Department of Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Ga. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
| Decision Date | 24 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | AFL-CI,I,Nos. 91-1211,91-1212,s. 91-1211 |
| Parties | 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2206, 295 U.S.App.D.C. 239 DEPARTMENT OF the NAVY, MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE, ALBANY, GEORGIA, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, American Federation of Government Employees,ntervenor. MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE, BARSTOW, CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, American Federation of Government Employees,ntervenor. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Petitions for Review and Cross-Applications for Enforcement of Orders of the Federal Labor Relations Authority.
Robert M. Loeb, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John F. Daly, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for petitioners in 91-1211 and 91-1212.
James F. Blandford, Atty., Federal Labor Relations Authority, with whom William E. Persina, Sol., William R. Tobey, Deputy Sol., and Arthur A. Horowitz, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondent in 91-1211 and 91-1212. Frederick M. Herrera, Atty., Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for respondent.
Mark D. Roth, Charles A. Hobbie and Alexia McCaskill, Washington, D.C., entered appearances for intervenor in 91-1211 and 91-1212.
Before: EDWARDS, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
The question presented in this case is whether an agency, which has reached agreement with a union regarding the procedures to be followed in exercising a management right, and has memorialized the agreed-upon procedures in a collective bargaining agreement, must nonetheless bargain with the union anew when it takes action pursuant to the agreement. The Federal Labor Relations Authority answered this question in the affirmative. We reverse.
In 1987, the United States Marine Corps ("Marine Corps") reassigned several employees at its Albany, Georgia, facility to temporary duties and established new performance standards for certain employees at its Barstow, California, facility. Because both actions were taken pursuant to contractual authority, the Marine Corps refused to engage in any further "impact and implementation" bargaining with union representatives before effecting the reassignments and the new performance standards. The Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA" or "Authority") held that the agency had committed unfair labor practices by failing to consult and bargain with the union over the disputed actions, even though the applicable collective bargaining agreement contained provisions covering the implementation of both actions, and the Marine Corps had followed the procedures prescribed by the agreement. Rejecting the Marine Corps' contention that it had no duty to bargain because the impact and implementation matters at issue were "covered by" the collective bargaining agreement, the Authority held that bargaining was required because the agreement did not "clearly and unmistakably waive" the union's bargaining right. See Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, Cal., 39 F.L.R.A. 1126 (1991) ("Barstow"); Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Ga., 39 F.L.R.A. 1060 (1991) ("Albany").
We hold that the Authority committed legal error in Albany and Barstow by improperly equating the question of whether the disputed agency actions were "covered by" the collective bargaining agreement with the question of whether the union had waived its right to bargain. A waiver occurs when a union knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes its right to bargain over a matter; but where the matter is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the union has exercised its bargaining right and the question of waiver is irrelevant. The Authority properly recognized that there is no duty to bargain over matters "covered by" a collective bargaining agreement; since the reassignments at the Albany, Georgia, facility and the implementation of performance standards at the Barstow, California, facility were "covered by" the parties' collective bargaining agreement, neither matter should have been subject to further bargaining except upon mutual consent. The Authority, however, avoided this result by purporting to rely on a "waiver" analysis, pursuant to which "covered by" is defined so narrowly that bargaining always will be required. By adopting this flawed approach, the Authority departed from its own prior cases and the private sector principles upon which it purported to rely; it also reached results at odds with both the governing statute and common sense. Accordingly, we reverse the Authority's decisions in both cases.
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988) ("FSLMRS" or "Statute"), grants most federal employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. See id. §§ 7102, 7103(a)(2). It requires agencies to negotiate with the recognized bargaining representative of their employees regarding "conditions of employment," id. § 7103(a)(12), which are defined as "personnel policies, practices, and matters ... affecting working conditions," id. § 7103(a)(14). However, the Statute specifically excludes certain "management rights" from the duty to bargain. These include matters such as hiring decisions, the assignment of work and the establishment of performance standards. See id. § 7106(a)(2).
Although an agency is not required to bargain with respect to its management rights per se, it is required to negotiate about the "impact and implementation" of those rights--that is, the "procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising" management rights and "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise" of such rights. Id. § 7106(b)(2), (3); see also United States Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA, 949 F.2d 475, 477 & n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1991). The FSLMRS also requires agencies to consult with employee unions before implementing "any substantive change in conditions of employment proposed by the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 7117(d)(2)(A). An agency commits an unfair labor practice if it refuses to bargain over "impact and implementation" issues or fails to consult with the employees' representative over proposed changes in conditions of employment. 1 Id. § 7116(a)(5).
The cases at bar concern duty to bargain disputes between the Marine Corps and the American Federation of Government Employees ("AFGE"), which is the recognized bargaining representative of certain civilian employees at the Marine Corps' Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California, facilities. The relationship between the Marine Corps and the AFGE is governed by a collective bargaining agreement called the Master Labor Agreement ("MLA"). The MLA establishes a grievance procedure to resolve disputes over the interpretation of the agreement and contains an "integration" clause which provides that the MLA constitutes the "total agreement" between the parties. See Albany, 39 F.L.R.A. at 1062, 1064.
The MLA sets forth procedures governing the exercise of certain management rights, including the temporary reassignment ("detailing") of employees and the establishment of performance standards. The disputes underlying the instant petitions for review arose when the Marine Corps decided to "detail" four employees at its Albany facility and to modify the performance criteria applicable to certain employees at its Barstow facility. The AFGE requested consultation and "impact and implementation" bargaining with respect to both decisions, but the Marine Corps refused.
Article 16 of the MLA governs the "detailing" of employees. It provides that an employee's duties may be changed in order to "meet[ ] temporary needs ... when necessary services cannot be obtained by other desirable or practical means"; the reassignment may be to a higher or lower grade level, or to a set of duties that has not yet been classified. See Albany, 39 F.L.R.A. at 1077 n. 1 (ALJ Decision) (reprinting Article 16). Article 16 also places limits upon the duration of a "detail" and addresses certain procedural matters relevant to the implementation of details, including how details must be documented, when details will result in temporary promotions, when competitive procedures must be used and how deductions of union dues will be handled for detailed employees. See id. Disputes arising from management decisions to detail employees are subject to the grievance procedure contained in Article 13 of the MLA. See id. at 1078.
In May 1987, the management of the Marine Corps facility at Albany, Georgia, decided to reassign four employees in order to address an unexpected need for vehicle maintenance services. Two "automotive repair inspectors" and two "mobile equipment servicers" were "detailed" to assist the facility's regular auto mechanics for a period of 120 days. Although none of the reassigned employees suffered a reduction in pay, their new work was less desirable than their former duties. The Marine Corps informed the union steward at the facility of the reassignment decision on the day that it took effect. 2 The AFGE subsequently requested bargaining with the Marine Corps over the impact of the reassignment on the four affected employees. The Marine Corps refused, asserting that it had no bargaining obligation because it had complied with the procedures contained in Article 16 of the MLA. In June 1987, the AFGE filed an unfair labor practice charge, asserting that the Marine Corps had violated its statutory duty to bargain.
On August 31, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge issued a decision in the union's favor. The ALJ reached this result by applying a waiver analysis. He began by finding that the temporary reassignment of the four employees...
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