Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Dietzen's Estate
| Citation | 21 N.E.2d 137,215 Ind. 528 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27222. |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY OF INDIANA v. DIETZEN'S ESTATE et al. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court; Charles E. Smith, Judge.
Omer S. Jackson, Atty. Gen., and Jos. McNamara, Depty. Atty. Gen for appellant.
B H. Campbell, of Anderson, for appellees.
The Department of Treasury of the State of Indiana instituted this action by filing a verified proof of preferred claim against the estate of Albert Dietzen, deceased, to collect from said estate a sum alleged to be due to the State of Indiana under the provisions of the Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 (Chapter 50, Acts 1933). The claim was disallowed by the administrator, and was transferred to the trial calendar where a trial was had before the court upon a stipulation of the evidence.
The stipulation discloses that Albert Dietzen died intestate in Madison County, Indiana, on the 23rd day of May, 1935.
An administrator was duly appointed. At the time of his death the decedent was the owner of a large amount of personal property consisting, in part, of shares of stock in divers corporations; that in the course of administration it became necessary to make sales of said stock in order to administer the estate; that sales were made by the administrator in the aggregate sum of $68,277.81. All sales were made by the administrator of the estate of Albert Dietzen and not otherwise, and the proceeds received therefrom went into and became a part of the estate of said decedent to be distributed to his heirs. He was survived by a widow and three children.
Upon these facts judgment was rendered in favor of the estate, and that the appellant take nothing. Motion for a new trial, upon the ground that the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law, was overruled with exceptions to appellant. This ruling presents a question of law to be decided. The appellee claims that the receipts of the sales of the personal property by the administrator of said decedent are not subject to tax under the Gross Income Tax Act of 1933.
Section 1 of Chapter 50 of the Gross Income Tax Act of 1933, Section 64-2601, Burns' Ind.St.1933, Sec. 15981 Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, defines certain terms therein used. Subclause (a) reads as follows: 'When used in this act, the term 'person' or the term 'company,' herein used interchangeably, includes any individual, firm copartnership, joint venture, association, corporation, municipal corporation, estate, trust, or any other group or combination acting as a unit, and the plural as well as the singular number, unless the intention to give a more limited meaning is disclosed by the context.'
The appellee points out that the terms 'executor', 'administrator', 'commissioner', and other fiduciaries are not included in the definition of 'person' as defined by the act; that an administrator is an officer of the court and acts pursuant to the court's orders; that he acts only in a representative capacity, and, since the Legislature failed to include the term 'administrator' in the definition of 'person', he cannot be charged with gross income tax upon sales made by him under order of the court; that the term 'estate' used in said section is not synonymous or interchangeable with 'executor', 'administrator', or Ind.St.1933, Pocket Supp., Sec. 15981, Baldwin's May 1937 Supp., which includes in the definition of the term 'person' the words 'executor', 'administrator', and other terms. From this it is argued that 'the legislature has not authorized the levy of the special gross income tax on funds received by administrators or executors from sale of property belonging to the estate for which he is acting,' for the reason that administrators of estates are not mentioned in Section 1(a), supra, and that the word 'estate' is not intended to be interchangeable with the word 'administrator'.
Section 1(a) specifically defines the term 'person' to include 'estate'. Section 2 of that act provides for the levy of the tax upon the entire gross income of all residents of the State of Indiana, and provides: 'Said tax shall apply to, and shall be levied and collected upon, all gross incomes received on or after the first day of May, 1933, with such exceptions and limitations as may be hereinafter provided.'
Sections 5 and 6 provide for deductions and exemptions, but no provision is made exempting sales of property by the administrator of a decedent. The court must give to the terms 'person' and 'estate' their ordinary and accepted meaning unless there is a clear intention to convey a different meaning. Midwestern Petroleum Corporation v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 1933, 206 Ind. 688, 705, 187 N.E. 882, 191 N.E. 153; Miles v. Department of Treasury, 1935, 209 Ind. 172, 199 N.E. 372, 101 A.L.R. 1359. The dictionary meaning of the term 'estate' is not different from that in ordinary use: Webster's New International Dictionary (Merriam, 1935).
Miles v. Department of Treasury, supra, holds that the Gross Income Tax Law of 1933 creates an excise tax levied upon all persons domiciled within the State of Indiana, and further that, 209 Ind. at page 176, 199 N.E. at page 374, 101, A.L.R.
1359: 'The power to tax is inherent in, and essential to, the existence of the state, and may be exercised without limit upon property, occupations, and activities carried on within the state unless prohibited by state of Federal Constitutions.'
The use of the term 'person' in the statute is broad and generic, and embraces the...
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Dep't of Treasury of Indiana v. Dietzen's Estate, 27222.
...215 Ind. 52821 N.E.2d 137DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY OF INDIANAv.DIETZEN'S ESTATE et al.No. 27222.Supreme Court of Indiana.June 2, Action by the Department of Treasury of the State of Indiana against the estate of Albert Dietzen, deceased, and others, to collect a sum alleged to be due under the......