Department of Labor and Indus. Services ex rel. Hansen v. East Idaho Mills, Inc.

Decision Date30 June 1986
Docket NumberNo. 15963,15963
Citation721 P.2d 736,111 Idaho 137
PartiesDEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, State of Idaho, ex rel. John HANSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EAST IDAHO MILLS, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Respondent, and EAST IDAHO MILLS, INC., a corporation, Third Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John HANSEN, Third Party Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Thomas H. Swinehart, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-appellant Dept. of Labor.

Lowell N. Hawkes, Pocatello, for plaintiff-appellant John Hansen.

John B. Kugler, Pocatello, for defendant-respondent. WALTERS, Chief Judge.

This suit involves a claim for unpaid wages allegedly owed to John Hansen by East Idaho Mills, Inc. (EIM). After a non-jury trial, the magistrate ruled that the wages were owed to Hansen and awarded him treble damages under I.C. § 45-615, plus costs and attorney fees. On appeal to the district court, the district judge held that the magistrate had abused his discretion by not allowing the taking of an out-of-state witness's deposition for use at trial. The district court therefore remanded for a new trial. 1 Hansen and the Department of Labor jointly appeal from the district court's disposition, contending that the district judge erred in remanding for a new trial. We agree and reverse the district court decision.

The record reveals the following facts. In 1977 Hansen was employed as a logger by EIM. In December 1977, EIM terminated Hansen's employment and paid him for the timber EIM believed Hansen had cut. EIM refused to pay approximately $440, contending that Hansen had falsified vouchers detailing how much timber he had cut. Hansen filed a wage claim with the Department of Labor and Industrial Services. Following a hearing, it was determined that Hansen was entitled to the disputed wages. The department then filed suit on behalf of Hansen, and the case was assigned to the magistrate division.

In April 1982, the parties stipulated that all pre-trial discovery had been completed. However, the magistrate ordered approximately ten more weeks for taking depositions and completing additional discovery. The magistrate ordered that all depositions or discovery be completed by June 15, 1982. The magistrate's pre-trial order indicated to all parties that the court intended full compliance with that order. The order stated that "[f]ailure to furnish any information or failure to comply with this pre-trial order will result in the exclusion of any evidence or disclosures not made to the court or opposing counsel within the time required herein." The court scheduled the trial for October 7, 1982. On September 30, 1982, the attorney for EIM filed a notice of his intent to depose one of its witnesses in Wyoming on the next day. 2 Allegedly, the witness was unable to attend the anticipated trial because of his employment. Hansen's counsel, who was scheduled to be in Denver, Colorado, at the time of the intended deposition, objected to the taking of the deposition. Because the pre-trial order and stipulation had closed discovery and the taking of depositions, the magistrate refused to allow the deposition to be taken. EIM then moved for a continuance of the trial until the out-of-state witness could be brought to Idaho. A hearing on that motion was held the morning of the trial, and the court denied the motion. The trial proceeded. On appeal, the district court held that the magistrate had abused his discretion in not allowing the deposition to take place. Based on the following reasoning, we conclude that the district judge erred in holding that the magistrate should have allowed the deposition.

According to I.R.C.P. 16(a), a pre-trial order controls the course of the action, "unless modified at trial to prevent manifest injustice." In Stevenson v. Steele, 93 Idaho 4, 453 P.2d 819 (1969) our Supreme Court construed Rule 16 in respect to amendments to a pre-trial order. In that case the amendment was requested after trial. The court held that such amendments were to be freely granted, absent bad faith or prejudice to the opposing party. The court stated that, under Rule 16, "the [trial] court may expedite justice, but it must always do substantial justice." 3 Id. at 9, 453 P.2d at 824. We recognize that balanced against this obligation is the need of the trial court, under its inherent power to regulate its calendar, to efficiently manage the cases before it. Whether to grant a continuance or to allow, on short notice, a deposition to be taken immediately prior to trial are the types of matters a court must consider in attempting to efficiently manage its docket while doing substantial justice to the parties. The Idaho Supreme Court in Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co., 74 Idaho 483, 264 P.2d 466 (1953) set forth certain criteria that must be satisfied by an applicant seeking a continuance based on the absence of a material witness. The court held that

if the showing made upon an application for a continuance upon the ground of the absence of a material witness, is made in good faith, shows that reasonable diligence has been exercised to obtain the presence of the witness, shows substantially to what the witness would testify and that such testimony is material, and shows a sufficient reason for the absence of the witness by the affidavit of an affiant in position to know the facts, then it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant a continuance.

Pauley, 74 Idaho at 490, 264 P.2d at 470; see also Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 540 P.2d 792 (1975).

The transcript of the hearing on the motion to vacate the trial setting indicates that the magistrate told EIM informally that the deposition would not be allowed because of noncompliance with the pre-trial order. As noted, EIM then requested a continuance until the witness could be available for trial. EIM's motion to continue was filed three days before trial; a hearing on the motion was held on the same day of trial. The attorney for the Department of Labor stated at the hearing that he had never received a copy of EIM's motion for continuance or a copy of the supporting affidavit. He related that his only notice of the motion was a phone call from his secretary received the day before trial and after he had left Boise for the trial in Pocatello. The attorney for Hansen also apparently received very short notice. The magistrate denied the motion for a continuance on the grounds that the notice was not timely and that the reasons given for the witness's absence were not satisfactory or sufficient. Thus the magistrate recognized that there...

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2 cases
  • Marriage of Goellner, In re, 87CA0429
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • February 2, 1989
    ...is its need to regulate its calendar and to manage efficiently the case before it. Rules Department of Labor & Industrial Services ex rel. Hansen v. East Idaho, 111 Idaho 137, 721 P.2d 736 (Idaho App.1986). Nevertheless, a court's interest in administrative efficiency may not be given prece......
  • Beal v. Griffin
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • March 9, 1993
    ...466, 470 (1953); see also Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 540 P.2d 792 (1975); Dept. of Labor and Industrial Services v. East Idaho Mills, 111 Idaho 137, 721 P.2d 736 (1986). Preliminarily, it is helpful to explain in greater detail the procedural history of this case. Beal f......

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