Department of Administrative Services v. Employees Review Bd., 14615

• Citation: 226 Conn. 670,628 A.2d 957
• Decision Date: 27 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14615,14615
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES et al. v. EMPLOYEES' REVIEW BOARD et al.

Page 957

628 A.2d 957

226 Conn. 670

DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES et al. v. EMPLOYEES' REVIEW BOARD et al.

No. 14615.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 6, 1993.

Decided July 27, 1993.

Robert J. Krzys, Amsterdam, NY, for appellants (defendant Marietta G. Sonido et al.).

Laurie Adler, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Overend, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

The defendants, state managerial employees, appeal from the judgment of the trial court that the employees' review board (review board) ¹ lacked jurisdiction to hear their grievances arising out of an employment benefit that allegedly discriminated against managerial employees. ² The employment benefit took the form of subsidized rent for state owned rental housing occupied by state employees. The state attempted to increase the rent on all of its housing, and thereby reduce the cost of this benefit. The increased rent was applied unilaterally to the defendants, who as managerial employees have no collective bargaining rights. The state was required, however, to negotiate the increase with collective bargaining unit employees, and at least one bargaining unit took the matter to arbitration and won a lower rent increase. The issue to be resolved is whether this difference in outcomes, resulting from collective bargaining law, constitutes a form of discrimination within the jurisdiction and remedial authority of the review board.

The facts, as found by the review board, are as follows. The defendant Marietta G. Sonido is a state employed psychiatrist and medical director at Fairfield Hills Hospital (hospital), a state hospital for the mentally ill. The defendant Okhikadu Devarajan is also employed by the state as chief of psychiatry at the hospital. The defendants lived for a number of years in state owned rental housing on the hospital grounds. Their rents were heavily subsidized by the state as a recruitment and retention incentive, so that the defendants were able to pay rents that were considerably below the contemporary rental market value of the housing. The defendants are managerial employees, and thus, unlike many of their physician and psychiatrist colleagues at the hospital, the defendants have no state employee collective bargaining rights. General Statutes § 5-270(b).

In 1987, the state reappraised its state employee housing rental rates to reflect the prevailing market rate. The commissioner of administrative services ordered that all state employees occupying state housing, including managerial and collective bargaining employees, pay rent at 70 percent of the appraised market value, to be phased in over a three year period. The commissioner unilaterally applied the new rent levels to the defendants, resulting in a 797 percent increase in Devarajan's biweekly rent from $51 in 1987 to a completely phased in rent of $402 in 1990, including utilities. Sonido received a 669 percent increase, from $77 paid biweekly in 1987 to a completely phased in rent of $515 in 1990, including utilities. ³ The review board found that these increases, in essence, constituted a pay cut for the defendants.

The commissioner was not able to apply higher rents unilaterally to bargaining unit employees, due to collective bargaining law which places a duty upon employers to bargain in good faith with the representatives of the employees prior to instituting modifications in terms and conditions of employment. ⁴ Although some bargaining units acquiesced in the increases, the Health Care (P-1) collective bargaining unit took the matter to arbitration and won much smaller rent increases, amounting to a total increase of 52 percent over a three year period. ⁵

Citing the disparity between rental increases for managerial employees and collective bargaining employees, the defendants filed grievances in November, 1988. General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 5-202. ⁶ The defendants' supervisor and appointing authority waived the first two steps of the preliminary review procedure; General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 5-202(g) and (h); and the office of labor relations of the department of administrative services denied the grievances at the third and final stage of the preliminary review procedure. General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 5-202(i). ⁷ The defendants appealed to the review board claiming that the disparity in rental increases constituted a form of discrimination within the review board's remedial authority under § 5-202(a).

Before the review board, the state argued that the rental increases did not constitute discrimination within the review board's jurisdiction. The review board held in favor of the defendants, finding discrimination within the meaning of § 5-202(a) on the basis of the different treatment between managerial employees and collective bargaining employees. The review board defined "discrimination" as "treating similarly-situated persons differently on a matter of importance." The review board concluded that the defendants and the health care collective bargaining employees were similarly situated, and stated that while "[p]erfect equality in compensation" between managers and nonmanagerial employees is not required, a "gross differential" between the two groups is unacceptable. The review board found such a gross differential and ordered restitution of part of the difference between the rents paid by the defendants and the rents paid by the employees in the health care collective bargaining unit.

The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 5-202(l ) and 4-183(a). ⁸ The trial court sustained the appeal, holding that the review board had exceeded its statutory authority because the disparities complained of did not constitute "discrimination." The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We now affirm the judgment of the trial court. ⁹

Section 5-202(a) delimits the jurisdiction of the review board. It provides that "[a]ny employee who is not included in any collective bargaining unit of state employees and who has achieved a permanent appointment as defined in subsection (r) of section 5-196 may appeal to the employees' review board if he or she ... is demoted, suspended or dismissed, or is aggrieved as a result of alleged discrimination...." (Emphasis added.)

The defendants rely on the "discrimination" clause of § 5-202(a) as the basis for the review board's jurisdiction over their appeal. The discrimination that the defendants allege is that managerial employees must pay 70 percent of the market value of employee housing rent, while at least some nonmanagerial employees covered by collective bargaining agreements pay a substantially lower rent. Section 5-202 does not define the term "discrimination," nor does General Statutes § 5-196, the definitional section of the State Personnel Act. We are therefore presented with an issue of statutory construction.

The purpose of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature. Police Department v. State Board of Labor Relations, 225 Conn. 297, 303 n. 7, 622 A.2d 1005 (1993); All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 194, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes. Police Department v. State Board of Labor Relations, 225 Conn. supra at 300, 622 A.2d 1005; Crocetto v. Lynn Development Corporation, 223 Conn. 376, 381, 612 A.2d 1212 (1992). "[A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts." Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 262, 579 A.2d 505 (1990). This case, however, presents a pure question of law, and therefore "invokes a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." Id., at 263, 579 A.2d 505; State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 718, 546 A.2d 830 (1988). Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, as in this case, the agency is not entitled to special deference. Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Department of Public Utility Control, 210 Conn. 349, 357, 554 A.2d 1089 (1989).

Section 5-202 is part of the State Personnel Act (personnel act), codified in General Statutes §§ 5-193 through 5-269. "We are obligated ... to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter." Concerned Citizens of Sterling, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 215 Conn. 474, 482-83, 576 A.2d 510 (1990). This is because of the presumption that the legislature intended to create a harmonious body of law. Berger v. Tonken, 192 Conn. 581, 589, 473 A.2d 782 (1984). We are therefore directed to General Statutes § 5-227, also found within the personnel act, which provides in relevant part: "No person in the classified service or seeking admission thereto may be appointed, demoted or dismissed or be in any way favored or discriminated against because of his political opinions or affiliations or as the result of a discriminatory employment practice as defined in section 46a-51." ¹⁰ (Emphasis added.) Section 5-227 is not expressly set out as a definition for "discrimination," and the venerable policy expressed in § 5-227 predates the creation of the review board by at least 32 years. ¹¹ Nevertheless, this court presumes that a law was enacted in view of existing relevant statutes and...