Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, AX-329
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | ERVIN |
| Citation | 455 So.2d 515 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Zia DURRANI, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Docket Number | No. AX-329,AX-329 |
| Decision Date | 16 August 1984 |
Page 515
v.
Zia DURRANI, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
First District.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1984.
Page 516
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and John E. Griffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant/cross-appellee.
William M. Barley and John Barley of John A. Barley & Associates, Tallahassee, for appellee/cross-appellant.
ERVIN, Chief Judge.
Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners (the Board), appeals a final order of the hearing officer of Florida Department of Administrative Hearings declaring Rule 21M-29.01(2), Florida Administrative Code (1983), to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Appellee, Durrani, cross-appeals, challenging the hearing officer's determination that deficiencies in the Economic Impact Statement (EIS), accompanying promulgation of the rule, did not impair the fairness of the rulemaking proceeding. We reverse the order on appeal and affirm as to the issue raised on cross-appeal.
Durrani was licensed in Illinois on the basis of having achieved a weighted average score of 75% following two separate seatings while he was taking the examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (FLEX). Illinois applies the general formula, rejected by the subject rule, of considering the highest score obtained on any of the three FLEX parts in multiple seatings in computing the weighted average scores of candidates who have taken any part more than once. Durrani's Illinois FLEX scores did
Page 517
not meet the criteria of Rule 21M-29.01(2) and his application for licensure in Florida was denied by the Board. Durrani challenged the rule in an administrative hearing, resulting in the order which found the rule to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority in that it adds substantive requirements to section 458.313(1)(d).In Florida, medical licensure may be secured either "by examination" of previously unlicensed persons or "by endorsement" of persons licensed elsewhere. Licensure by endorsement is provided for in Section 458.313(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as follows:
(1) The department shall issue a license by endorsement to any applicant who, upon applying to the department and remitting a fee not to exceed $250 set by the board, demonstrates to the board that he has met the qualifications for licensure in s. 458.311 and:
* * *
* * *
(d) Has been certified by licensure examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc. (FLEX) or is certified by the National Board of Medical Examiners as having completed its examination; provided that said examination required shall have been so certified within the 10 years immediately preceding the filing of his application for licensure under this section.
Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, referenced above, is the provision controlling licensure by examination, one qualification of which is successful completion of the FLEX examination.
Rule 21M-29.01(2) interprets the section 458.313(1)(d) phrase "has been certified by licensure examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc." as requiring that applicants obtain a 75% weighted average score from a single complete sitting of FLEX, a three-day, three-part examination. The EIS accompanying the rule anticipated no significant impact on competition or on the open market for employment.
The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. Florida...
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In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., MDL No. 09–2046.
...election to use different words to convey different meanings within a statute”) (citing Dep't of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984)). The motion to dismiss the FDUTPA claim on the basis of lack of standing is denied.5. The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Dec......
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Maddox v. State, SC03-2110.
...meanings were intended." State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997) (quoting Dep't of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)); see also Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So.2d 146, 152 (Fla.1997) (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., ......
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Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, s. 90-1733
...239-40 (Fla. 1st DCA1985), review denied, 486 So.2d 596 (Fla.1986); Department of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA1984). These criteria have since been codified by the 1987 legislature, amending section 120.52 by adding subsection (8) ......
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Davis v. Sheridan Healthcare, Inc., Case Nos. 2D17-829
...meanings were intended." State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 541 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Dep't of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) ); see also Burgess v. State, 198 So. 3d 1151, 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (en banc) ("[T]he legislature does not ordinaril......