DePina v. State

• Decision Date: 06 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2011–259–Appeal.,2011–259–Appeal.
• Citation: 79 A.3d 1284
• Parties: Jorge M. DePINA v. STATE of Rhode Island.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

79 A.3d 1284

Jorge M. DePINA

v.STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2011–259–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 6, 2013.

John B. Lawlor, Jr., Esq., East Providence, for Appellant.

Danielle R. Menard, Esq., for Applicant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on October 22, 2013, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The applicant in this case, Jorge M. DePina ¹ (applicant or DePina), filed a subpoena duces tecum in connection with his application for postconviction relief, seeking discovery of the mental health records of Gelci Reverdes (appellant or Reverdes), who testified as an eyewitness in the applicant's 1998 murder trial. Reverdes is before the Court on appeal from a Superior Court order denying her motion to quash the subpoena. After hearing the arguments of counsel and carefully examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the issues raised by this appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the order and remand the case to the Superior Court with directions to make findings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Travel

The underlying facts leading up to DePina's application for postconviction relief were discussed in great detail in State v. DePina, 810 A.2d 768, 772–73 (R.I.2002), in which this Court affirmed applicant's conviction on counts of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The applicant was initially convicted after a jury trial on these counts—in which he was tried jointly with two other defendants—stemming from a stabbing outside a Providence nightclub in the early morning hours of December 28, 1997, that left one man dead. Id. at 773. At trial, Reverdes was one of the eyewitnesses who described the events leading up to the stabbing as 100 patrons left the club and a fight broke out. Id. Although applicant filed a pretrial motion to suppress Reverdes' eyewitness identification, the trial justice denied the motion, finding the identification within constitutional limits. Id.

After DePina's appeal was denied by this Court, applicant filed a pro se application for postconviction relief on July 14, 2003, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He filed a second pro se application on January 14, 2010, which expanded the grounds upon which applicant sought postconviction relief, including whether the prosecution withheld information regarding an agreement by the state to prevent Reverdes' brother from being deported in exchange for her testimony in DePina's murder trial. On May 21, 2010, applicant—represented by new counsel—filed yet another amended application for postconviction relief, in which he included the claim about Reverdes and reiterated claims of evidence spoliation, jury obstruction, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.² Contemporaneous with the filing of this amended application, applicant filed a motion to conduct discovery in connection with his application for postconviction relief.

On March 14, 2011, in a written filing, applicant advised the court that Reverdes had been deposed on March 2, 2011, and at that deposition, she was accompanied by a member of the state's Office of the Mental Health Advocate. At the deposition, Reverdes disclosed that she suffered from mental illness and memory problems, and had been prescribed several psychotropic medications. Reverdes also stated that she was unable to recall how long she had been on medication or had suffered from such ailments. Based on this information, applicant asserted that Reverdes may have been suffering from mental health or memory issues at the time she identified DePina as a perpetrator or when she testified at his murder trial. The applicant then indicated that he was preparing a motion and a subpoena to obtain all of Reverdes' medical, psychiatric, and psychological records in connection with his application for postconviction relief.

On May 9, 2011, applicant filed a motion ³ requesting the court's permission to issue a subpoena upon the Keeper of Records of Gateway Healthcare (Gateway) for all of Reverdes' psychological, psychiatric, medical, and counseling records. In response, Reverdes—represented by an attorney from the Office of the Mental Health Advocate—filed an objection to applicant's motion. At a hearing on the motion, the Superior Court justice—who also had presided over the murder trial—granted the motion. The applicant then served the subpoena for Reverdes' medical records upon Gateway.

Reverdes subsequently filed a motion to quash the subpoena, and a hearing on the motion was held on July 19, 2011; attorneys were present on behalf of DePina, Gateway, the state, and Reverdes—again represented by a mental health advocate attorney. At that hearing, counsel for Gateway moved the court to order the records protected pursuant to the Rhode Island Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act,⁴ a request that was denied by the trial justice. On behalf of Reverdes, counsel argued that DePina had failed to seek Reverdes' health care records before the 1998 trial, and that the issue of such records falling under the ambit of newly-discovered evidence should, therefore, be deemed to have been waived. The trial justice denied Reverdes' motion to quash the subpoena, but directed that the documents be produced for an incamera review by the trial justice in order to determine whether, before Reverdes testified about witnessing the homicide, she had been suffering any mental health issues “which may touch upon her ability to observe and to remember certain facts.”

After the trial justice's in camera review of the records, a second hearing was held on July 29, 2011. The trial justice—citing Rule 26 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure—declared that he had reviewed the medical records produced—totaling over 700 pages—and extracted a small percentage of documents that he deemed appropriate for disclosure to applicant. The trial justice specified that, in turning over the documents, the court was not ruling that the information contained therein was relevant or admissible in any subsequent proceeding, but rather was being provided “so that [applicant] can have a full opportunity to proceed on any legal theory and factual theory that he may believe supports his application for postconviction relief.”

After the ruling, counsel for Reverdes requested that the trial justice stay the decision and postpone distributing the selected documents pending an appeal to this Court, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 5–37.3–4 of the Rhode Island Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act. Counsel also argued that, because the records began in the year 2007, the records were not relevant to an incident that occurred in 1997. Rather, counsel claimed that the discovery request constituted a “fishing expedition,” and that to order production of health care information compiled twelve years “after the testimony is embarrassing, oppressive and burdensome under Rule 45 [of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure].”

The trial justice entered an order (order) denying Reverdes' motion to quash, but stayed its effect until August 12, 2011. Reverdes requested that this Court stay the disclosure of any medical records pending this appeal. This Court granted the stay ⁵ and ordered the appeal expedited.

Discussion

As an initial matter, we first address the nature of Reverdes' appeal to this Court. The order denying Reverdes' motion to quash is interlocutory—a type of order that lacks finality and concerning which this Court has a long-standing practice to decline to address on appeal. See Dale v. Dale, 37 A.3d 124, 124 (R.I.2012) (mem.) (indicating that “[i]nterlocutory orders are reviewable only by way of writ of certiorari”). Despite this general rule, however, a judicial doctrine has developed, first articulated in the case McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.I. 462, 472, 83 A. 837, 841 (1912), whereby this Court “will review an order or decree which, although in a strict sense interlocutory, does possess such an element of finality that action is called for before the case is finally terminated in order to prevent clearly imminent and irreparable harm.” ⁶Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 118 R.I. 644, 648–49, 375 A.2d 410, 412–13 (1977).

In this case, Reverdes argues that the denial of her motion to quash the subpoena seeking her medical records ends her stake in the litigation. She also argues that the consequences of the order are imminent and irreparable, because all other avenues of relief have been exhausted, and because once her medical records are released, the confidential nature of those documents will be irremediably breached. We agree.

The record is clear that the challenged order allows for the inspection of Reverdes' health care records, including psychological, psychiatric, and counseling records—information that enjoys limited statutory protection. Moreover, Reverdes—who is not a party to the underlying postconviction-relief action—has no standing to challenge the introduction of those records into evidence in that proceeding. Therefore, based on the record before us, we are satisfied that the order entered possesses the requisite element of finality and potential for irreparable harm to warrant our immediate review. See McAuslan, 34 R.I. at 472, 83 A. at 841. Having resolved this procedural issue, we now turn to the merits of Reverdes' appeal.

It is well settled that, although the underlying conviction from which collateral relief is sought is criminal in nature, postconviction-reliefff proceedings are civil actions. G.L.1956 §§ 10–9.1–1; 10–9.1–7; Palmigiano v. Mullen, 119 R.I. 363, 374, 377 A.2d 242, 248 (1977). As a result, a litigant seeking discovery in this...