Dep't of Transp. of Ill. v. Greatbanc Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 12 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-17-1393 & 1-18-2310 cons.,1-17-1393 & 1-18-2310 cons. |
| Parties | The DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION of the State of Illinois, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF the PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREATBANC TRUST COMPANY (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ), as Trustee Under Trust Agreement Dated October 8, 1973, and Known as Trust Number 996; The Beneficiary or Beneficiaries of a Trust Agreement Dated October 8, 1973 and Known as Trust Number 996, with GreatBanc Trust Company (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ) as Trustee, Whose Names are Unknown and are Designated Unknown Owners; GreatBanc Trust Company (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ), as Trustee Under a Trust Agreement Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust Number 1447; The Beneficiary or Beneficiaries of a Trust Agreement, Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust Number 1447, with GreatBanc Trust Company (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ) as Trustee, Whose Names are Unknown and are Designated Unknown Owners; Peter Kattos; Marquette Bank a/k/a Marquette; and Unknown Owners, Defendants, (Neal & Leroy, LLC, Appellees). The Department of Transportation of the State of Illinois, for and on Behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant, v. GreatBanc Trust Company (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ), as Trustee Under Trust Agreement Dated October 8, 1973, and Known as Trust Number 996; The Beneficiary or Beneficiaries of a Trust Agreement Dated October 8, 1973 and Known as Trust Number 996, with GreatBanc Trust Company (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ) as Trustee, Whose Names are Unknown and are Designated Unknown Owners; GreatBanc Trust Company (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ), as Trustee Under a Trust Agreement Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust Number 1447; The Beneficiary or Beneficiaries of a Trust Agreement, Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust Number 1447, with GreatBanc Trust Company (Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights ) as Trustee, Whose Names are Unknown and are Designated Unknown Owners; Peter Kattos; Marquette Bank a/k/a Marquette; and Unknown Owners, Defendants, (Peter Kattos, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-appellee). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Amanda Ripp, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Walker Wilcox Matousek, LLP, of counsel), for appellant Department of Transportation.
Carl A. Gigante and Rebecca Kaiser Fournier, of Figliulo & Silverman, PC, of Chicago, for appellee Peter Kattos.
Langdon D. Neal and Nicole Castillo, of Neal & Leroy, LLC, of Chicago, for appellee Neal & Leroy, LLC.
¶ 1 In the consolidated appeals from this eminent domain matter, the parties' disputes center around a series of orders entered by the trial court on the withdrawal and subsequent refund of preliminary compensation funds deposited by plaintiff, the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), pursuant to section 20-5-15 of the Eminent Domain Act (Act) (735 ILCS 30/20-5-15 (West 2006)). In appeal No. 1-17-1393, IDOT argues that the trial court erred in (1) permitting Neal & Leroy, LLC (N&L), defendant Peter Kattos's former counsel, to withdraw preliminary compensation funds; (2) not requiring N&L to participate in the refund of excess preliminary compensation funds; and (3) not permitting IDOT to conduct discovery or file a written response to N&L's petition to vacate. In appeal No. 1-18-2310, Kattos argues that the trial court erred in awarding IDOT prejudgment interest on the preliminary compensation refund prior to a determination of the precise amounts owed by each of the refunding parties. In its cross-appeal in No. 1-18-2310, IDOT argues that the trial court incorrectly held that a pending appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to determine who was responsible for refunding the portion of preliminary compensation funds received by N&L. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in appeal No. 1-17-1393. In appeal No. 1-18-2310, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in Kattos's appeal and determine that IDOT's cross-appeal is moot.
¶ 3 In August 2006, IDOT filed a complaint to condemn a portion of real property located at the intersection of U.S. Route 6 and U.S. Route 45 in Orland Park, in which the named defendants had either an ownership or beneficial interest (subject property), for use in a road improvement project. The record is not clear on the precise relationship of the named defendants to the subject property. Although not specifically stated anywhere, it appears, based on information gathered in the record and from statements in the parties' appellate briefs, that the two trusts for which Greatbanc Trust Company (Greatbanc) is the trustee were the record owners of the two parcels that comprised the subject property. The beneficiaries of those trusts were Ashton Drive, LLC (Ashton), and Petey's Two Real Estate, LLC (Petey's), both owned in part by Kattos but neither named as defendants.
¶ 4 In September 2006, pursuant to quick-take proceedings1 instituted by IDOT, the trial court set the preliminary just compensation for the subject property at $3,202,000, which IDOT deposited with the Cook County Treasurer the following month. Thereafter, in January 2007, Kattos, Greatbanc, Ashton, and Petey's filed a verified petition to withdraw the preliminary compensation (petition to withdraw). In their petition to withdraw, Kattos, Greatbanc, Ashton, and Petey's sought to withdraw the full amount of the deposited preliminary compensation. In support, they represented that they and defendant Marquette Bank (Marquette), who held a mortgage on a portion of the subject property, were the only parties who had any interest in the subject property and that, should the trial court later determine that a refund of any portion of the withdrawn preliminary compensation is necessary, they would be responsible for refunding any amount exceeding the determination of just compensation. They asked that the trial court enter an order directing the disbursement of the preliminary compensation funds according to a letter of direction, which would include disbursement to Marquette to pay off the mortgage, payment to N&L for attorney's fees and costs, and payments to Ashton and Petey's.
¶ 5 In response, IDOT did not object to the actual withdrawal of the preliminary compensation funds, but instead objected to the withdrawal of the preliminary compensation funds in the absence of an order specifying the identities of all of the fund recipients and the precise amounts they were to receive. IDOT also argued that the withdrawal order needed to specify that the withdrawal of the funds was conditioned on the refund of any excess funds following the determination of just compensation and that some preliminary compensation funds should be held back to ensure the demolition of a building on the subject property. In addition, IDOT questioned in a footnote of its written response whether N&L was an "interested party" under the Act. IDOT argued that if N&L was an "interested party," then it was also subject to the refund provisions of the Act. IDOT did not, however, argue that N&L was precluded from receiving any of the funds because it was not an "interested party."
¶ 6 Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the petition to withdraw the funds. Without specifying precise amounts, the trial court directed that the county treasurer disburse the preliminary compensation funds to a number of entities, including Marquette to pay off the outstanding mortgage on the subject property and N&L for attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to a letter of direction to follow. The order also stated that any withdrawing party would be required to refund any amount that exceeded the final just compensation determination. Of the $3,202,000 in preliminary compensation, $3,102,000 was ultimately distributed—Marquette received $319,054.26, N&L received $284,067.95, Ashton received $1,313,069.42, and Petey's received $1,185,808.37. The remaining $100,000 of the preliminary compensation was left on deposit with the county treasurer as security for the demolition holdback, as requested by IDOT.
¶ 7 On April 27, 2017, the trial court entered a final judgment order, setting the final just compensation for the subject property at $1,520,000. In that order, the trial court also directed that within 30 days, Marquette, N&L, Ashton, and Petey's refund their pro rata share of $1,582,000, the amount the withdrawn preliminary compensation funds exceeded the final just compensation.2
¶ 8 Shortly thereafter, N&L, which no longer represented Kattos, Ashton, or Petey's, filed a petition for leave to file a limited appearance for the purpose of contesting the trial court's jurisdiction over N&L. The trial court granted N&L leave to file its limited appearance, after which N&L filed a petition to vacate the final judgment order as void with respect to N&L (petition to vacate). In the petition to vacate, N&L argued that the final judgment order was void as to N&L because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over N&L, since N&L was not a party to the case and did not receive proper notice of the entry of the judgment. N&L also argued that no motion had been filed asking for judgment against N&L and that the trial court entered the final judgment order prior to the date originally set for its entry.
¶ 9 On May 17, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the petition to vacate. During that hearing, counsel for Kattos indicated that he intended to file a notice of appeal from the April 27,...
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