Department of Community Affairs v. Massachusetts State College Bldg. Authority

• Decision Date: 05 July 1979
• Citation: 378 Mass. 418,392 N.E.2d 1006
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. MASSACHUSETTS STATE COLLEGE BUILDING AUTHORITY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1006

392 N.E.2d 1006

378 Mass. 418

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. MASSACHUSETTS STATE COLLEGE BUILDING AUTHORITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 7, 1979.

Decided July 5, 1979.

Jonathan Brant, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Herbert D. Friedman, Boston, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, KAPLAN, WILKINS and ABRAMS, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

This case, which is before us on reservation and report by a single justice, involves the interpretation of the scope of the Relocation Assistance Act, G.L. c. 79A, §§ 1-15 (the Act). See G.L. c. 211, § 6. The plaintiff Department of Community Affairs (Department) brought suit in the county court seeking a declaration of rights and an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the defendant Massachusetts State College Building Authority (Authority) to honor the provisions of the Act when acquiring land for the purpose of constructing college dormitories. See G.L. c. 214, § 2; G.L. c. 231A, § 1. We conclude that the Authority is subject to the provisions of the Act.

I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND.

A. The Authority. Certain background is necessary for appreciation of the factual setting in which the present action arose. The legislature created the Authority as a "body politic and corporate" in 1963. See St.1963, c. 703, § 2. The Authority consists of nine members appointed by the Governor, "of whom three members shall be appointive members" of the board of trustees of State colleges (Trustees) established by G.L. c. 15, § 20A. St.1968, c. 347, § 1. St.1965, c. 572, § 47. St.1963, c. 703, § 1(B ). Although the Authority is technically within the Department of Education, it is not "subject to the supervision or regulation of the department of education or of any department, commission, board, bureau or agency of the commonwealth except to the extent and in the manner provided in" its enabling act. St.1963, c. 703, § 2. The Legislature declared: "The Authority is hereby constituted a public instrumentality and the exercise by the Authority of the powers conferred by this act shall be deemed and held to be the performance of an essential governmental function." Id.

The Authority was "created for the general purposes of aiding and contributing to the performance of the educational and other purposes of a state college by providing dormitories, dining commons and other buildings and structures for . . . use (by) a state college, its students, staff and their dependents . . . (or) by a research foundation or other research organization the operation of which in conjunction with a state college is approved by the trustees." Id. § 3. To fulfill this purpose, the Authority may, "upon written request made by authority of the trustees," initiate and operate projects "designed primarily to provide facilities for the housing, feeding, medical care or extra-curricular use by students, staff and dependents or facilities for use by a research foundation or other research organization . . . ." Id.

Section 4 of the enabling act sets out the various powers of the Authority. Those having particular relevance to this action are these: to sue and be sued in its own name (Id. S 4(D )), to borrow money to finance its projects and to issue and sell revenue bonds and notes therefor (Id. § 4(G )), and to acquire real property (Id. § 4(I )).

Subject to an overall debt limit of $55,000,000, the Authority may issue bonds to fund its projects or to refund its outstanding debt. St.1970, c. 845, § 1. The interest on such bonds is free from taxation within the Commonwealth. St.1963, c. 703, § 14. The Commonwealth may, but need not, pledge its faith and credit to guarantee their repayment. Id. §§ 10, 11. St.1970, c. 845, § 2. Those notes and bonds of the Authority which do not bear such guarantee are payable only from revenues derived from fees for use of Authority projects or from sale of refunding obligations. St.1963, c. 703, §§ 7, 9, 11. In addition, "(w)hile any bonds or notes issued by the Authority remain outstanding, the powers, duties or existence of the Authority shall not be diminished or impaired in any way that will affect adversely the interests and rights of the holders thereof." Id. § 7.

Finally, the Legislature provided that "(a)ll other general or special laws, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby declared to be inapplicable to the provisions of this act." Id. § 24.

B. The Department. Through its bureau of relocation, the Department is charged with the administration of the Act. G.L. c. 79A, §§ 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12. The key provision of the Act is found in § 3: "Any public agency, or any person authorized to take by eminent domain, including corporations established under the provisions of (G.L. c. 121A, concerning urban redevelopment), shall provide relocation assistance and payments under this act upon undertaking a project which results in displacement of occupants by the acquisition of real property or by the issuing of a written order to vacate for purposes of rehabilitation, demolition, or other improvement." Id. § 3, as appearing in St.1973, c. 863, § 3. The payments required by the Act include, in substance, the cost of moving and, in some cases, the excess cost of procuring substitute housing. Id. § 7. The relocation advisory agency associated with a displacing agency must also assist displaced persons in locating substitute accommodations and in obtaining payments. Id. § 6. Finally, when the occupants of six or more dwelling or business units will be displaced by a project, the displacing agency must submit a relocation plan for approval by the Department. Id. §§ 4, 8. Except in emergency situations, the project may not proceed until such a plan is filed and approved and unless such approval remains effective. Id. §§ 9, 10.

II. FACTS.

The facts are agreed and simply stated. The Trustees requested the Authority to construct dormitories at Fitchburg State College and at certain other locations. On December 7, 1976, the Authority authorized issuance of notes to fund these projects. During 1976 and 1977, the Authority (acting through an agent) purchased eleven residential structures in Fitchburg by negotiated sale. It proposed to demolish the existing structures and to erect dormitories on the acquired land.

The eleven structures contained a total of sixteen dwelling units. On the dates of the various purchase and sale agreements, six units were owner-occupied, three were vacant, and seven were occupied by tenants. On the actual closing dates, six units were owner-occupied, seven were vacant, and three were occupied by tenants. No written notices to vacate were sent.

The Authority did not file a relocation plan, and it neither offered to provide nor provided relocation assistance to any persons displaced by the Fitchburg project. By letter dated February 7, 1977, an official of the Department stated his belief that the Authority had violated the pertinent provisions of c. 79A and requested that all acquisition activities should cease until there was compliance. By letter dated February 18, 1977, counsel for the Authority stated his opinion that c. 79A was inapplicable to the Authority's activities. That difference of opinion persists and forms the basis for this lawsuit.

III. JURISDICTION.

Although neither party has raised the question, we first consider whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Haas v. Breton, --- Mass. ---, --- ^A, 387 N.E.2d 138 (1979); Massachusetts Home Mortgage Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, --- Mass. ---, --- ^B, 382 N.E.2d 1084 (1978); Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 364 Mass. 639, 645, 308 N.E.2d 488 (1974). Our power to render declaratory and other relief is limited to cases "in which an actual controversy has arisen . . . ." G.L. c. 231A, § 1. Massachusetts Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, --- - --- ^C, 367 N.E.2d 796 (1977); Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., Supra, 364 Mass. at 645 n.8, 308 N.E.2d 488, n.8. A mere difference of opinion or uncertainty over the meaning to be ascribed a statute does not, without more, rise to the level of a justiciable controversy. See Commissioner of the Dep't of Community Affairs v. Medford Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. 826, 832-835, 298 N.E.2d 862 (1973); Kelley v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 351 Mass. 187, 192, 218 N.E.2d 130 (1966). Rather, there must be "a real dispute caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation, status or right in which he has a definite interest, and the denial of such assertion by another party also having a definite interest in the subject matter, where the circumstances attending the dispute plainly indicate that unless the matter is adjusted such antagonistic claims will almost immediately and inevitably lead to litigation." School Comm. of Cambridge v. Superintendent of Schools of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 516, 518, 70 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1946). Accord, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Graye, 358 Mass. 238, 240, 263 N.E.2d 442 (1970); South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 351 Mass. 363, 368, 220 N.E. 899 (1966).

The Authority unquestionably has a "definite interest in the subject matter," arising from the financial and planning burden that will fall on it if we hold c. 79A applicable to its activities. The interest of the Department is, however, considerably more obscure. The Department stands to gain no monetary reward if it wins, and no claimant of relocation benefits (who would have such a financial stake in the outcome) is before us. Indeed, to the extent the Department prevails, it will be required to devote additional funds and energy to the enforcement of c. 79A as that law applies to the Authority. The only interests of the Department apparent to us are in vindicating its own power and in helping those claimants, thus far hypothetical and unidentified, who may someday come forward...