Department of Cent. Management Services v. American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employee's (AFSCME), AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 27 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 1-89-1299,AFL-CI,D,1-89-1299
• Citation: 584 N.E.2d 317,165 Ill.Dec. 138,222 Ill.App.3d 678
• Parties: , 165 Ill.Dec. 138 DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES and Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME),efendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 317

584 N.E.2d 317

222 Ill.App.3d 678, 165 Ill.Dec. 138

DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES and Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-89-1299.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fifth Division.

Nov. 27, 1991.

Roland Burris, Atty. Gen., Chicago (William D. Frazier, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Gilbert Feldman, Cornfield and Feldman, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by defendant, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting plaintiffs' motion to vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds. Defendant also appeals from an order declining to hear a motion for rehearing.

Cornelius Burress was a parole officer employed by the Department of Corrections. He was discharged on April 16, 1986, on the ground that he had pled guilty in federal court to two counts of knowingly making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), a felony. Specifically, he understated his income in an application for rental assistance payments. The basis for the discharge was that his criminal conduct brought discredit to the Department of Corrections and constituted a violation of departmental rules.

After his discharge, the defendant, on behalf of Burress, filed a grievance and requested arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the State and AFSCME, alleging that his discharge was not for "just cause" as required under the agreement. The arbitrator was asked to decide whether there was "just cause for the suspension and discharge of the grievant? If not, what is the appropriate remedy?"

Although the arbitrator found there was a linkage between Burress' wrongful conduct and his responsibilities on the job, the arbitrator went on to consider "whether the grievant's conduct was so inherently wrong as to disqualify the grievant from his job." In determining that discharge was not warranted, the arbitrator considered the fact that other parole officers in the continued employ of the Department of Corrections have been convicted of felonies. He also relied heavily upon a letter from Federal Judge Prentice Marshall, the judge before whom Burress pled guilty, in which Judge Marshall recommended that Burress' employment be continued.

"I write to urge you to consider, if possible, retaining Mr. Burress in his present position. I am convinced that he truly regrets his misconduct. I placed him on probation with the special condition that he make restitution of the rent subsidies and perform a substantial number of hours of community service. * * *

It is conceivable that this experience will make Mr. Burress a 'better' parole officer. From my vantage point, it is worth a try.

* * * The primary purpose of my letter is to tell you that I would have no objections (and indeed would support) the retention of Mr. Burress in his present position."

The final mitigating factor considered was Burress' otherwise almost unblemished work record. As a result, the arbitrator ordered Burress reinstated to his former position without back pay.

Plaintiffs filed an application in the circuit court to vacate the arbitration award, on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and that the award was contrary to public policy. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On June 8, 1987, the circuit court entered its final order, finding that it had jurisdiction to review the arbitration award on public policy grounds, and vacating the award as violative of public policy. Defendant's subsequent motion for rehearing was denied as not being timely moved to hearing, and this appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

Opinion

Defendant raises two issues in its appeal. The first is whether the circuit court was the proper forum for this public policy challenge to an arbitration award, and the second issue is whether the subject arbitration award was properly vacated as violative of public policy.

Defendant urges that the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (ISLRB) has "exclusive primary jurisdiction" over public policy challenges to arbitration awards issued under collective bargaining agreements subject to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1601 et seq.) It is clear, however, that the IPLRA itself does not provide for exclusive jurisdiction in the ISLRB over arbitration awards, and the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court and this and other appellate courts have held that the circuit court has jurisdiction over public policy challenges to such awards.

Section 8 of the IPLRA provides that "[t]he grievance and arbitration provisions of any collective bargaining agreement shall be subject to the Illinois 'Uniform Arbitration Act'." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1608.) Under sections 102, 112, 114 and 116 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 10, pars. 102, 112, 114, 116), "all proceedings to compel arbitration, to stay arbitration, to seek vacation of an award, or to enforce an award are through the circuit court." (Board of Education of Community School District No. 1, Coles County v. Compton (1988), 123 Ill.2d 216, 222, 122 Ill.Dec. 9, 526 N.E.2d 149.) Section 12(e) of the UAA provides "Nothing in this Section or any other Section of this Act shall apply to the vacating, modifying, or correcting of any award entered as a result of an arbitration agreement which is a part of or pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement; and the grounds for vacating, modifying or correcting such an award shall be those which existed prior to the enactment of this Act." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 10, par. 112(e).) Defendant contends that circuit court review is limited to cases in which vacation is sought on the grounds of fraud, partiality or misconduct of the arbitrator. When an award is challenged on public policy grounds, defendant urges, jurisdiction lies with the ISLRB, and circuit courts should refrain from considering such cases, and defer to the expertise of the labor board for resolution.

In support of its position, defendant cites several cases decided under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1701 et seq.). (Board of Education of Warren Township High School District 121 v. Warren Township High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504, IFT/AFL-CIO (1989), 128 Ill.2d 155, 131 Ill.Dec. 149, 538 N.E.2d 524; Board of Education of Community School District No. 1, Coles County v. Compton (1988), 123 Ill.2d 216, 122 Ill.Dec. 9, 526 N.E.2d 149.) In those cases it was held that the IELRA divested the circuit courts of jurisdiction to vacate or enforce labor arbitration awards subject to the IELRA. Defendant urges that the IELRA and the IPLRA evidence a common legislative intent to lodge in the labor boards the exclusive responsibility for effectuating labor policy by enforcing the provisions of the two acts.

This argument, however, overlooks a significant difference between the two labor acts. Section 8 of the IPLRA (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1608) explicitly provides for enforcement of arbitration awards in accordance with the Uniform Arbitration Act, while the IELRA makes no reference to the UAA. This distinction was noted in Compton, where the court, in reaching the conclusion that arbitration awards under the IELRA are not subject to circuit court review, said "[t]he absence of any reference to the Uniform Arbitration Act in the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act strongly suggests that the legislature did not intend review of arbitration awards by the circuit court, even as to 'arbitrability.' " Compton, 123 Ill.2d at 216, 122 Ill.Dec. 9, 526 N.E.2d 149.

Defendant points to the many areas of similarity between the IPLRA and the IELRA in support of its argument that Compton and Warren Township should control our decision here. Specifically, both acts bypass the circuit court for review of unfair labor practice decisions made by the respective boards, in the interest of uniformity of labor policy. Both acts also stress the strong public policy favoring arbitration and the finality of arbitration awards. Further, both acts define mandatory, permissive, and illegal subjects of bargaining. They also both include a provision giving each act preference over other laws. The acts show a common purpose of regulating labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements. Based on these similarities, defendant urges, we should follow Compton and Warren Township, decided under the IELRA, and find that under the IPLRA, the ISLRB has jurisdiction over this matter.

These same arguments were raised in Department of Central Management Services v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO (1990), 197 Ill.App.3d 503, 143 Ill.Dec. 824, 554 N.E.2d 759. The court there found these similarities insufficient to overcome the express difference in the two acts: the IPLRA expressly providing for judicial review of arbitration awards and the IELRA being silent on the subject.

We also find significant another difference between the two labor acts which we believe supports our position that it is the circuit court rather than the ISLRB which has jurisdiction over vacation of arbitration awards. Under the IELRA, refusal to comply with an arbitration award is an unfair labor practice (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, pars. 1714(a)(8), (b)(6)), while such refusal is not explicitly made an unfair labor practice under the IPLRA. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1610.) Under both acts, charges of unfair labor practices are dealt with by the boards. (...