for the reasons that follow, we reverse.
¶ 5 On February 20, 2003, the Department, on behalf of Hodges, filed a uniform support petition against respondent pursuant to the Support Act, seeking a finding of paternity and establishment of an order of support with respect to Hodges's daughter Terriana, who was 22 months old at the time.
¶ 6 The sheriff's office allegedly served respondent via substitute service. The return of service form provided that respondent was served at an address on Chase Avenue on April 2, 2003, when a copy of the summons and complaint were left with an individual named "William Delaney," who was listed as respondent's "brother"; the summons and complaint were also allegedly mailed to respondent at that address.
¶ 7 On July 16, 2003, the trial court entered a default order of parentage, finding that respondent was the father of Terriana; respondent was not present at the court hearing. The court reserved the issue of support, continuing the matter for a later hearing on September 16, 2003. The case was continued several more times until the Department withdrew the support petition on January 21, 2004, due to Hodges's failure to supply an affidavit as to her expenses and financial needs. On February 18, 2004, the Department filed a motion to vacate the January 21, 2004, order after Hodges supplied the requested affidavit, which was granted on April 22, 2004. On May 24, 2004, the trial court entered a support order, ordering respondent to pay $200 per month in child support as well as $25 per month for retroactive child support; respondent's child support obligation was to terminate on April 2, 2019, when Terriana turned 18. Again, respondent was not present in court.
¶ 8 On October 23, 2012, respondent filed a pro se appearance and a pro se motion, claiming that he had never been contacted about the support petition. Respondent claimed that he had never resided at the Chase Avenue address at which he had been allegedly served, nor did he know anyone by the name of "William Delaney." Respondent sought to reopen the case to challenge the paternity and support orders.
¶ 9 On November 15, 2012, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of respondent, and the trial court granted counsel leave to amend respondent's motion, which it characterized as a petition filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code.
¶ 10 On January 15, 2013, through counsel, respondent filed an amended petition, which sought to vacate the trial court's parentage and support orders pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code and to quash service pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2010) ). Respondent claimed that he did not reside at the Chase Avenue address, nor had he resided there at the time of the alleged substitute service. Instead, respondent had lived at an address on Touhy Avenue from 2002 to 2003 and had been living at an address on Ridge Boulevard since 2004. In support, respondent attached (1) his affidavit; (2) a September 18, 2002, letter from the circuit court of Cook County adult probation department, which showed his address as the Touhy Avenue address; (3) an April 18, 2003, letter from the Social Security Administration, which showed his address as the Touhy Avenue address; and (4) the title to his Honda Accord, issued October 19, 2004, which showed his address as the Ridge Boulevard address.
¶ 11 Respondent also claimed that he had a meritorious defense to the judgments against him, and he alleged in his affidavit that he was never lawfully served. Respondent additionally claimed that he had acted with due diligence because he had no knowledge of the proceedings against him until October 2012, when he was informed of the proceedings. In his affidavit, respondent averred that he was incarcerated with the Cook County Department of Corrections in 2009 and was sentenced to three years with the Illinois Department of Corrections on June 11, 2010. He was released on December 13, 2011, and in October 2012 discovered his driver's license was suspended. When respondent contacted the Secretary of State's office, he was informed that his license had been suspended due to past-due child support. Shortly thereafter, respondent filed his pro se motion seeking to vacate the orders.
¶ 12 Before respondent's petition was ruled on, respondent's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, claiming that irreconcilable differences had made counsel's continued representation impossible. On August 7, 2013, the trial court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and gave respondent 21 days to obtain new counsel.
¶ 13 Also on August 7, 2013, the trial court struck respondent's section 2-1401 petition with leave to refile because respondent was not present in court.
¶ 14 On October 3, 2019, respondent filed another pro se motion to vacate the support order. Respondent again claimed that he had never been served with process and that he had been incarcerated for the past 10 years and had no steady income or employment. The matter was continued several times, and on January 27, 2020, respondent filed another pro se petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code, seeking to vacate the order of parentage and the support order as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Again, respondent claimed that he never lived at the Chase Avenue address and that "William Delaney" was not a family member. Attached to the petition were (1) the affidavit of respondent's brother, who averred that respondent resided with him at the Touhy Avenue address at the time of the alleged service and that they did not have a family member named "William Delaney"; (2) the affidavit of respondent, who averred that he resided at the Touhy Avenue address with his brother at the time of the alleged service and did not have a family member named "William Delaney"; (3) the September 18, 2002, letter from the circuit court of Cook County adult probation department, addressed to respondent at the Touhy Avenue address; and (4) the April 18, 2003, letter from the Social Security Administration, addressed to respondent at the Touhy Avenue address.
¶ 15 In its response, filed on February 19, 2020, the Department addressed only respondent's October 3, 2019, motion and did not address his January 27, 2020, petition. In its response, the Department argued that respondent's motion should be denied because "his claim is self-serving and is not credible." The Department further argued that respondent's motion should be denied because he first raised the claims as to the adequacy of service in 2012 but failed to appear in court on that petition and waited six years before filing a new motion, demonstrating a lack of diligence. Additionally, the Department claimed that respondent's delay in refiling after his initial petition meant that his claims should now be barred by laches. Finally, the Department claimed that respondent's motion should be denied because respondent failed to name Terriana, who was now an adult, as a necessary party.
¶ 16 On February 26, 2020, the trial court entered an order, finding that on October 3, 2019, respondent filed a motion, which was heard on January 22, 2020. After arguments were presented, the court continued the motion and set a briefing schedule. However, respondent then filed another petition on January 27, 2020. The court found that Consequently, the court struck the January 27, 2020, petition.
¶ 17 In his reply, respondent attached and incorporated the January 27, 2020, petition and its exhibits. Respondent further claimed that his allegations were supported by affidavits, as well as by the letters he submitted, and that the Department did not provide any counteraffidavits. Respondent also argued that his previous filings were never substantively decided and that jurisdictional defects did not require a showing of due diligence. Similarly, respondent contended that he...
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