Dep't of Human Res. v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 27 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Sept. Term,2008.,No. 11,11 |
| Citation | 197 Md.App. 48,12 A.3d 179 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Montgomery County Office of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. Andrea Allisonv.Keith Scott MITCHELL, Sr. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bradley J. Neitzel, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Joseph Spillman, Douglas Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.Sameer Sidh, Ellicott City, MD, for appellee.Panel: * SALMON, MEREDITH, and WOODWARD, JJ.WOODWARD, J.
Appellants, the Maryland Department of Human Resources and Montgomery County Office of Child Support Enforcement (“MCOCSE”) 1, appeal from the decision of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County regarding child support due to Andrea Allison (“Andrea”), a resident of Alabama, for the care of her children, Diana Allison (“Diana”) 2 and Keith Scott Mitchell, Jr. (“Keith Jr.”). In January 2007, MCOCSE registered with the circuit court a 1992 New York divorce decree that ordered appellee, Keith Scott Mitchell, Sr. (“Keith Sr.”), to pay child support for his children, Diana and Keith Jr. Keith Sr. at first contested registration of the order but then withdrew his challenge. Later, Keith Sr. and MCOCSE agreed to a Consent Modified Child Support Order. The consent order provided, inter alia, that Keith Sr. was no longer obligated to support Keith Jr. because Keith Jr. was emancipated and that Keith Sr.'s support obligation for Diana was increased.
At the time of the filing of the consent order, however, Keith Sr. filed a request to set aside the declaration of his paternity of Diana. After a DNA test was conducted, it was revealed that Keith Sr. was not Diana's biological father. Thereafter, over MCOCSE's opposition, the circuit court excluded Keith Sr. as the father of Diana, vacated the registration of the New York decree and the Maryland consent order, and nullified Keith Sr.'s child support arrears relating to Diana. This appeal followed.
MCOCSE presents one question for our review, which we have rephrased as two questions 3:
I. Did the circuit court err in concluding that the parentage of Diana had not been determined previously by the State of New York?
II. Did the circuit court err in permitting Keith Sr. to utilize the defense of nonparentage in the proceeding to register and enforce the New York divorce decree?
Finding error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Keith Sr. and Andrea (then Andrea Mitchell) were granted a Divorce Judgment in New York, on March 18, 1992 (the “New York divorce decree” or the “New York support order”). The New York divorce decree noted that Andrea would have custody “of the child(ren) of the marriage, i.e.” Keith Jr., born June 8, 1987, and Diana, born February 17, 1990. The decree further ordered Keith Sr. to pay child support to Andrea in the total amount of $62 per week “for all children.”
On January 24, 2007, at the request of Alabama, MCOCSE filed the New York support order in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”),4 along with a request to file a foreign child support order. On February 15, 2007, Keith Sr., acting pro se, filed an answer to the request to file a foreign child support order in which he raised the defense that Keith Jr. was emancipated. In his answer, Keith Sr. made no mention of Diana or his parentage of her. On April 11, 2007, a hearing was held before a Special Master of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on Keith Sr.'s opposition to MCOCSE's request to file a foreign child support order. At that hearing Keith Sr. withdrew his opposition to the registration of the foreign order. Keith Sr. also signed a Line, filed on April 19, 2007, stating that “[Keith Sr.] withdraws his petition/opposition to registration of the Foreign Support Order.”
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2007, MCOCSE filed a Motion for Modification of the foreign support order in which MCOCSE claimed that the “incomes and expenses of the custodial and non-custodial parents have materially changed, warranting an increase/decrease in the amount of support.” On April 11, 2007, Keith Sr. filed an answer to MCOCSE's motion for modification denying that there had been a material change in the parties' incomes and expenses warranting an increase in the amount of child support. That same day Keith Sr. also filed a Counter–Petition/Motion to Modify Child Support. In his counter-petition, Keith Sr. alleged that “our eldest child, Keith Jr. is emancipated by age and other factors.” Again, Keith Sr. failed to mention Diana or his parentage of her. Indeed, in the request for relief in his counter-petition, Keith Sr. asked the circuit court, among other things, to “reduce the number of minor children from 2 to 1.”
On June 21, 2007, a hearing was held on MCOCSE's motion for modification before a Special Master of the circuit court. At that hearing, a Consent Modified Child Support Order between Keith Sr. and MCOCSE was submitted to the court. The consent order increased Keith Sr.'s child support obligation from $62.00 per week for both children to $483.00 per month for Diana and eliminated any ongoing support obligation for Keith Jr. The consent order also set forth Keith Sr.'s total arrears for both children at $41,345.83 as of June 21, 2007.
On June 21, 2007, Keith Sr. also filed a Request to Set Aside Declaration of Paternity and Request for Modification of Child Support. In his request, Keith Sr. stated his belief that he was not Diana's father because, according to Keith Sr., Andrea “admitted I am not the Father and I was in military [sic] when child was conceived.” In the request, Keith Sr. asked the court to order the parties and Diana to undergo a DNA test to determine whether Keith Sr. could be excluded as Diana's father. MCOCSE filed no response to Keith Sr.'s request for genetic testing, and on July 12, 2007, the circuit court entered an order granting the requested test. On October 11, 2007, MCOCSE filed the results of a paternity test, which determined that Keith Sr. was not Diana's biological father.
On October 17, 2007, MCOCSE filed a response to Keith Sr.'s Request to Set Aside Declaration of Paternity and Request for Modification of Child Support. In its response, MCOCSE claimed that Keith Sr.'s paternity of Diana had been determined under the law of New York by virtue of the New York divorce decree and that under Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 10–327 of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”), parentage of a child that has been previously determined by or pursuant to law cannot be raised as a defense under a UIFSA action. MCOCSE also asserted that Keith Sr. failed to file a timely challenge to the validity or enforcement of the New York support order, as is required by F.L. § 10–345, and even if he had, non-paternity was not a defense available to Keith Sr. in contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order under F.L. § 10–346. MCOCSE concluded by asking the circuit court to deny Keith Sr.'s request to set aside the New York paternity determination and to deny Keith Sr.'s request to modify the Consent Modified Child Support Order dated June 21, 2007.
On January 18, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing at which it concluded that there had been no determination of paternity by New York, that the defense of nonparentage was available to Keith Sr. in the instant case, and that it was “kind of a logical absurdity to require him to continue paying and paying for past [sic] for a child that's not his.” On February 1, 2008, the circuit court entered an order that, inter alia, excluded Keith Sr. as Diana's father, vacated both the registration of the New York support order and the Consent Modified Child Support Order, and nullified the arrears Keith Sr. owed for Diana. On February 11, 2008, MCOCSE filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on February 29, 2008. Thereafter, MCOCSE filed a timely notice of appeal.
MCOCSE argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed Keith Sr. to raise a defense of nonparentage of Diana. Specifically, MCOCSE contends that under UIFSA, this defense is barred when parentage has previously been determined. According to MCOCSE, Keith Sr.'s New York divorce decree that referred to Diana and Keith Jr. as “children of the marriage” and set a child support obligation was a determination of parentage.5
Keith Sr. responds that the New York divorce decree created only a presumption of parentage, and was not a determination of parentage.6 According to Keith Sr., under Maryland law, a “properly ordered” paternity test, as here, rebuts the presumption of paternity based on Diana's conception during Keith Sr. and Andrea's marriage. Keith Sr. further contends that UIFSA allowed him to raise the defense of nonparentage as a “defense under the laws of this State.” Finally, Keith Sr. argues that, when the circuit court modified the New York support order, it assumed “continuing and exclusive jurisdiction,” and thus UIFSA ceased to apply.
The instant appeal concerns the proper interpretation of the UIFSA statute. Where “the issue is the circuit court's interpretation of [a] statute, and, thus, a question of law, our review of the circuit court's decision is de novo.” Hernandez v. Hernandez, 169 Md.App. 679, 688, 906 A.2d 429 (2006).
In rendering its decision, the circuit court below stated: “I don't think there was a determination [as to Keith Sr.'s paternity], as contemplated by the statute[,] in New York.” As a result, in its final order, the circuit court directed “that pursuant to genetic testing ordered by this court ... and the results thereof ... [Keith Sr.] be and hereby is excluded as the father of the minor child [Diana], born February 17, 1990.” MCOCSE contends that, under New York law, Keith Sr.'s paternity of Diana had been previously determined by the New York court. We agree.
In Sandra I. v. Harold...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Piscatelli v. Smith
-
Blount v. Blount
...the registration within 25 days, the time provided by California's version of the UIFSA); Dep't of Human Res. v. Mitchell , 197 Md.App. 48, 12 A.3d 179, 188-89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (holding that the withdrawal of a timely challenge to the registration of a foreign support order constit......
-
Blount v. Blount
...not, challenge the registration within 25 days, the time provided by California's version of the UIFSA); Dep't of Human Res. v. Mitchell, 12 A.3d 179, 188-89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (holding that the withdrawal of a timely challenge to the registration of a foreign support order constitut......
-
Prince George's Cnty. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Fowler v. Dickens
...Office asserts that F.L. § 10-3275 bars Mr. Dickens from raising the issue of paternity in this case, citing Department of Human Resources v. Mitchell, 197 Md. App. 48, 67 (2011). However, like Burden, Mitchell is distinguishable from the present case, and for some of the same reasons. Mitc......