Department of Corrections v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1979
• Docket Number: S.F. 23818
• Citation: 589 P.2d 853,23 Cal.3d 197,152 Cal.Rptr. 345
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 589 P.2d 853 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Public Employees' Retirement System, et al., Respondents.

Page 345

152 Cal.Rptr. 345

23 Cal.3d 197, 589 P.2d 853

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Public Employees' Retirement System, et al., Respondents.

S.F. 23818.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 1, 1979.

James J. Vonk, Robert M. Jakob, Arthur Hershenson, Frank C. Evans, Los Angeles and Robert A. La Porta, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Corinne Lee Murphy, Talmadge R. Jones and Carol Hunter, Deputy Attys. Gen., McCallum & McCallum, Donald G. McCallum and David C. Moody, Sacramento, for respondents.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

The California Department of Corrections petitions for review of a decision by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (hereafter WCAB) awarding death benefits to respondent Deanna Antrim. This court must decide whether the WCAB had the authority to award death benefits under Labor Code section 4701 et seq. to a deceased's minor child of a prior marriage when the deceased's surviving spouse had elected to receive special death benefits under Government Code section 21363.

I

This case involves two distinct statutory schemes for benefits on the death of a qualified employee. The workers' compensation law provides "death benefits" under Labor Code section 4701 et seq. "Special death benefits" are payable on the death of certain classes of public employees under Government Code section 21360 et seq. The Public Employees' Retirement System (hereafter PERS), which is controlled by a board of administration, provides these benefits. (Gov.Code, § 20100 et seq.) ¹

When an employee suffers an injury which results in death and arises out of his employment, the workers' compensation law provides that the employer is liable to pay a death benefit to the deceased employee's dependents. (Lab.Code, § 4701.) The value of the benefit is set by statute and does not vary with the deceased employee's income. (Lab.Code, § 4702.) The extent of an individual's dependency on the deceased employee (Lab.Code, § 3500 et seq.) usually determines the amount of the death benefit awarded to that person. (Lab.Code, § 4703.) ² However, Labor Code section 4707 imposes certain restrictions when one or more surviving dependents are eligible for special death benefits from PERS. "No benefits . . . shall be awarded under this division . . . unless it shall be determined that a special death benefit, as defined in the Public Employees' Retirement Law, . . . will not be paid . . . to the widow or children under 18 years of age, of the deceased . . . ." ³ This section nevertheless assures that when special death benefits are awarded, the total benefits will not be less than the death benefits payable under the workers' compensation law. Further, the WCAB has been granted broad powers in Labor Code section 4704 to reassign or reapportion any death benefit "in a just and equitable manner." ⁴

When the deceased in the present case died special death benefits were payable under PERS "if the deceased was a patrol, prison, state safety, state industrial or local safety member," the death was industrial, and the deceased's widow or child qualified under Government Code section 21364. (Gov.Code, § 21363.) ⁵ Government Code section 21364 specified the method for calculating the amount of the special death benefit and the order of distribution. If there were a surviving spouse, the entire benefit was payable to her. If there were no surviving spouse, or if the spouse died or remarried before any of the deceased's children attained age 18, these children were collectively entitled to the benefit. However, no child could receive any part of the allowance after marrying or reaching age 18. ⁶

There are significant differences between these two systems of death benefits. If special death benefits are payable, the total benefits will at least equal those payable under the Labor Code, and may be substantially greater. (See Lab.Code, § 4707; compare Lab.Code, § 4702 with Gov.Code, § 21364.) In addition, eligibility for any benefit is markedly different. An individual must have been dependent on the deceased in order to collect any death benefit under the Labor Code. (Lab.Code, § 4701, subd. (b).) There is no such requirement for entitlement to a special death benefit. (Gov.Code, § 21363.) Further, while death benefits payable under the Labor Code are shared among those equally entitled (Lab.Code, § 4703), special death benefits are payable exclusively to the deceased's spouse. (Gov.Code, § 21364, subd. (b).) Only if the spouse has died or remarried does the statute permit an award to the deceased's children. It is the disparate treatment provided by these two systems of compensation that led to this appeal.

II

Dale Wesley Antrim was employed as a correctional officer by petitioner, Department of Corrections. On May 23, 1975, he suffered a cardiac arrest due to a myocardial infarction and died. His widow, Lorene Antrim, filed a claim with the WCAB for special death benefits under Government Code section 21363, a provision of the Public Employees' Retirement Law. (Gov.Code, § 20000 et seq.) As a result, PERS was made a party to that proceeding. (Lab.Code, § 4708.) A second claim for death benefits was filed with the WCAB by the deceased's minor daughter from a prior marriage, Deanna Antrim. Deanna was 16 years old and living with her mother at the time of her father's death. The two claims were consolidated. ⁷

The parties stipulated that the injury to the deceased's heart arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment and proximately caused his death. That stipulation entitled the deceased's widow to special death benefits from PERS. However, in accordance with the provisions of Government Code section 21364, subdivision (b), PERS stated that the deceased's minor daughter was not entitled to any special death benefits. Eligibility for such benefits would occur only if the deceased's widow died or remarried and Deanna had neither married nor attained age 18. ⁸

The workers' compensation judge held that since the deceased's widow had elected to receive special death benefits from PERS, Labor Code section 4707 precluded Deanna from receiving any death benefit under the workers' compensation law. However, he found that this construction of section 4707 would deny equal protection of the law to an employee's dependents who were not protected under Government Code section 21364. Nevertheless, the judge denied any death benefit to Deanna because he believed he lacked the power to rule on a statute's constitutionality.

On reconsideration, the WCAB awarded a death benefit to Deanna on the theory that Labor Code section 4707 guaranteed that "the children as well as the widow are at least entitled to the Death Benefit in the Labor Code. Thus, since the child in the instant case has not received any funds from the Public Employees' Retirement System, said child is entitled to the difference of what she should have received. In this case (the child is awarded) one-half of $45,000.00 as per Labor Code section 4701." ⁹

The Department of Corrections petitioned for review on the ground that Labor Code section 4707 precluded the WCAB from awarding any death benefit to the deceased's minor child and further argued that this interpretation of section 4707 did not deny Deanna equal protection of the law.

III

Article XIV, section 4, of the California Constitution authorizes the Legislature to create and enforce "a complete system of workers' compensation . . . to compensate any or all . . . workers for injury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workers in the course of their employment . . . . A complete system of workers' compensation includes adequate provisions for the comfort, health and safety and general welfare of any and all workers and those dependent upon them for support . . . ." The workers' compensation laws codified in Labor Code section 3200 et seq. are intended to implement that objective and provide "a complete system of (workers') compensation . . . ." (Lab.Code, § 3201.)

The Legislature has mandated that those statutes be "liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment." (Lab.Code, § 3202.) Accordingly, "(w)here provisions of (the workers' compensation) laws are susceptible of an interpretation either beneficial or detrimental to injured employees or an ambiguity appears, they must be construed favorably to the employees." (Granado v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 399, 404, 71 Cal.Rptr. 678, 682, 445 P.2d 294, 298; see Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 668, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564; Larsen v. Industrial Acc. Comp. (1950) 34 Cal.2d 772, 776, 215 P.2d 16.) That statutory presumption unquestionably applies to the construction of statutes governing death benefits. (E. g., L. B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 13, 14-15, 313 P.2d 860; see Arndt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 139, 147, 128 Cal.Rptr. 250.)

However, Labor Code section 4707 provides that no death benefits shall be paid if special death benefits from PERS are paid "to the widow Or children under 18 years of age, of the deceased . . . ." (Emphasis added.) In this case, the deceased's widow was awarded the entire special death benefit under Government Code sections 21363 and 21364. Therefore, the workers' compensation judge correctly found that Labor Code section 4707 did not permit an award to the deceased's minor child. In light of the statute's clear language, the WCAB's construction to the contrary to justify an award to the child is unreasonable.

Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end here since the Legislature also expressly granted the WCAB discretion in awarding death benefits. "The appeals board may set apart or reassign...