Dep't of Human Servs. v. C. M. H. (In re S. R. R.)

• Decision Date: 06 May 2021
• Docket Number: CC 18JU06113 (SC S067827)
• Citation: 486 P.3d 772,368 Or. 96
• Parties: In the MATTER OF S. R. R., a Child. Department of Human Services, Respondent on Review, v. C. M. H., Petitioner on Review.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

368 Or. 96

486 P.3d 772

In the MATTER OF S. R. R., a Child.Department of Human Services, Respondent on Review,

v.C. M. H., Petitioner on Review.

CC 18JU06113 (SC S067827)

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and submitted January 7, 2021.

May 6, 2021

Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey, Chief Defender

Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Nakamoto, Flynn, Duncan, Nelson, and Garrett, Justices, and Kistler, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore.^**

FLYNN, J.

This case requires us to determine the nature and scope of the "exclusive original jurisdiction" that ORS 419B.100(1) confers on the juvenile courts over specified categories of "case[s] involving a person who is under 18 years of age." The question arises out of petitioner's challenge to a juvenile court judgment that deprived her of legal-parent status as to S, a child over whom petitioner had claimed a right to custody. According to petitioner, the court's judgment of "nonparentage" is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the juvenile court did not determine that S actually fell within one of the categories specified in ORS 419B.100(1). The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's challenge to the judgment, Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. H. , 301 Or. App. 487, 455 P.3d 576 (2019), and we affirm.

Although we agree with petitioner's premise that the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" refers to the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction, we reject petitioner's contention that the juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under ORS 419B.100(1) unless and until it determines that a child actually falls within one of the specified categories.¹ Here, it is undisputed that this case involved a child who was the subject of a petition alleging that she fell within one of those categories and requesting that the juvenile court exercise its authority to address those allegations. And it is undisputed that proceedings to address the petition were pending when the juvenile court ruled on petitioner's parentage status. We conclude that the allegations and relief sought in the pending petition were sufficient to bring the case within the subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Accordingly, we reject petitioner's contention that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it ruled on petitioner's parentage status, and we express no opinion regarding whether the court otherwise erred in rejecting petitioner's claim of parentage under the circumstances of this case.

I. FACTS

The child at the heart of this case, S, was born when petitioner was married to S's biological mother. Although petitioner and biological mother were not living together at the time of S's birth and divorced shortly thereafter, the marriage gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that petitioner is a legal parent of S, ORS 109.070,² and petitioner had claimed a right to custody of S. Before this case reached the juvenile court, petitioner had unsuccessfully filed a motion in Benton County Circuit Court to enforce a purportedly valid California judgment awarding petitioner custody of S. In opposition to that motion, biological mother had contended that the California judgment was not valid and also had sought to rebut the presumption of petitioner's parentage with DNA evidence that her current fiancé was 99.99% likely to be S's biological father. The circuit court had ruled that petitioner was not relying on a valid judgment from California and had dismissed her custody motion on that basis, but without prejudice.

Shortly after the dismissal of petitioner's custody motion, the Department of Human Services filed the petition in the present case in the Benton County juvenile court, alleging that "[t]he condition and circumstances of [S] are such as to endanger [her] welfare"—one of the categories specified in ORS 419B.100(1). The circumstances alleged in that petition included unsafe conduct by both biological mother and the man whom she claimed was S's biological father, as well as a "domestically violent relationship" between petitioner and biological mother. The department's petition asked the court "to have an investigation made of the circumstances concerning [S] and to make such order or orders as are appropriate in the circumstances."

While that petition was pending before the juvenile court, the department moved for a "judgment of nonparentage" as to petitioner. In support of that motion, the department cited ORS 419B.395(1), which authorizes the juvenile court to enter a judgment of "parentage" or "nonparentage" in a "proceeding under ORS 419B.100" if the court determines that "parentage is disputed as allowed in ORS 109.070" (the presumptive parentage statute). The department supported the motion with the evidence and assertions that biological mother had submitted in opposition to petitioner's earlier custody motion.

Before the juvenile court, petitioner's only opposition to the nonparentage motion was an estoppel argument, in which she alleged that S's biological mother had at times urged petitioner to remain a part of S's life and that it was not in S's best interest to allow anyone to question petitioner's presumption of parentage. The court rejected that argument, ruled that the DNA evidence rebutted the statutory presumption that petitioner was a parent, and entered a judgment concluding that petitioner was not a legal parent of S. Shortly after the court issued its judgment of nonparentage as to petitioner, the department filed a motion to dismiss its pending petition without prejudice, based on a change of circumstances in the home of biological mother and biological father.³ The juvenile court granted the department's motion to dismiss the petition without prejudice, and petitioner then appealed the judgment of nonparentage.⁴

Petitioner raised essentially the same argument in the Court of Appeals that she raises in this court—that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it ruled on petitioner's parentage status because the court had not yet adjudicated the merits of the pending petition alleging that S fell within one of the categories over which the juvenile court has "exclusive original jurisdiction." ORS 419B.100(1). The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's challenge to the judgment, although it did so without expressly analyzing whether the department's pending petition was sufficient to give the juvenile court subject matter jurisdiction under ORS 419B.100(1). C. M. H. , 301 Or. App. at 496, 455 P.3d 576. Instead, the court identified a different statute as the primary source of the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction in this case and also concluded that the juvenile court, having subject matter jurisdiction, "had the authority to decide an issue of parentage under ORS 419B.395(1)."⁵ Id.

II. DISCUSSION

We allowed review to address a recurring question regarding the nature of the juvenile court's "exclusive original jurisdiction" under ORS 419B.100(1). Petitioner's challenge to the judgment of nonparentage in this case rests on two premises: first, that the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" in ORS 419B.100(1) refers to the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction; and second, that ORS 419B.100(1) limits that subject matter jurisdiction to cases in which the court has determined that a person under the age of 18 actually falls within one of the categories set out in the statute. Because the juvenile court in this case did not determine that S's "condition or circumstances" actually were "such as to endanger [her] welfare," as the department had alleged, petitioner concludes that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the parentage dispute.

As described above, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's challenge to the judgment, but did so without specifically analyzing whether the department's pending petition was sufficient to bring the case within the scope of the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction. C. M. H. , 301 Or. App. at 496, 455 P.3d 576. In the course of its analysis, however, the Court of Appeals observed that the juvenile code uses the term "jurisdiction" to refer to multiple, distinct legal concepts. Id. at 495-96, 455 P.3d 576. The first legal concept is "the juvenile court's authority to act at all—often referred to as subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 495, 455 P.3d 576. But the code also uses the term "jurisdiction" to refer to the "the juvenile court's determination to assert jurisdiction over a child," which is a determination that causes "a series of complex statutes and proceedings [to] come into play." Id. at 495-96, 455 P.3d 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).⁶ The court explained that, whereas a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, a challenge to the court's decision "to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction" generally must be raised through a preserved claim of error. Id. And the court concluded that the juvenile court's determination on the merits of the department's ORS 419B.100(1) allegations was "not a prerequisite for that court's authority to act at all, viz ., for the court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 496, 455 P.3d 576.

Shortly before the petitioner filed her opening brief in this court, however, the Court of Appeals decided another case raising a similar challenge under ORS 419B.100(1) and, in that case, expressly rejected the proposition that that statute confers subject matter jurisdiction on the juvenile court only after the court has determined that the child falls within one of the specified categories. Dept. of...