Department of Transp. v. Davison Inv. Co.
| Citation | 481 S.E.2d 522,267 Ga. 568 |
| Decision Date | 03 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S96G1216,S96G1216 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 703 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. DAVISON INVESTMENT CO. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
John A. Dickerson, Luther Harold Beck, Jr., McClure, Ramsey & Dickerson, Toccoa, for Department of Transp.
Andrew J. Hill, Jr., Lavonia, for Davidson Inv. Co., Inc.
In order to construct a limited-access highway bypassing the City of Royston and connecting to Georgia Highway 17, the Georgia Department of Transportation ("DOT") filed a petition and declaration of taking which named 6.164 acres of land of a 134-acre tract owned by appellee Davison Investment Company. When it filed its petition, DOT paid $24,300 as just and adequate compensation for the taking into the registry of the Franklin County superior court. Davison contested the need for the taking and appealed the valuation. Mayes Davison and Agnes Davison Ray, who each had an interest in a one-acre tract in the midst of Davison Investment's 134 acres, were permitted to intervene in the action. The jury in the trial on the issue of the value of the taking returned a verdict for $316,000. DOT appealed the judgment entered on that verdict to the Court of Appeals, which found two errors: that the trial court had given a jury instruction on actual value that was not warranted by the evidence, and that evidence of consequential damages to a contiguous tract of land had been admitted erroneously. Department of Transportation v. Davison Investment Co., 221 Ga.App. 29(3), (4), 470 S.E.2d 900 (1996). The Court of Appeals determined that the first error was harmless, and rectified the second error by ordering $50,000 be stricken from the verdict returned by the jury in favor of the condemnees. Id. We granted DOT's petition for a writ of certiorari, asking whether the Court of Appeals was authorized to affirm the judgment on the condition that a portion of the general verdict be written off, and whether the jury instruction given on actual value was harmless error. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
1. We address first the Court of Appeals' decision to strike $50,000 from the jury's verdict. OCGA § 5-6-8 empowers the appellate court deciding an appeal "to make such order and to give such direction as to the final disposition of the case by the lower court as may be consistent with the law and justice of the case." An appellate court may affirm the judgment of the lower court upon the condition that an erroneous judgment be corrected by writing off the illegal portion, if the illegal portion can be determined and is separable from the rest. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, 214 Ga. 2, 102 S.E.2d 492 (1958). In the case at bar, the jury returned a general verdict for the condemnees, 1 and the Court of Appeals ordered that $50,000 of the general verdict be stricken on the ground that the stricken portion represented damages not recoverable, i.e., that it was an award of damages for a diminution in value to a contiguous tract of land which had ownership different from the tract in which the taking occurred. DOT v. Davison Investment, supra, 221 Ga.App. at 31, 470 S.E.2d 900. The Court of Appeals found $50,000 to be the figure to be written off after reasoning that the jury, acting erroneously, "could have added no more than $50,000" in light of the testimony of the two witnesses who valued the contiguous tract's reduction in value at $25,000 and $50,000, respectively.
The Court of Appeals determined the amount to be stricken from the verdict by finding the greatest amount, as presented by the evidence, that the jury could have erroneously awarded. However, in order to strike a portion of a verdict, the court must be able to affirmatively show the illegal portion of the jury verdict, i.e., the amount actually awarded by the jury in error. See e.g., Love v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 259(3), 121 S.E. 648 (1924) (); Co-op Cab Co. v. Arnold, 106 Ga.App. 160, 165, 126 S.E.2d 689 (1962) (); Tift v. Shiver & Aultman, 24 Ga.App. 638(4), 102 S.E. 47 (1919) (). See also Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, supra, 214 Ga. at 3, 102 S.E.2d 492 (). In the case at bar, it is impossible to determine what amount, if any, of the general verdict the jury allowed as consequential damages to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Drug Emporium, Inc. v. Peaks, A97A0710
...that the jury could not have been misled thereby." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Transp. v. Davison Investment Co., 267 Ga. 568, 570, 481 S.E.2d This charge created a fair risk that the jury would believe they were compelled to award punitive damages to the appellees/plaintif......
-
Abm Realty v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys., A08A2195.
...453. 12. 202 Ga.App. 67, 68(1), 413 S.E.2d 249 (1991). 13. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. 14. See Dept. of Transp. v. Davison Investment Co., 267 Ga. 568, 570(2), 481 S.E.2d 522 15. 161 Ga.App. 363, 365, 288 S.E.2d 129 (1982). 16. (Emphasis in original.) 168 Ga.App. at 545(3), 309 S.E.2d 816. 17.......
-
Dent v. Memorial Hosp. of Adel, Inc., A97A0289
...unable to say that the erroneous charge, as vague as it was, could not have misled the jury." Dept. of Transp. v. Davison Investment Co., 267 Ga. 568, 570, 481 S.E.2d 522 (1997). The trial court's error in charging the jury that precluded a consideration of ordinary negligence and restricte......
-
Young v. Griffin, A14A1409.
...as a matter of law. Young argues that the evidence did not support these charges. See Dept. of Transp. v. Davison Investment Co., 267 Ga. 568, 570(2), 481 S.E.2d 522 (1997) (“Instructions not warranted by the evidence are cause for a new trial unless it is apparent that the jury could not h......