Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam
Decision Date | 25 June 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 19-161,19-161 |
Citation | 207 L.Ed.2d 427,140 S.Ct. 1959 |
Parties | DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Petitioners v. Vijayakumar THURAISSIGIAM |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler for the petitioners.
Lee Gelernt, New York, NY, for the respondent.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Morgan L. Ratner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Erez Reuveni, Joshua S. Press, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the Petitioners.
Cody Wofsy, Stephen B. Kang, Adrienne Harrold, Morgan Russell, Cecillia D. Wang, American Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, San Francisco, CA, Lucas Guttentag, Stanford, CA, David Loy, Sarah Thompson, ACLU Foundation of San, Diego & Imperial Counties, San Diego, CA, Lee Gelernt, Omar C. Jadwat, Jonathan Hafetz, Anand V. Balakrishnan, Celso J. Perez, American Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, New York, NY, David D. Cole, American Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Every year, hundreds of thousands of aliens are apprehended at or near the border attempting to enter this country illegally. Many ask for asylum, claiming that they would be persecuted if returned to their home countries. Some of these claims are valid, and by granting asylum, the United States lives up to its ideals and its treaty obligations. Most asylum claims, however, ultimately fail, and some are fraudulent. In 1996, when Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546, it crafted a system for weeding out patently meritless claims and expeditiously removing the aliens making such claims from the country. It was Congress's judgment that detaining all asylum seekers until the full-blown removal process is completed would place an unacceptable burden on our immigration system and that releasing them would present an undue risk that they would fail to appear for removal proceedings.
This case concerns the constitutionality of the system Congress devised. Among other things, IIRIRA placed restrictions on the ability of asylum seekers to obtain review under the federal habeas statute, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that these restrictions are unconstitutional. According to the Ninth Circuit, they unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus and violate asylum seekers’ right to due process. We now review that decision and reverse.
Respondent's Suspension Clause argument fails because it would extend the writ of habeas corpus far beyond its scope "when the Constitution was drafted and ratified." Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 746, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008). Indeed, respondent's use of the writ would have been unrecognizable at that time. Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention, but respondent invokes the writ to achieve an entirely different end, namely, to obtain additional administrative review of his asylum claim and ultimately to obtain authorization to stay in this country.
Respondent's due process argument fares no better. While aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in deportation proceedings, the Court long ago held that Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an alien's lawful entry into this country and that, as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States , 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892). Respondent attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended just 25 yards from the border. He therefore has no entitlement to procedural rights other than those afforded by statute.
In short, under our precedents, neither the Suspension Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires any further review of respondent's claims, and IIRIRA's limitations on habeas review are constitutional as applied.
We begin by briefly outlining the provisions of immigration law that are pertinent to this case. Under those provisions, several classes of aliens are "inadmissible" and therefore "removable." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1229a(e)(2)(A). These include aliens who lack a valid entry document "at the time of application for admission." § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). An alien who arrives at a "port of entry," i.e. , a place where an alien may lawfully enter, must apply for admission. An alien like respondent who is caught trying to enter at some other spot is treated the same way. §§ 1225(a)(1), (3).
If an alien is inadmissible, the alien may be removed. The usual removal process involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, and at that hearing an alien may attempt to show that he or she should not be removed. Among other things, an alien may apply for asylum on the ground that he or she would be persecuted if returned to his or her home country. § 1229a(b)(4) ; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c) (2020). If that claim is rejected and the alien is ordered removed, the alien can appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, if that appeal is unsuccessful, the alien is generally entitled to review in a federal court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(5), 1252(a). As of the first quarter of this fiscal year, there were 1,066,563 pending removal proceedings. See Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Adjudication Statistics: Pending Cases (Jan. 2020). The average civil appeal takes approximately one year.1 During the time when removal is being litigated, the alien will either be detained, at considerable expense, or allowed to reside in this country, with the attendant risk that he or she may not later be found. § 1226(a).
Congress addressed these problems by providing more expedited procedures for certain "applicants for admission." For these purposes, "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival ...)" is deemed "an applicant for admission." § 1225(a)(1).2 An applicant is subject to expedited removal if, as relevant here, the applicant (1) is inadmissible because he or she lacks a valid entry document; (2) has not "been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility"; and (3) is among those whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has designated for expedited removal. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(I)–(II).3 Once "an immigration officer determines" that a designated applicant "is inadmissible," "the officer [must] order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review." § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
Applicants can avoid expedited removal by claiming asylum. If an applicant "indicates either an intention to apply for asylum" or "a fear of persecution," the immigration officer "shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer." §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The point of this screening interview is to determine whether the applicant has a "credible fear of persecution." § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). The applicant need not show that he or she is in fact eligible for asylum—a "credible fear" equates to only a "significant possibility" that the alien would be eligible. Ibid. Thus, while eligibility ultimately requires a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of," among other things, "race" or "political opinion," §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A), all that an alien must show to avoid expedited removal is a "credible fear."4
If the asylum officer finds an applicant's asserted fear to be credible,5 the applicant will receive "full consideration" of his asylum claim in a standard removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the asylum officer finds that the applicant does not have a credible fear, a supervisor will review the asylum officer's determination. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(8). If the supervisor agrees with it, the applicant may appeal to an immigration judge, who can take further evidence and "shall make a de novo determination." §§ 1003.42(c), (d)(1) ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
An alien subject to expedited removal thus has an opportunity at three levels to obtain an asylum hearing, and the applicant will obtain one unless the asylum officer, a supervisor, and an immigration judge all find that the applicant has not asserted a credible fear.
Over the last five years, nearly 77% of screenings have resulted in a finding of credible fear.6 And nearly half the remainder (11% of the total number of screenings) were closed for administrative reasons, including the alien's withdrawal of the claim.7 As a practical matter, then, the great majority of asylum seekers who fall within the category subject to expedited removal do not receive expedited removal and are instead afforded the same procedural rights as other aliens.
Whether an applicant who raises an asylum claim receives full or only expedited review, the applicant is not entitled to immediate release. Applicants "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed." § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Applicants who are found to have a credible fear may also be detained pending further consideration of their asylum applications. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) ; see Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U. S. ––––, ––––, ––––, 138 S.Ct. 830, 836–837, 842, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018).8
The IIRIRA provision at issue in this case, § 1252(e)(2), limits the review that an alien in expedited removal may obtain via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. That provision allows habeas review of three matters: first, "whether the petitioner is an alien"; second, "whether the petitioner was ordered removed"...
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