Depositors Ins. Co. v. Sandidge

• Decision Date: 15 February 2022
• Docket Number: DA 21-0230
• Citation: 2022 MT 33
• Parties: DEPOSITORS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. PATRICK SANDIDGE, Defendant and Appellant. and SARA THARP, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant,
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

2022 MT 33

DEPOSITORS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, and SARA THARP, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, v. PATRICK SANDIDGE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 21-0230

Supreme Court of Montana

February 15, 2022

Submitted on Briefs: January 19, 2022

District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Broadwater, Cause No. CDV-2019-13 Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge

For Appellant: Geoffrey C. Angel, Angel Law Firm, Bozeman Montana

For Appellee for Depositors Insurance Company: Paul Robert Haffeman, Stephanie Hollar, Davis, Hatley, Haffeman &amp Tighe, Great Falls, Montana

For Cross-Appellant for Sara Tharp: Scott G. Gratton, Adam M. Shaw, Brown Law Firm, P.C., Missoula, Montana

JIM RICE JUDGE

¶1 Patrick Sandidge (Sandidge) appeals a First Judicial District Court's Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Summary Judgment Order) granting summary judgment in favor of Depositors Insurance Company (Depositors) in its declaratory judgment action to determine any Ridley^[1] obligation it has relative to Sandidge. The restated issues on appeal are:

1. Did the District Court err by not holding a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment?

2. Did the District Court err by holding that Depositors had standing to bring a declaratory action pursuant to Ridley?

3. Did the District Court err by granting Depositors' motion for summary judgment?

4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Sandidge attorney fees and costs?

Sara Tharp (Tharp) cross-appeals the District Court's Order on Motions to Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order dismissing her from this action. Because we affirm the District Court's Summary Judgment Order and resolve the litigation, we conclude Tharp's cross-appeal is moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Sandidge and Tharp were involved in a motor vehicle accident on September 1, 2017. Sandidge was traveling along Highway 287 in Townsend with a group of motorcyclists while himself riding a motorcycle. Tharp was attempting to exit a store's driveway and slowly merge onto Highway 287 around a visual obstruction. While the parties disagree as to what occurred, Sandidge alleges he was forced to ditch his motorcycle to avoid hitting Tharp's vehicle. A collision did not occur, but Sandidge's motorcycle came to rest against Tharp's vehicle. Sandidge made a Ridley claim to Depositors, Tharp's insurer, for advance payment of damages caused by the accident. Depositors advanced payments for medical bills and lost wages in the amount of $89, 983.95. After Sandidge's past medical records were obtained, Depositors retained Dr. Lowell Anderson to conduct a document review of Sandidge's injuries. Dr. Anderson concluded the injuries Sandidge received from the accident should have been fully treated within six weeks and that any additional treatment was due to the natural progression of his pre-existing conditions. Thereafter, Depositors ceased making advance payments.

¶3 Sandidge retained counsel and demanded that Depositors continue making advance payments. Depositors and Tharp filed this declaratory judgment action to obtain a determination regarding Depositors' obligation to make additional payments. Sandidge sought to dismiss Tharp and Depositors, and the District Court granted his motion as to Tharp. However, because Sandidge attached "multiple exhibits to his motion to dismiss," the court converted the motion to dismiss Depositors into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 56. Depositors filed its own motion for summary judgment. The District Court concluded Depositors had raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether its liability was reasonably clear and whether Sandidge's ongoing injuries were causally related to the accident. Accordingly, the District Court denied Sandidge's motion and granted summary judgment to Depositors. Sandidge appeals the District Court's denial of his motion for summary judgment, and Tharp cross-appeals her dismissal.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶4 "We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M. R. Civ. P." Plouffe v. State, 2003 MT 62, ¶ 8, 314 Mont. 413, 66 P.3d 316 (citing Powell v. Salvation Army, 287 Mont. 99, 102, 951 P.2d 1352, 1354 (1997)). A party's standing is a question of law that we review de novo. Brown v. Gianforte, 2021 MT 149, ¶ 7, 404 Mont. 269, 488 P.3d 548 (citation omitted).

¶5 "We review a district court's ruling on summary judgment de novo, to determine whether it is correct, using the same standards as the district court under M. R. Civ. P. 56." Warrington v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2019 MT 111, ¶ 8, 395 Mont. 432, 443 P.3d 369 (quoting Great Falls Clinic, LLP v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 2016 MT 245, ¶ 7, 385 Mont. 95, 381 P.3d 550). "We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct . . ." Teeter v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 2017 MT 292, ¶ 10, 389 Mont. 407, 406 P.3d 464 (citing Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2013 MT 354, ¶ 9, 373 Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839). At the summary judgment stage, courts do not "make findings of fact, weigh the evidence, choose one disputed fact over another, or assess the credibility of witnesses" but only examine the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits" to determine if there is a material issue of fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Andersen v. Schenk, 2009 MT 399, ¶ 2, 353 Mont. 424, 220 P.3d 675 (citations omitted).

¶6 We review a district court's decision to deny a hearing on a motion for summary judgment for abuse of discretion. Miller v. Goetz, 2014 MT 150, ¶ 9, 375 Mont. 281, 327 P.3d 483 (citing SVKV, L.L.C. v. Harding, 2006 MT 297, ¶ 19, 334 Mont. 395, 148 P.3d 584). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason." Wagner v. Woodward, 2012 MT 19, ¶ 18, 363 Mont. 403, 270 P.3d 21 (citing Harmon v. Fiscus Realty, Inc., 2011 MT 232, ¶ 7, 362 Mont. 135, 261 P.3d 1031). A district court's decision to deny or award attorney fees and costs is likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion. Shockley v. Cascade Cty., 2016 MT 34, ¶ 5, 382 Mont. 209, 367 P.3d 336 (citing Billings High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Billings Gazette, 2006 MT 329, ¶ 23, 335 Mont. 94, 149 P.3d 565).

DISCUSSION

¶7 1. Did the District Court err by not holding a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment?

¶8 Sandidge states the District Court failed to hold a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment because "it erroneously believed neither party requested a hearing." Sandidge points to lines in his briefs supporting his motion for summary judgment and opposing Depositors' motion for summary judgment in which he stated, "Mr. Sandidge requests to be heard on this matter" or "on this motion" to argue that he requested oral argument on the motions. He contends the District Court's failure to hold a hearing cost him the opportunity to present witness testimony and lay the foundation for otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence he offered in support of his motion.

¶9 A party's right to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment is "waived unless the party requests a hearing within 14 days after the time for filing a reply brief has expired." M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)(A). "Though a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment without first holding a hearing . . . it is still required to make a determination that there [is] no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Chapman v. Maxwell, 2014 MT 35, ¶ 11, 374 Mont. 12, 322 P.3d 1029 (citations omitted). Here, the District Court's scheduling order limited the parties to a response brief and advised them that "[i]n the event counsel desire oral argument on the motions, they shall request it in accordance with the Rules." Thus, the parties' right to a hearing was waived if they did not request one within fourteen days after the time for filing the response brief had ended. M. R. Civ P. 56(c)(2)(A). Sandidge argues that the above-quoted lines in his briefs constituted a sufficient request for oral argument.

¶10 A motion is "[a] written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order." Motion, Black's Law Dictionary, (11th ed. 2019). A brief provides an argument containing the factual and legal authority supporting a motion. See generally MUDCR 2(b). Here, to request oral argument-which the District Court would then have to order-pursuant to the District Court's briefing schedule, Sandidge was required to either file a specific motion within fourteen days after the time for filing response briefs had expired, or to include the request in his motion for summary judgment and indicate the same in the motion's title. See Montana First Judicial District Court Rules, Rule 5(E). However, he did neither. Sandidge's briefs did not indicate in their titles that they contained a request for oral argument, and district courts cannot be expected to comb through the briefing for a possible request. Neither were any further inquiries made about the issue when Depositors filed a Notice of Submittal, or when months thereafter passed without the District Court scheduling oral argument. As required, the District Court's Summary Judgment Order "[made] a determination that there [is] no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" as required by our precedent. Chapman, ¶ 11. Under these circumstances, we conclude Sandidge waived his right to a hearing pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)(A).

¶11 2. Did the District...