Dept. of Transp. v. Robertson, 31770.

• Citation: 618 S.E.2d 506
• Decision Date: 10 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 31770.,31770.
• Parties: WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, a State Agency, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Joyce L. ROBERTSON, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

618 S.E.2d 506

WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, a State Agency, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Joyce L. ROBERTSON, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 31770.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted February 8, 2005.

Decided May 10, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kathryn Reed Bayless, Bayless Law Firm, PLLC, Princeton, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellant.

Joseph S. Beeson, Kent J. George, Matthew S. Casto, Robinson & McElwee, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Appellee, Joyce L. Robertson.

DAVIS, Justice:

This appeal was filed by the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, appellant/petitioner below (hereinafter referred to as "DOT"), from an order of the Circuit Court of Logan County granting partial summary judgment¹ to Joyce L. Robertson, appellee/defendant below (hereinafter referred to as "Ms. Robertson"). Additionally, the circuit court's order was adverse to Ethel Erickson, an intervener. However, Ms. Erickson has not appealed the adverse decision. Here, DOT contends that the circuit court committed error in denying its motion for partial summary judgment. After thoroughly reviewing the briefs, the record designated for appellate review, and pertinent authorities, we affirm in part and reverse in part the lower court's ruling and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 17, 2000, DOT filed an application in the circuit court seeking to condemn property² for highway construction purposes. The property was owned by Ms. Robertson.³ The property in question consisted of approximately 6.873 acres from a parcel referred to as Parcel 8-1.⁴ According to a plat that was attached to the deed of Parcel 8-1, that parcel consisted of approximately 11.08 acres.⁵

On May 10, 2000, Ms. Robertson filed an answer to the application. In her answer Ms. Robertson, among other defenses, denied that the money tendered to the court represented the fair market value of the property. After a period of negotiation, Ms. Robertson and DOT reached an agreement that $1,999,950.00 would be fair compensation for the property, excluding costs for coal minerals underlying the property. The parties tendered their agreement to the circuit court. The circuit court accepted the agreement and, on April 10, 2001, entered a partial final order in the case. The order stated that the "case shall remain open so that the matter of the coal mineral interests may be negotiated and/or litigated at a later date."

After entry of the partial final order, the parties engaged in a period of discovery pertaining to the valuation of the coal mineral interests. During this period, Ms. Robertson contended that Parcel 8-1 contained more than 11.08 acres. Ms. Robertson asserted that Parcel 8-1 was comprised of an additional 22.33 acres. Therefore, DOT was obligated to compensate her for the coal minerals underlying the additional acreage. On April 2, 2003, DOT filed a motion in limine to limit the testimony of Ms. Robertson's designated experts to the value of the affected coal minerals on only 11.08 acres.

On April 21, 2003, the court held a hearing on DOT's motion in limine.⁶ During that hearing, counsel for Ethel Erickson, a former owner of Parcel 8-1, moved the court for leave to intervene. Ms. Erickson sought intervention on the grounds that she was the actual owner of the disputed 22.33 acres. On May 9, 2003, the circuit court entered an order addressing the issues raised at the April 21st hearing. In that order, the court permitted Ms. Erickson to intervene. The order also stated that the parties had agreed to let the court, as opposed to a jury, determine the issue of the ownership of the disputed 22.33 acres. The order invited the parties to file motions for partial summary judgment addressing the issue of ownership of the disputed 22.33 acres. Finally, the order expressly stated that a decision on DOT's motion in limine would be held in abeyance until a later date.

On July 16, 2003, DOT filed a motion for partial summary judgment. DOT's motion did not address the issue of who owned the disputed 22.33 acres. Instead, DOT argued that Ms. Robertson should not be allowed to use the additional acreage to increase the 11.08 acres that were involved in the condemnation proceeding. Ms. Robertson filed a response to DOT's motion.⁷ In her response, Ms. Robertson argued that should the court conclude that she was the owner of the disputed 22.33 acres, then DOT should be held liable for compensating her for the coal minerals underlying that additional property.⁸

On July 18, 2003, Ms. Robertson filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Ms. Robertson's motion was confined to allegations that she was the rightful owner of the disputed 22.33 acres.⁹ Also on July 18th, Ms. Erickson filed a motion for partial summary judgment contending that she was the lawful owner of the disputed 22.33 acres.¹⁰

After a hearing on the partial summary judgment motions, the circuit court, by order entered October 17, 2003, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Ms. Robertson. In that order, the circuit court found that the metes and bounds descriptions in the deed for Parcel 8-1 were incorrect. The circuit court further concluded that the disputed 22.33 acres should have been included in the deed. The circuit court finally ordered that Ms. Erickson "must draft a reformed deed ... and deliver it to Joyce Robertson." As a result of those rulings, DOT filed an appeal to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We are asked to review the circuit court's entry of partial summary judgment.¹¹ With respect to our standard of review, we now hold that Appellate review of a partial summary judgment order is the same as that of a summary judgment order, which is de novo. See Smith v. First Community Bancshares, Inc., 212 W.Va. 809, 816, 575 S.E.2d 419, 426 (2002); Stonewall Jackson Mem'l Hosp. Co. v. American United Life Ins. Co., 206 W.Va. 458, 463, 525 S.E.2d 649, 654 (1999); Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 203 W.Va. 477, 482, 509 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1998). In conducting our de novo review, we are mindful that "[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).

With regard for these standards, we turn to the issues herein raised.

III. DISCUSSION

A. DOT's Standing to Appeal

The first issue we must confront is Ms. Robertson's assertion that DOT lacks standing to challenge the partial summary judgment order. Ms. Robertson has interpreted the partial summary judgment order as involving only the issue of ownership of the disputed 22.33 acres. Therefore, DOT is not involved. If the procedural posture of this case was as narrow as Ms. Robertson contends, we would agree that DOT lacked standing to appeal the partial summary judgment order.¹² However, the procedural posture below was much more broad than Ms. Robertson has asserted.¹³

This Court has observed that, "[g]enerally, standing is defined as `[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.'" Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 94, 576 S.E.2d 807, 821 (2002) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1413 (7th ed.1999)). We articulated the elements for establishing standing in Syllabus point 5 of Findley as follows:

Standing is comprised of three elements: First, the party attempting to establish standing must have suffered an "injury-in-fact" — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed through a favorable decision of the court.

213 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807. We believe the procedural facts of this case support DOT's standing to bring this appeal.

First, as a consequence of the partial summary judgment order, DOT has sustained an injury-in-fact. As previously noted, DOT filed a separate motion for partial summary judgment. Ms. Robertson filed a response to the motion. In that response, Ms. Robertson argued that should the court find that she was the owner of the 22.33 acres, then the court should hold DOT liable to her for the coal minerals underlying the additional acreage. The partial summary judgment order stated "[t]he Court has studied all the motions, the responses to the motions, the memoranda of law, affidavits, depositions, and exhibits submitted by the parties.... As a result of these deliberations... the Court has concluded that Defendant Robertson is entitled to Summary Judgment." The order expressly stated that the circuit court considered all of the motions, which would include DOT's motion for partial summary judgment and Ms. Robertson's response. Thus, absent specific language in the order excluding its application to DOT's partial summary judgment motion, we must presume that in granting Ms. Robertson partial summary judgment, the circuit court's ruling meant that not only did Ms. Robertson own the disputed 22.33 acres, but that she would also be allowed to claim compensation for coal minerals underlying the 22.33 acres.¹⁴ Consequently, the injury-in-fact to DOT is that the circuit court's order exposes it to compensate Ms. Robertson for coal minerals underlying an additional 22.33 acres, as opposed to only 11.08 acres.

Second, there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. The injury to DOT is the increased liability for additional coal minerals. This injury is directly connected to the conduct forming the basis of...