Department of Human Services v. Gaddis
| Decision Date | 31 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-CA-00946-SCT.,97-CA-00946-SCT. |
| Citation | 730 So.2d 1116 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, State of Mississippi v. Melvin GADDIS. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Paul B. Caston, Columbia, Attorney for Appellant.
Deborah J. Gambrell, Hattiesburg, Attorney for Appellee.
Before PRATHER, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and MILLS, JJ.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
¶ 1. On October 5, 1996, Denice Quinn applied for and later began receiving public assistance from the Department of Human Services (" DHS") for herself and her three minor children. In applying for these benefits, Quinn was required to identify the father of any children for whom the assistance was to be received. Although she was married to Danny Quinn at the time of the birth of all three children, Quinn identified Melvin Gaddis as the biological father of her three children.
¶ 2. Upon receiving this information, DHS filed a complaint to determine the paternity of the three minor children and to establish a child support obligation for them. DHS's complaint named both Danny Quinn and Melvin Gaddis as defendants and alleged that Melvin Gaddis was the true biological father of the children in spite of Danny Quinn's legal presumption of paternity. DHS also filed a motion for genetic testing of Danny Quinn, Denice Quinn, Melvin Gaddis, and the three children in order to establish paternity. All of the parties except Gaddis complied with the judge's order granting these tests, and the results showed with high probability that Danny Quinn could not be the biological father of the three minor children.
¶ 3. Gaddis filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that DHS lacked legal standing to bring an action to determine paternity against him. The Chancellor agreed, dismissing DHS's suit and denying DHS's motion to reconsider. DHS timely appealed to this Court.
¶ 4. The present appeal presents solely a question of law, and it is well established that this Court reviews questions of law on a de novo basis. The issue in the present case is whether or not DHS has legal standing to bring a suit to determine the paternity of children born to an existing marriage. It is well settled that children born within wedlock are legally presumed to be the natural children of the husband of the mother. Stone v. Stone, 210 So.2d 672 (Miss.1968). This presumption, while strong, is a rebuttable one, and DHS asserts that it has legal standing to rebut this presumption through the establishment of paternity. ¶ 5. DHS's position is supported by Miss.Code. Ann. § 93-9-9(1), which provides that:
(1) Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, or father, the child or any public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child ...
In the view of this Court, DHS clearly constitutes a "public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child," and case law indicates that this statute applies equally to cases in which the children are legally presumed to be legitimate.
¶ 6. In Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 252 (Miss.1987), this Court, in discussing MCA § 93-9-9(1), noted that "it can be determined that the legislative intent for its passage was to provide a method for determining paternity of illegitimate children to enforce support." Significantly, this Court in Williams held that "the Court can find no prohibition for a presumed legitimate child's use of the statute to establish the fact of paternity when, as here, (1)the child is properly before the Court through her next friend and (2) alleges facts to support her claim." Williams, 503 So.2d at 252. This Court in Williams thus concluded that a child, as one of the parties given a right to determine paternity under § 93-9-9(1), has the right to establish paternity in spite of the existence of any legal presumption of legitimacy.
¶ 7. There is similarly no basis for this Court to conclude that the presumption of legitimacy should bar DHS from utilizing the authority granted to it by § 93-9-9(1) to establish the true paternity of the children. As noted in Williams, the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute was to facilitate child support enforcement, and it is apparent that DHS is attempting to utilize the...
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