Dept. of Corrections v. Human Rights

Decision Date29 December 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-503.,04-503.
Citation917 A.2d 451,2006 VT 134
PartiesDEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Marie J. Salem and Kate Duffy, Assistant Attorneys General, Waterbury, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Robert Appel, Executive Director, Montpelier, for Respondent-Appellee.

Barbara Prine, Vermont Legal Aid, Burlington, for Intervenor-Appellee.

Present: REIBER, C.J., and DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.

JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1. The issue in this appeal is whether the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 4500-4507, applies to state correctional facilities, thereby giving the Human Rights Commission jurisdiction to investigate complaints filed by state prisoners alleging violations of the Act. Based upon its determination that the Act covers state prisons, the superior court denied the Department of Corrections' motion to quash a subpoena served by the Commission in conjunction with a prisoner's discrimination claim. The Department contends that the court erred insofar as prisons do not offer services or benefits to the "general public" and thus are not "places of public accommodation" subject to the Commission's investigatory powers. We conclude that the Legislature intended to make all governmental entities, including state prisons, subject to the Act. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's decision.

¶ 2. On appeal, the Department relies primarily on a single phrase in one statutory definition to support its argument that state prisons are not covered by the public accommodations statute. Nothing in the language or history of the statute, however, indicates that the Legislature intended the law to cover some governmental entities, but not others, depending on whether, or how directly, they offer services or benefits to the general public. The phrase "general public" within the statutory definition of a "place of public accommodation" is a holdover from the original 1957 statute, which, like similar laws in other jurisdictions, was aimed at assuring that private establishments catering to members of the general public did not discriminate on the basis of race or other specified criteria. Hence, a "place of public accommodation" was defined as an establishment that provided benefits or services to the general public. The critical inquiry, then, in determining which private entities were covered by the law was whether a particular establishment served the general public. That question makes little sense, however, when applied to public or governmental entities, which are created for the very purpose of serving the general public.

¶ 3. The most reasonable interpretation of the statute, particularly considering that it must be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose, is that the Legislature intended to make all governmental entities, in addition to all private entities offering services or benefits to the general public, subject to the Act's anti-discrimination provisions. There is support for this interpretation not only in the statutory language, but also in the history of the statutory amendments and the legislative policy underlying the Act. In particular, the legislative history of the 1992 amendment unequivocally confirms that the Act was intended to apply to all governmental entities and to provide a local enforcement mechanism for claims actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300, which applies to all public entities, including state prisons.

¶ 4. The Human Rights Commission has jurisdiction to investigate and enforce complaints of unlawful discrimination in public accommodations. 9 V.S.A. § 4552(b). Pertinent to this case, it is generally unlawful for any place of public accommodation to discriminate against an individual with a disability. Id. § 4502(c). The Commission may accept complaints that state a prima facie case of discrimination, and must dismiss those that do not. Id. § 4554(a)-(b). In conducting an investigation, the Commission can issue subpoenas with respect to complaints filed under § 4554 where there is reasonable cause to believe that the materials or testimony requested are material to the complaint. Id. § 4553(a)(5).

¶ 5. In November 2003, the Commission served a subpoena on the Department in connection with a discrimination charge filed on behalf of a state prisoner. The prisoner complained that the Department's correctional facility discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. The Department moved the Commission to quash the subpoena under § 4553(a)(5), asserting that the complaint failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination because a correctional facility was not a "place of public accommodation" under the Act. The Commission denied the Department's request in December 2003.

¶ 6. The Department then moved to quash the subpoena in superior court. In September 2004, following a hearing, the court denied the Department's motion and granted the Commission's motion to enforce the subpoena. Relying on Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998), the court concluded that Vermont's correctional facilities plainly offered "services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, benefits or accommodations" to prisoners and thus was a "place of public accommodation." See 9 V.S.A. § 4501(1). According to the court, irrespective of whether the physical structures of government buildings, including prisons, are open to the public, state prisons are essentially public places open to any member of the general public unfortunate enough to meet the criteria for obtaining their services. The court granted the Department's request for a stay, and this appeal followed.

¶ 7. On appeal, the Department argues that the Human Rights Commission did not have jurisdiction to issue its subpoena in this case because correctional facilities do not serve or benefit the general public and thus are not "places of public accommodation" under the Act. This is a case of statutory interpretation in which our review of the trial court's decision is nondeferential and plenary. Human Rights Comm'n v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 2003 VT 104, ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 125, 839 A.2d 576. "Our paramount goal, when interpreting a statute, is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature," Id. As we stated in Order of Elks, a recent case interpreting the Act, we effectuate legislative intent by looking "to the statute's language and any legislative history, as well as the legislative policy the statute was designed to implement." Id. We also stressed in Order of Elks that, as a remedial statute, the Act "must be liberally construed in order to `suppress the evil and advance the remedy' intended by the Legislature." Id. (quoting 3 N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 60:1, at 183 (6th ed.2001)).

¶ 8. To interpret the Legislature's intent, we begin by examining the statutory language. Russell v. Armitage, 166 Vt. 392, 403, 697 A.2d 630, 637 (1997). Our public accommodations statute forbids owners or operators of places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of specified criteria. 9 V.S.A. § 4502. "Public accommodation" is defined as "an individual, organization, governmental or other entity that owns, leases, leases to or operates a place of public accommodation." Id. § 4501(8). "Place of public accommodation," in turn, is defined as "any school, restaurant, store, establishment or other facility at which services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, benefits or accommodations are offered to the general public." Id. § 4501(1). The interpretive problem arises because the definition of "place of public accommodation" retains the term "general public," which historically was used to determine which private entities were subject to the law, while the relatively recent definition of "public accommodation" does not necessarily restrict governmental entities to the criteria set forth in the definition of "place of public accommodation."

¶ 9. The statute also has a legislative intent section that was added in 1992 to ensure that the Public Accommodations Act would be applied consistently with the then recently enacted federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300. That section states:

(a) The provisions of this chapter establishing legal standards, duties and requirements with respect to persons with disabilities in places of public accommodation as defined herein, except those provisions relating to remedies, are intended to implement and to be construed so as to be consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and rules adopted thereunder, and are not intended to impose additional or higher standards, duties or requirements than that act.

(b) Subsections 4502(b) and (c) of Title 9 shall not be construed to create or impose on governmental entities additional or higher standards, duties or requirements than that imposed by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

9 V.S.A. § 4500.

¶ 10. It is undisputed that prisoners may pursue discrimination claims under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. See, e.g., Charbonneau v. Gorczyk, 2003 VT 105, ¶ 8, 176 Vt. 140, 838 A.2d 117 (reviewing state prisoner's discrimination claim against commissioner of Department of Corrections, and noting that the ADA "prohibits state agencies like the DOC from excluding an individual from a DOC program because of the individual's disability"). Indeed, in a unanimous opinion, the United States Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA "unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage." Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209, 118 S.Ct. 1952. Hence, the real issue in this case is whether prisoners can use the local enforcement provisions of the Public Accommodations Act to raise...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Hinkson v. Stevens
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • August 7, 2020
    ...are remedial statutes that should be broadly construed to further their protective purposes. See Dep't of Corr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 2006 VT 134, ¶ 3, 181 Vt. 225, 917 A.2d 451 (reasoning that Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act "must be liberally construed to effectuate i......
  • Hinkson v. Stevens
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • August 7, 2020
    ...Protection Act are remedial statutes that should be broadly construed to further their protective purposes. See Dep't of Corr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 2006 VT 134, ¶ 3, 181 Vt. 225, 917 A.2d 451 (reasoning that Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act "must be liberally construed ......
  • State v. Richland
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • September 18, 2015
    ...policy it was designed to implement." Perry v. Med. Practice Bd., 169 Vt. 399, 406, 737 A.2d 900, 905 (1999) ; see Dep't of Corrections v. Human Rights Comm'n, 2006 VT 134, ¶ 7, 181 Vt. 225, 917 A.2d 451 (stating that "we effectuate legislative intent by looking to the statute's language an......
  • State v. Rajda, s. 17-051 & 17-126
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • July 20, 2018
    ...its enactment, and the legislative policy it was designed to implement" in construing the statute. Dep't of Corr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 2006 VT 134, ¶ 22, 181 Vt. 225, 917 A.2d 451 (quotation omitted). There is little doubt that the Legislature's goal was to bring Vermont law into complia......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT