Depuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc.
Decision Date | 11 September 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 1:19-cv-01072-JMS-DLP,1:19-cv-01072-JMS-DLP |
Citation | 403 F.Supp.3d 690 |
Parties | DEPUY SYNTHES SALES, INC., Plaintiff, v. ORTHOLA, INC., Bruce A. Cavarno, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Anthony B. Haller, Pro Hac Vice, Rosemary McKenna, Pro Hac Vice, Samuel M. Ventresca, Pro Hac Vice, Leigh Ann Buziak, Pro Hac Vice, Blank Rome LLP, Philadelphia, PA, David J. Carr, Paul Conrad Sweeney, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.
Dirk O. Julander, Pro Hac Vice, M. Adam Tate, Pro Hac Vice, Julander, Brown & Bollard, Irvine, CA, Ryan Michael Hurley, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.
This matter involves the Federal Arbitration Act, ("FAA"), by which Congress has "mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements." Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). The existence of arbitration agreements in the contracts at issue in this case affect the Court's analysis at every turn, taking arguments concerning personal and subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the well-established jurisdictional principles at issue in cases where the FAA is not a factor, and altering the Court's analysis under the familiar factors derived from Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. U.S. , 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) in a host of ways.
In March 2019, nearly five months after a related case had been filed in California state court, Plaintiff DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. ("DePuy") filed two petitions in this Court to compel arbitration against Defendants OrthoLA, Inc. ("OrthoLA") and Bruce A. Cavarno (collectively, "Defendants") and to enjoin them from proceeding with their California state court action under the Anti-Injunction Act. [Filing No. 1; Filing No. 53.] On July 12, 2019, this Court consolidated the two related cases under this cause number after finding that the two cases involve common questions of law and fact. [Filing No. 52.] Prior to consolidation, Defendants had filed three sets of nearly identical Motions in the two cases, each of which is presently pending before the Court, including: two Motions to Dismiss pursuant to the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine, and Sections 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [Filing No. 29; Filing No. 54]; two Motions for Judicial Notice, [Filing No. 45; Filing No. 60]; and two Motions to Strike portions of a reply brief, [Filing No. 46; Filing No. 61]. All of the pending Motions are fully briefed and are ready for the Court's review.
The Court will first consider the Motions for Judicial Notice. Next, the Court will take up the Motions to Dismiss. Lastly, the Court will consider the Motions to Strike.
In their unopposed Motions for Judicial Notice, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of two categories of documents: (1) "the court docket reflecting the actions in Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 18STCV02833," [Filing No. 45 at 2; Filing No. 60 at 2], and (2) documents related to the two separate cases that were then pending before this Court, and have since been consolidated, [Filing No. 45 at 2-3 ( ); Filing No. 60 at 2-3 ( ) ].
As to the first category, Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 201(b) provides that a court may take judicial notice of a fact that is "not subject to reasonable dispute" because it: "(1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." It is well settled that orders entered by a state court "are public records and appropriate subjects of judicial notice." In the Matter of Lisse , 905 F.3d 495, 496 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson , 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998) ; Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(7) ). Therefore, Defendants' Motions, [Filing No. 45; Filing No. 60], are GRANTED as they relate to the court docket in Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 18STCV02833.
As to the second group of documents, Defendants seek judicial notice of documents that have – for the most part – already been transferred onto the docket for this cause number. To the extent such documents have already been transferred, Defendants' Motions are DENIED as MOOT . To the extent Defendants' request notice of documents in Filing No. 45 that have not been transferred to this docket, Defendants' Motions are GRANTED .
In support of their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants raise both jurisdictional and substantive arguments. But "[d]eciding any part of the merits [of a case] ... is possible only if there is jurisdiction." Smith v. Greystone All., LLC , 772 F.3d 448, 450 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the Court must consider Defendants' jurisdictional arguments before turning to any others. Defendants bring their jurisdictional arguments pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2).
Under both subsets of Rule 12, courts look beyond the complaint's allegations and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction exist. See Ciarpaglini v. Norwood , 817 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2016) ( ); Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi–Synthelabo, S.A. , 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing personal jurisdiction). As such, the Court will first set forth the relevant background of the case consistent with the standards set forth below for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). Next the Court will consider Defendants' jurisdictional arguments, first those relating to subject matter jurisdiction, then those related to personal jurisdiction.1 Lastly, the Court will consider Defendants' arguments concerning the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine.
DePuy manufactures, markets, and sells medical implants and instruments, including joint reconstruction products. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] DePuy's joint reconstruction product line is sold, marketed, and distributed through exclusive distributors who are assigned to specific sales territories in certain geographic areas. [Filing No. 1 at 2.]
In 2008, DePuy entered into a Sales Representative Agreement ("Sales Agreement") with Defendants OrthoLA and Bruce Cavaro, which provided that Defendants would be DePuy's exclusive sales distributors for certain joint reconstruction products in and around Los Angeles, California. [Filing No. 1 at 3.] The Sales Agreement was renewed several times after the original 2008 Sales Agreement. [Filing No. 1 at 4.]
Most recently, on November 30, 2015, DePuy, OrthoLA, and Mr. Cavarno signed a Sales Agreement appointing OrthoLA as DePuy's "exclusive sales representative" in a territory consisting of several counties in southern California for the "solicitation of orders for Products from hospitals, medical centers, trauma centers, outpatient facilities and orthopaedic (sic) surgeons." [Filing No. 30-2 at 1; Filing No. 30-2 at 22.]
The Sales Agreement contains a clause (the "Arbitration Clause") that provides as follows:
DePuy, OrthoLA and Mr. Cavarno also entered into a Continuing Incoming Agreement (the "Income Agreement") with an effective date of November 30, 2015, that provided the terms by which DePuy would pay OrthoLA income for ten years following the termination or expiration of the Sales Agreement. [Filing No. 30-3 at 1.] The Income Agreement provided that DePuy would have no obligation to pay any continuing income if it terminated the Sales Agreement pursuant to specific terms of the Sales Agreement. [Filing No. 30-3 at 3.] The Income Agreement contained an Arbitration Clause identical to the one contained in the Sales Agreement. [Filing No. 30-3 at 4-5.]
The parties attempted to renegotiate the Sales Agreement in late 2017 but were unsuccessful and the Sales Agreement lapsed on January 7, 2018.2 [Filing No. 1 at 5.] The next day, all of OrthoLA's sales representatives left OrthoLA and began working for DePuy's...
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