Dep't of Revenue v. Graczyk, CASE NO. 1D16–2102

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: LEWIS, J.
• Citation: 206 So.3d 157
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and Mark Cole Cruickshank, Appellants, v. Laura Beth GRACZYK, Appellee.
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1D16–2102
• Decision Date: 12 December 2016

206 So.3d 157

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and Mark Cole Cruickshank, Appellants,
v.
Laura Beth GRACZYK, Appellee.

CASE NO. 1D16–2102

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed December 12, 2016.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Toni C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Richard L. Trionfo of Richard L. Trionfo, P.A., Brandon, for Appellee.

LEWIS, J.

Appellants, the Department of Revenue ("DOR") and Mark Cole Cruickshank, appeal a final order entered by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), arguing that the ALJ erred by determining that the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") lacked subject matter jurisdiction to establish the child support obligation of Laura Beth Graczyk ("Appellee") because DOAH had jurisdiction pursuant to section 409.2563, Florida Statutes (2015). For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Appellants and, therefore, reverse and remand.

Background

DOR initiated the underlying administrative proceeding on behalf of Appellant Cruickshank to establish Appellee's child

206 So.3d 159

support obligation by serving Appellee with its Notice of Proceeding to Establish Administrative Support Order. Appellee contested DOR's proposed administrative support order and requested a hearing on the matter. At the hearing, Appellee's counsel informed the ALJ that child support was at issue in a paternity and dependency case the parents had pending in the circuit court and that the circuit court case was filed in 2013, conceded that Appellee did not opt out of the administrative action, and requested that the administrative action be either consolidated with the circuit court case or dismissed. DOR argued that it could proceed administratively to establish child support because the circuit court had not entered a support order and Appellee did not opt out of the administrative action.

In the final order, the ALJ determined that Appellee has a legal duty and the ability to contribute to the child's support and that the child needs support. Notice of DOR's intent to initiate child support proceedings was served on Appellee on January 12, 2016, and she did not timely opt out of the administrative case or notify DOR that a circuit court case was then pending to resolve issues of child custody, timesharing, and child support. The circuit court case involving the parents was originally filed in 2013, and they have participated in a dependency case and a paternity action, neither of which has been resolved. The circuit court has not provided for temporary child support. However, the ALJ denied DOR's request to establish Appellee's child support obligation upon concluding that DOAH does not have jurisdiction to enter a child support order when an action addressing support in the circuit court predates the initial notice of the administrative action. This appeal followed.

Analysis

The issue presented is whether DOR, and by association DOAH, has subject matter jurisdiction to establish child support obligations when a circuit court action involving child support predates the administrative action and is still pending, but no order of support has been entered. This is an issue of first impression.

The issue of whether a lower tribunal has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Faulk v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 157 So.3d 534, 535–36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Likewise, an issue involving a question of statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo . Fortune v. Gulf Coast Tree Care Inc., 148 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). "The polestar of a statutory construction analysis is legislative intent." W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So.3d 1, 8–9 (Fla. 2012). As the Florida Supreme Court has explained:

To discern legislative intent, this Court looks first to the plain and obvious meaning of the statute's text, which a court may discern from a dictionary. If that language is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, this Court will apply that unequivocal meaning and not resort to the rules of statutory interpretation

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